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ABSTRACT 
The Vichy regime and the resistance stand out as central aspects of French history. In 
contemporary politics both are still frequently cited when debating the legacies of Francois 
Mitterrand, the intricacies of recent crimes against humanity legislation, or in the anti-racist 
campaigns fought against Jean-Marie Le Pen's resurgent Front National. However, behind the 
journalistic headlines lies a complex pattern of ideological manipulation of the Second World 
War. The thesis is a study of the first wave of political reinterpretations of the occupation, 
produced throughout the years of the Fourth Republic. 
Taking well-known political memoirs, as well as neglected but equally significant 
historical accounts and biographies, it is shown that communists, Gaullists and extreme right- 
wingers produced highly sophisticated, mutually antagonistic, treatments of the annees noires. 
The dissertation sheds new light on the role of the activist historian and his work. It is revealed 
that while their writings served political aims, they were not mere propagandists. Tracing the 
shape of ideological history-writing across the currents, significant similarities and differences 
are highlighted. Notwithstanding the obvious animosity which the politically committed writers 
showed towards one another, a critical re-reading of their publications suggests that the 
historians often employed comparable rhetorical devices and discursive strategies to present 
their case. 
Adding to the research of scholars such as Henry Rousso, Francois Bedarida and Jean- 
Pierre Azema, the thesis contributes to the continuing `French historians' debate' on Vichy and 
its portrayal. Detailed examination of the publishing scene of the 1940s and 1950s, as well as 
nuanced analysis of selected historical writings, offers a refined view of how the French 
regarded their national record. 
11 
CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements v 
Introduction 1 
Questions of Scope and Methodology 11 
Writing the History of the French War Experience 11 
A Typology of the `Histories or History' 18 
A Synthetic Approach to Interpreting Ideological Historiography 33 
II Ideological History-Writing 1944-1958 37 
Three Currents of Ideological History Writing 37 
Historiographic Rivalry and Response 64 
Concluding Discussion 80 
III Portrayals of War 82 
Content 82 
War Mythology 92 
Concluding Discussion 102 
IV Manipulating the Debacle 105 
Communist and Gaullist Accusations of Conspiracy and Subversion 105 
Stigmatising the Republic 117 
Structural Overlap in Interpretations of 1940 134 
V Broadcasts, Appeals and Announcements 137 
`J'entrais dans 1'aventure' 137 
The Extreme Right-Wing on the 17 and 18 June Appeals 146 
Comparing the Thorez and Duclos Declarations with the 18 June 
Broadcast 154 
A Note on Cross-Current Influence 161 
111 
VI Perpetual Resistance 164 
Social Heroism 164 
The Historic Virtues of Gaullism 172 
Resistance `Vichyssoise' 183 
Concluding Discussion: The Certainties of Ideological Interpretation 191 
VII The Liberation 193 
`Insurrection Nationale' or `Liberation Trahie'? 193 
Recovering National Honour or a Return to the Third Republic 200 
The Purge: Suffering and Nobility 209 
Concluding Discussion 217 
VIII Degrees of Neutrality 220 
Reviewing Ideological Alignments 220 
Writing Non-Ideologically-Coloured Accounts of the Occupation 233 
Conclusion 236 
Appendix I The Appel de Maurice Thorez et Jacques Duclos, August1940 240 
Appendix II Charles de Gaulle's 18 June 1940 broadcast 246 
Bibliography of Works Cited 247 
IV 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
It is a pleasure to thank all those who have assisted me in the production of this thesis. In 
particular I thank Christopher Flood for the time and attention he has devoted to the study, as 
well as his professional supervision of it. The opportunity to engage in additional co-authored 
projects with him is only one example of Christopher Flood's enthusiasm and interest. I have 
also benefited from conversations and correspondence with a number of other colleagues, 
notably, Richard J. Golsan, Noel Parker and Kevin Passmore. In addition, the expertise of my 
examiners, Laurence Bell and Roderick Kedward, has strengthened my work. Without the 
financial support of the University of Surrey's Research Scholarship programme my task would 
have been considerably more difficult. Subsequent Faculty research grants and part-time 
employment within the University's School of Language and International Studies have proved 
stimulating and supportive. The computer studies expertise of Richard Nice has always been 
forthcoming and welcome. Numerous libraries have given invaluable assistance. I am indebted 
to the staff of the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris; the Bibliotheque de la Fondation Nationales 
des Sciences Politiques, Paris; the British Library, London; and Senate House Library of the 
University of London; and university librarians in Surrey, Reading and Warwick. As always, 
my parents have been encouraging throughout. 
V 
INTRODUCTION 
In retrospect, times of national crisis become part of deeply held, conflicting views of historical 
events. Wars, revolutions, and other periods of trauma inspire ideologically marked writing 
and re-writing of history. The fiftieth anniversary of the Second World War and the 
bicentenary of the Revolution are two recent examples of the complex relationship which 
France has with its past. This study provides an interpretative analysis of ideologically 
coloured historical accounts of the last world war produced during the Fourth Republic (1944- 
1958). 
The thesis examines political memoirs, biographies and historical texts which were 
written by communists, Gaullists and the grouping of authoritarian conservatives, royalists and 
neo-fascists who can be taken to constitute the extreme right wing. It provides a comparative 
analysis of representative writings from each of these ideological currents. It is neither a study 
of the lives and works of individual historians, nor does it focus on an editorial team or 
publishing house. Instead, it is my intention to present the detailed context and content of 
historical writings which interpreted the war to communicate sophisticated political messages 
about the present. Throughout the Fourth Republic this type of literature was widely circulated. 
It would have been unusual for a subject of the magnitude of the Second World War not to be 
a well used part of each political faction's armoury. The manipulation of the past was an 
everyday activity. Key political figures such as Maurice Thorez and Charles de Gaulle each 
produced their versions of the war for national readerships. In 1949, Thorez reissued his 
memoirs, Fils du peuple, which included coverage of the occupation, whilst de Gaulle waited 
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until 1954 to release his own account of the period in the first volume of his war memoirs. ' 
Although extreme right-wing historians could not compete directly with Thorez or de Gaulle 
in electoral politics, their numerous historiographic publications and range of focus were equal 
to those of their opponents. The purges had not destroyed the extreme right. The speed of their 
collective recovery was impressive, and especially so in the cultural-intellectual sphere. As 
early as in the spring of 1948, the weekly newspaper Carrefour underlined the presence of a 
growing number of pro-Vichy accounts. In an unsigned editorial, it protested against the return 
of those who had been associated with collaboration. The column warned: 
Nous assistons, depuis quelques semaines, ä une vaste entreprise de division 
nationale. Par le livre, par la parole, par d'obscures intrigues et d'etranges 
concours, des hommes, que leur attitude avant et pendant la guerre avait reduits 
au silence, pretendent refaire au sens inverse le proces que la liberation a 
instruit contre eux. 2 
The return of the extreme right, now almost unified in defeat, had begun. War historiography 
would be as vital a weapon for this group as for any other. 
The phrases political ideology and ideological current are used in the thesis to account 
for broad bodies of political ideas. Communist, Gaullist, liberal, conservative and extreme 
right-wing beliefs and organisations are considered equally ideological in nature. This 
definition is in line with the traditional humanities usage of the term. I interpret ideology 
through the truth-neutral, inclusive definition offered by the theorists Martin Seliger, Roger 
' Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, 3 Vols (Paris: Plon, 1954,1956,1959); Maurice Thorez, Fils du 
peuple (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1949). As will be discussed later a number of ghost-writers contributed to the 
production of the communist leader's memoirs. 
I Unsigned, "Pas ra et pas vous! ", Carrefour, 18 February 1948: 1. For a comparable editorial see also Hubert 
Beuve-Wry writing as Sirius, "Heil Hitler", Le Monde, 1 January 1949: 1. 
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Eatwell, Anthony Wright and others. 3 Eatwell views political ideology as a `relatively coherent 
set of empirical and normative beliefs and thought, focusing on the problems of human nature, 
the process of history, and socio-political arrangements'. ' The approach has several 
implications. It draws analysis away from a questioning of what is ideological, or what is not 
ideological, to a comparative discussion of a range of political beliefs and structures. 
Comparison implies a refined concern for the characteristics of ideology, including the content 
or function of each set of political beliefs. The non-pejorative perspective removes the popular 
view that ideologies are dangerous or pathological, expressed only by the dogmatic or the 
politically ambitious. 
Closely related to ideology, the theory of political myth also underpins the study. It is 
defined as the narrative communication of political values, judgements and outlooks. Political 
myths are stories told in the service of ideology. The concept and term have again been 
employed in a neutral way, as suggested by Henry Tudor and Christopher Flood. ' This 
perspective points to the advantages of the detailed examination of ideological writings. 
Importantly, the casting of myth as an ideologically marked narrative allows for the analysis 
of variations in colouring. The interpretations of history produced by writers such as Maurice 
Thorez are taken to be mythopoeic. However, products which are not so strongly informed by 
ideology can also serve as vehicles for persuasion. Whilst avoiding the use of theoretical 
language in the body of the thesis, these definitions have shaped its parameters. 
The dissertation has two theses. The first centres on a nuanced portrait of the three key 
3 Martin Seliger, Ideology and Politics (London: G. Allen and Unwin, 1976); Roger Eatwell and Anthony Wright 
(eds), Contemporary Political Ideologies (London: Pinter Publishers, 1993). 
4 Roger Eatwell, "Ideologies: Approaches and Trends", in Roger Eatwell and Anthony Wright (eds), 
Contemporary Political Ideologies, 9-10. 
5 Henry Tudor, Political Myth (London: Pall Mall, 1972); Christopher Flood, Political Myth: A Theoretical 
Introduction (New York: Garland, 1996). 
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ideological currents `in action' between 1944 and 1958. While many historians and political 
scientists have discussed the general profile of each of the three strands, very few scholars have 
offered either a comparative or text-based study of ideological confrontation under the Fourth 
Republic as conducted through the historical writings of the period. Building on the research 
of Courtois, Robrieux, Chariot, Touchard, Winock, Sirinelli and others, the examination of 
the historiens engages and their work adds to our understanding of communism, Gaullism and 
the extreme right wing, and of the relationship between them. ' Comparative discussion of the 
core representations which the activist historians developed to portray the war reveals major 
differences and similarities in the writings. By shedding new light on the structures of writing, 
rhetorical devices and discursive patterns which the committed historians employed it is 
suggested that across the different political strands historians shared several interpretative 
strategies. Ideological interpretations overlapped and the portrayals of one ideological current 
influenced the presentation of history advocated in another. The didactic features which 
legitimated the historian's voice as a commentator were also broadly common across the 
sources. Through the detailed analysis of texts one sees the complexity of how the writers 
manipulated history. In place of a traditional account of the thinking and political organisation 
of each ideological current, the thesis provides a new discussion of how the ideological actors 
operated through the production of historical interpretations. The result is a refined picture of 
politically committed historians. 
6 Stephane Courtois, "Luttes politiques et elaboration d'une histoire: le PCF historien Bans la deuxieme guerre 
mondiale", Communisme, 4 (1983): 5-25; Philippe Robrieux, Histoire interieure du Parti communiste, Vol. 2, 
De la liberation ä i'avenement de Georges Marchais (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1981); Jean Chariot, Le Gaullisme 
d'opposition 1946-1958. Histoire du gaullisme (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1983); Jean Touchard, Le Gaullisme 
1940-1969 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978); Michel Winock, Nationalisme, antisemitisme etfascisme en France 
(Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1990); Jean-Francois Sirinelli (ed. ), Histoire des droites en France, 3 Vols (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1992). 
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Secondly, the thesis throws an informative sidelight on several issues raised in the now 
well-known study of the historical memory of the Vichy period, Henry Rousso's Le Syndrome 
de Vichy. ' Using psychoanalytic analogies to explain the nation's post-war relationship with 
Vichy, Rousso has suggested that the memory of the war divided the Fourth Republic into 
periods of le deuil inacheve' (1944-54) and `les refoulements' (1954-1971). Rousso argued 
that in the former period the French repeatedly used the occupation as a weapon in political 
debate, while in the latter he suggests that a more consensual vision of the occupation formed 
around a glorification of the Gaullist resistance. In the light of evidence derived from the 
ideological publishing scene I support aspects of Rousso's argument. Certainly, the activist 
historians, who are central to this study, perpetuated the divisions of the Franco-French civil 
war long into the 1940s and early 1950s. On the other hand, research on the ideological 
currents of interpretation does not always correspond precisely to Rousso's explanations of the 
development of historical memory in France. I argue that complex works such as de Gaulle's 
Memoires de guerre do not wholly lend themselves to the model of collective memory 
developed by Rousso. Instead, it is more appropriate to view them as sophisticated cultural 
artefacts which reflect the period's ideological battles. 
The thesis is organised as follows. Firstly, discussion focuses on issues and factors 
which are external to the selected writings, but which have a significant bearing upon how I 
analyse their content. Chapter I, a discussion of method, provides an account of the major 
historiographic publications to have treated the occupation. To give recognition, and to 
critique, I delineate a typology of works which have been influential in my consideration of 
the ideologically marked histories of the Fourth Republic. The typology comprises four 
categorisations: traditional historiography, literary approaches, historical and political studies 
7 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy. De 1944 6 nos jours (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1990). 
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of the three ideological currents and the literature of the Vichy syndrome. Even if the 
borderlines between these groups are subject to blurring, they form a helpful matrix which 
highlights the advantages and disadvantages of the existing literature. The evaluation is 
concluded with a discussion of how a synthesis of the four approaches underpins the thesis. 
The subsequent chapter offers a detailed examination of the history of ideological 
production on the subject of the Second World War, as published between 1944 and 1958. 
Here I appraise the selected currents (communist, Gaullist and extreme right-wing). I 
demonstrate the range of factors which contributed to the continued interest in the Second 
World War throughout the Fourth Republic. By studying reaction to the publication of two 
histories, the extreme right-winger Pierre Taittinger's Et Paris ne fut pas detruit (1948) and 
the first volume of de Gaulle's war memoirs (1954), 1 argue that inter-ideological debate was 
a key factor in the continuation of writing on the war, long after the initial period of 
contemporary interest had elapsed. 8 
In Chapters III to VII, I analyse a range of ideological histories selected from the three 
currents of production. Chapter III begins with an illustration of the major mythopeic stories 
which each ideological current used to represent the war as a single event. I argue that the 
material which the historians covered was more extensive than has been indicated in much of 
the secondary scholarly literature. It is shown that the war myths which the historians evoked 
offered compelling exemplary narratives which instructed and guided readers to the 
conclusions which could be drawn in the present political climate. 
Moving from analysis of the function of war narratives to an examination of discursive 
structures, the subsequent chapter debates the issue of ideological overlap. I show that whilst 
the three ideological currents established different general portrayals of the occupation, the 
Pierre Taittinger, Et Paris ne fut pas detruit (Paris: L'Elan, 1948). 
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episode of the defeat of 1940 provided an example of sophisticated commonalities. Similarly, 
the examination of writing on the announcements of the 17,18 June and the 10 July 1940 
conducted in Chapter V introduces the phenomenon of cross-ideological influence. Here, we 
see that in writing on key historical documents communist and extreme right-wing historians 
were strongly influenced by the Gaullist historians' portrayal of the 18 June speech. 
Chapters VI and VII study the historians' representation of resistance and the liberation. 
In highlighting writing on these episodes, I show that although the ideological historians held 
radically different views, they employed comparable structures of argument. That all the 
historians used their version of the resistance as a historical role model for contemporary 
political behaviour illustrates this characteristic. The creation of a didactic voice in the texts 
is shown to have underlined the significance of resistance throughout the Fourth Republic. The 
selected writers also shared comparable perspectives on the liberation. Specifically, I suggest 
why none of the historians depicted 1944 as either an uncomplicatedly positive or negative 
moment in the nation's development. 
The final chapter is situated slightly off-centre from the rest of the thesis. It uses the 
knowledge of the three dominant currents of writing to address four important scholarly works 
of the period. The classic histories of Aron, Elgey, Michel, Mirkine-Guetzevich and Siegfried 
are analysed. 9 While these historians displayed affinities with the extreme right wing's and the 
Gaullists' interpretation, they cannot be simply aligned within these strands. Comparing the 
activist historians with their scholarly counterparts, I debate the fundamental difficulties 
associated with writing an ideology-free account. 
9 Robert Aron and Georgette Elgey, Histoire de Vichy 1940-1944 (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1954); Henri Michel, 
Histoire de la resistance (1940-1944) (Paris: PUF, 1950); Michel and Boris Mirkine Guetzevich, Les Idees 
politiques et sociales de la resistance (Paris: PUF, 1954); Andre Siegfried, De la IIF ä la IV Republique (Paris: 
Bernard Grasset, 1956). 
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The choice of texts for detailed analysis in the thesis was made on the basis of a series 
of factors. Henri Michel's Bibliographie critique de la resistance provides a graphic indication 
of the substantial volume of works being published on the Second World War in France in the 
period. The issue-by-issue bibliographies of the Revue d'histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre 
Mondiale confirm a similar picture of mass production. The Institut Charles de Gaulle's 
bibliography provides further evidence of the large number of accounts written by Gaullists 
on de Gaulle, although there were also works on other aspects of the war. 10 1 have selected a 
representative corpus of nine texts for detailed analysis (other publications are discussed in the 
thesis when they are relevant or have a particular bearing on the currents of writing). My 
intention is that the sample should be sufficiently wide to allow meaningful conclusions, but 
not so broad that the writings cannot be considered in detail. 
Text selection reflects the variety of genres which were used to portray the occupation. 
These included straightforward histories, biographies and political memoirs. For each current, 
one example of each type has been selected for detailed analysis. Nonetheless, the thesis does 
not offer a literary theory based discussion of genre related matters. Instead questions of genre 
are treated when they contribute to historical analysis. 
The years 1944 to 1958 are important because they directly followed the occupation and 
thus form the first wave of its historiographic interpretation. At this time, communists, 
Gaullists and extreme right-wingers were almost exclusively portrayed to the public, and each 
other, in the light of the occupation. This was not always the case after 1958. Of course, the 
point is especially true for Charles de Gaulle, with his return to office and the foundation of 
the Fifth Republic signalling a new kind of representation of Gaullism from either the 
10 Henri Michel, Bibliographie critique de la resistance (Paris: Institut Pedagogique National, 1964); Institut de 
Charles de Gaulle, Bibliographie internationale sur Charles de Gaulle 1940-1980 (Paris: Plon, 1981). 
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liberation, the RPF period or his internal exile. On this basis, the first two volumes of his war 
memoirs, published in 1954 and 1956, are examined. 
A further criterion of text-selection lies in my focus on the three ideological currents 
which were the major producers of works on the Second World War: communist; Gaullist and 
extreme right-wing. Naturally, other ideological formations wrote their versions of the war. 
Nevertheless, each of the ideological groups selected had the propensity to produce more 
historiographic material concerning the Second World War than adherents of other political 
ideologies, such as the socialists or the radicals. Communists, Gaullists and extreme right- 
wingers had been the major participants in the politics of the occupation. To this extent, they 
had more to say about the war, and equally had more to gain (or lose) from how they 
represented it. The war was an aspect of history which went to the core of Gaullism's self- 
identification, and the same was true of both the PCF and the extreme right wing. For this 
reason the history of the war was a significant element in each grouping's heritage and culture. 
The following nine titles, three for each current, have been chosen for the detailed reading 
which is presented in the thesis. They are: 
THE COMMUNIST CURRENT: 
Jean Dautry and Louis Pastor, Histoire de la resistance (Paris: Editions de 1'Union 
Francaise Universitaires, 1950) with a selection of articles from the journal Cahiers du 
communisme (1945 to 1958). 
Jean Freville, Avec Maurice Thorez (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1950). 
Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1949). 
9 
THE GAULLIST CURRENT: 
Georges Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Editions Universitaires, 1956). 
Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 1, L'Appel, Vol. 2, L'Unite (Paris: Plon, 
1954,1956). 
Louis-Henri Parias (ed. ), Trente ans d'histoire: de Clemenceau ä de Gaulle (Paris: 
Nouvelle Librairie de France - Editions Saint Andrea, 1949). 
THE EXTREME RIGHT-WING CURRENT: 
Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante jours qui ebranlerent 1'Occident, 3 Vols (Paris: 
Albin Michel, 1956, reference hereafter to the collected edition 1957). 
Pierre Hering, La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain (Paris: Paris-Livres, 1956). 
Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres (Geneva and Paris: Editions du Cheval aile, 
1948). 
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CHAPTER I 
QUESTIONS OF SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter I will present an overview of the trends in French historiography of the Second 
World War. A typology of the major works which have been influential in my consideration 
of ideologically marked history-writing is offered. I analyse four typical approaches: traditional 
histories; literary studies; historical and political studies of the ideologies; and the Vichy 
Syndrome approach. In the final section of the chapter I show how a synthetic reading of this 
literature informs the thesis. 
Writing the History of the French War Experience 
Even in the early months of the liberation the creation of a history of the war was considered 
important to the nation. Repeatedly, in issues of Le Monde (1945-1946) one finds articles and 
faits divers which indicate the desire of both official resistance and governmental bodies to 
establish a record of the war years. For example, on the 24 January 1946, a journalist reported 
the creation of `une bibliographie de la litterature clandestine'. The reporter suggested to 
readers that they contribute their own documentation of the resistance to a planned repository. ' 
On the very same page of this issue of the newspaper, a correspondent representing the 
Syndicat d'initiative de Vichy requested that journalists and future historians refrain from 
labelling Petain's regime after the Allier spa. He considered that this practice was a dangerous 
trend which jeopardised the tourist economy of his town. ' These episodes are symptomatic of 
1 Unsigned, "Une bibliographie de la litterature clandestine", Le Monde, 24 January 1946: 5. This initiative was 
supported by the Bibliotheque nationale. For similar civic projects see, Unsigned, "L'Histoire de la guerre", Le 
Monde, 10 May 1946: 5; J. L, "Pour l'Histoire de la liberation de la France", Le Monde, 10 January 1945: 2; 
Maurice Cherie, "L'Exposition des crimes hitleriens", Le Monde, 10/11 June 1945: 2. 
2 Doctor J. Aimard, "Le Regime de Vichy", Le Monde, 24 January 1946: 5. 
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the wider national picture. They illustrate the desire for an immediate historical survey, whilst 
they also reveal the sensitive nature of the task. Darker reminders of the human cost of war 
and occupation were the regular `Recherches' columns which were printed in the national 
press. Regularly, private advertisers called for information concerning the whereabouts of 
missing or displaced persons. For example, one such plea in Le Monde on 2 June 1945, 
requested: `Priere ä toute personne pouvant donner nouvelles de Madame Andre Biltz, nee 
Yvonne Neuberger, veuve du lieutenant-colonel Andre Biltz, mort pour la France, deportee 
de Drancy, le 20 janvier 1944, direction presumee Auschwitz, d'ecrire ä M. Alfred Lambert, 
banque Lambert-Biltz, 119, boulevard Haussmann, Paris' . 
Publishers quickly responded to public demand for more general historical information. 
They offered all manner of works on the wider topic of the war, with French editions of books 
by Italian, American, and British personalities, for example Count Ciano's, Dwight 
Eisenhower's, and Winston Churchill's memoirs, complementing the initial surge in domestic 
production. ' In addition to this type of international publishing event, two patterns emerge in 
the first wave of historiography. A significant number of ideologically coloured accounts were 
in circulation from the late 1940s. These came from both the French left and right. Works 
devoted to Vichy were often highly sympathetic towards their subject. These included accounts 
by Jean Tracou, Louis-Dominique Girard and Pierre Taittinger, and one of the selected writers 
3 , Recherches", Le Monde, 2 June 1945: 2; for furthers examples see, "Recherchen", Le Monde, 20 November 
1945: 5; "Recherches", Le Monde, 20 December 1945: 4. 
4 Le Monde devoted a series of detailed reviews to Count Ciano's journal, as well as to Eisenhower's and 
Churchill's war memoirs. See, Maurice Vaussard, "Les Etapes de la seconde guerre modiale", Le Monde, 21 
May 1948: 3; Andre Latreille, "Croisade pour la liberte", Le Monde, April 28 1949: 3; Andre Latreille, 
"L'Annee tragique: 1940", Le Monde, 30 June 1949: 3. 
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which this thesis considers at length, Professor Louis Rougier. 5 In the case of the resistance, 
a mirror image of the extreme right-wing accounts of Vichy developed. The Gaullists, such 
as Remy, de Benouville, Soustelle and de Gaulle himself, contributed their memoirs of the 
Free French group, whilst communists also quickly developed their own literature, for example 
in the relatively sophisticated journal, the Cahiers du communisme. Detailed discussion of 
these currents of interpretation is given in Chapter II. 
Less dramatically, a comparatively limited number of academics considered the history 
of the war. In general, historical scholarship did not view contemporary history as a fully 
legitimate field of research. Nevertheless, Marc Bloch's account of the debacle, L'Etrange 
defaite, was published posthumously. ' Building institutional footholds, the work of the Comite 
d'histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale (CHDGM), supported and legitimated by the state, 
followed rather more slowly. As Henry Rousso has noted, in 1944 a Commission d'Histoire 
de 1'Occupation et de la Liberation de la France was established under the wing of the 
Provisional Government and six years later this body merged with a second state-sponsored 
group of historians, the Comite d'Histoire de la Guerre, establishing the aforementioned 
CHDGM. ' By 1954 the major series of publications, Esprit de la Resistance had been launched 
by Henri Michel and Boris Mirkine-Guetzevich. 8 The project's first publications were Michel 
and Mirkine-Guetzevich's own Les Idees politiques et sociales de la resistance and Andre 
Truchet's L'Armistice de juin 1940. Of-long term academic importance, particularly in 
5 Louis-Dominique Girard, Montoire, Verdun diplomatique (Paris: Andre Bonne, 1948); Jean Tracou, Le 
Marechal aux liens (Paris: Andre Bonne, 1948); Pierre Taittinger, Et Paris nefut pas detruit; Louis Rougier, 
Mission secrete ä Londres (Paris: Editions du Cheval aile, 1948). 
6 Marc Bloch, L'Etrange defaite (Paris: Editions Franc-Tireur, 1944). 
7 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 277. 
8 Henri Michel, Histoire de la resistance (1940-1944); Michel and Boris Mirkine-Guetzevitch, Les Idees 
politiques et sociales de la resistance. 
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promoting the field as an appropriate area of discussion, was the group's journal, the Revue 
d'histoire de la Deuxieme Guerre Mondiale. 
Another kind of historical institution, the publishing house Artheme Fayard, had found 
two more moderate historians, Robert Aron and Georgette Elgey, to co-author an account of 
the Vichy regime. Their work was a major synthesis of the many accounts, memoirs and 
histories which had already been in circulation. For the time of publication, Histoire de Vichy 
represented a considerably more nuanced work than many of its contemporaries. When it is 
compared with those texts which were published by the historians who were more closely 
associated with the extreme right-wing current, the book can be seen to have been highly 
informative. In terms of its historiographic value, notwithstanding later revisions, it provided 
an articulate and detailed picture of the internal machinations of Vichy governance, as well as 
the ideological variety within successive cabinets and their coteries. This was oriented by 
emphasising the differences which existed between the policies of Petain and Laval. Indeed, 
the political scientist, Andre Siegfried's review of contemporary history, De la IIF ä la IV 
Republique (1956) adopted a comparable argument to that already developed in Aron's work. 
Finally, when detailing academic research, it is important to credit a fourth organisation 
which was beginning to dissect the history of the war, the Centre de Documentation Juive 
Contemporaine. A clandestine group, formed in 1943, its members sought to perpetuate the 
history of the nazi genocide, collecting and archiving source material pertaining to this subject. 
As has been correctly noted by Rousso, its historical production has been consistently 
impressive, albeit somewhat ignored by the Parisian intellectual, university and press 
community. Rousso summarises: 
14 
En 1955, un de ses animateurs, Joseph Billig, publiait le premier volume d'une 
etude tres complete sur le Commissariat general aux Questions juives (Editions 
du Centre, 1955-1960): vingt-trois ans avant 1'effet Darquier, 1'ampleur de la 
participation francaise ä la solution finale etait mise au jour, sans provoquer 
d'emoi, le livre etant reste plus ou moires confidentiel. Les animateurs du 
CDJC, dont Georges Wellers, Serge Klarsfeld, etc., vont inlassablement 
poursuivre la publication d'etudes sur les chambres ä gaz, les criminels nazis, 
les camps, meme s'il faut attendre les annees 1970 pour recueillir un large 
echo 
.9 
By the 1960s the two poles of ideological manipulation and academic production appear 
to have been set. For example, Marc Ferro has illustrated the continuity of extreme right-wing 
publishing on Marshal Petain. 1° Similarly, in 1964, the PCF produced its Manuel d'histoire, 
through which its members could reinterpret their contemporary struggles in relation to those 
of the past. li Scholarly publishing also continued, most notably under the guiding influence of 
Henri Michel. By 1967, he had published four standard works on the war experience, 
including studies of the resistance, the Free French, the debacle and, in 1964, a rich 
bibliography of the state of the field. " Indeed his contributions expanded, with further reviews 
of the dröle de guerre, Petain and, more generally, the course of the Second World War. 
As is now commonly asserted, the work of two non-French nationals, the German 
Eberhard Jäckel, and the American, Robert Paxton, relaunched French and international 
9 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 278. 
10 Marc Ferro, Petain (Paris: Artheme FayardlPluriel, 1987), 706. 
11 Jacques Duclos et al. (eds), Histoire du Parti communiste francais: manuel (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1964). 
12 For example, Michel, Les Courants de pensee de la resistance (Paris: PUF, 1962); Vichy, annee 40 (Paris: 
Robert Laffont, 1966); Bibliographie critique de la resistance. 
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interest in the occupation. 13 Both scholars re-framed and revised Aron's work. Notably, La 
France dans l'Europe de Hitler and Vichy France, Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 
returned to the question of the precise relationship which had existed between the Vichy regime 
and the nazi state. 14 Although the works are in many respects different, both emphasised the 
role of Petain as a more enthusiastic collaborator than had been originally suggested. Equally, 
Paxton did not focus on the arcane internal politics of the Marshal's circle but instead 
addressed issues such as Vichy's foreign policy role, or its economic and rural life, as well as 
the continuities which he suggested had influenced the post-war period. A number of these 
trends were subsequently taken up in Jean-Pierre Azema's De Munich ä la liberation, a 
contributing volume to the scholarly `Histoire de France' series, published by the prestige 
house, Editions du Seuil. 15 However, support for Aron's more sympathetic thesis was recycled 
in the numerous works of the popular historian Henri Amouroux. 16 
Meanwhile, the resistance field appears to have progressed as has been detailed in a 
recent article on this specific topic of historiography. Participants in the writing of the history 
of France at war, Jean-Pierre Azema and Francois Bedarida, accurately narrate the major 
scholarly developments: 
Dans le meme temps [... ] paraissent ä la fois une chronique mensuelle de la 
13 The point has been made by, amongst others, Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 287-292; Pascal Ory, 
"Comme de 1'an quarante. Dix annees de `retro satanas"', Le Debat, 16 (1981): 110; Marc Ferro, Petain, 707- 
712. 
'4 Eberhard Jäckel, La France daps l'Europe de Hitler (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1968); Robert 0. Paxton, Vichy 
France: Old Guard, New Order 1940-1944 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972). 
15 Jean-Pierre Azema, De Munich ä la liberation 1938-1944 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979). 
16 Henri Amouroux's enormous rate of production has included, La Vie des Francais sous l'occupation (Paris: 
Artheme Fayard, 1961); and more recently the completion of, La Grande Histoire des Francois sous 
l'occupation, Vol. 10, La Page nest pas encore tournee (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1993). 
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Resistance par Henri Nogueres, appuyee presque uniquement sur les 
temoignages des acteurs (les cinq volumes s'etendent de 1967 ä 1981) et des 
travaux d'historiens, qui au contraire recoupent systematiquement les 
temoignages oraux par des papiers, publics ou prives. Ainsi en va-t-il, parmi 
les Francais, de deux solides etudes de mouvements, le Franc-Tireur de 
Dominique Veillon (1977) et Temoignage chretien de Renee Bedarida (1977), 
et parmi les historiens etrangers, des ouvrages stimulants de John Sweets aux 
Etats-Unis sur les Mouvements unis de Resistance (The Politics of Resistance 
in France: a History of the MUR, 1976) et de Roderick Kedward en Angleterre 
sur la resistance en zone sud (Resistance in Vichy France, 1978, qui a attendu 
1989 pour etre traduit en francais). 17 
By the early 1980s, the Second World War was not only a classic site of ideological 
interpretation but also one of academic excellence. Publications too numerous to mention in 
this contextualising review continue to provide both scholarly and ideologically marked 
interpretations of the war and, on occasions, both. As has been the case since Adrien 
Dansette's early contribution, the sub-topics of the purge and the liberation have also attracted 
their own literature. 18 On the whole, examples of war history have either nudged scholarship 
forwards, or provoked further ideological readings. Of course, at times, these two sub-fields 
of production have mercilessly used and manipulated each other. Typically this was the case 
in the wake of the Klaus Barbie and Paul Touvier trials. Attempts by the state to foster 
increased historical awareness through `pedagogical justice' also served to produce a plethora 
17 Jean-Pierre Azema and Francois Bedarida, "Historisation de la resistance", Esprit, 198.1 (1994): 32-33. 
18 For example, Adrien Dansette, Histoire de la liberation de Paris (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1946); Robert Aron, 
Histoire de l'epuration, 3 Vols (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1967,1969,1974); Peter Novick, The Resistance versus 
Vichy France (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968); H. R. Kedward and Nancy Wood (eds), The 
Liberation of France: Image and Event (Oxford: Berg, 1995). One of the most detailed bibliographies of early 
work on the liberation is to be found in the `book of the film', Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Is Paris 
Burning? (London: Penguin, 1966), 385-392. 
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of counter-publications from the extreme right wing. 19 Conversely, in 1994, the media scandals 
which centred on President Francois Mitterrand's personal history, his service to the Vichy 
regime, and his friendship with Rene Bousquet, culminated in professional historians and 
reputable journalists repeating a number of pseudo-revelations which had been previously aired 
in extreme right-wing journals and magazines. 20 From time to time, exchanges have also 
developed over the question of Holocaust denial literature, as well as the accusation that the 
resistance hero Jean Moulin was a communist spy. 21 This is the wider context in which the 
thesis has been written. 
A Typology of the `Histories of History' 
Traditional Historiographical Approaches 
Since at least the 1960s historiographers have monitored the growth of works on the Second 
World War in France. Generally, this approach has been to provide a summary or survey of 
the central participants in the field, and to classify their work in relation to past and anticipated 
trends in interpretation. In this light scholars have contributed accounts of the historiography 
of the resistance and Vichy. The work of Henri Michel, Jean-Pierre Azema, Francois 
Bedarida, Pierre Aycoberry, Olivier Wieviorka, Bernard Laguerre, Olivier Dumoulin, David 
Caute, Stephane Courtois, R. J. B. Bosworth, Hilary Footitt, John Simmonds and to some extent 
19 For example, Andre Chelain, Le Proces Barbie, ou le `Shoah business' ä Lyon (Paris: Polemiques, 1987); 
Robert Faurisson, "Un grand faux temoin: Elie Wiesel", Annales d'histoire revisionniste, reproducd as appendix 
to Chelain, 78-86. 
20 The accusation that the young Mitterrand had enthusiastically supported Petain had been a widely circulated 
claim in the extreme right-wing press. A point which is highlighted in Richard J. Golsan, "Reflections on 
Mitterrand's Annees Noires", Contemporary French Civilization, 19.2 (1995): 297-298. 
21 For well documented summaries of these affairs see Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Les Assassins de la memoire. `Un 
Eichmann de papier' et autres essais sur le revisionnisme (Paris: La Decouverte, 1991); Pierre Vidal-Naquet, 
Le Trait empoisonne: reflexions sur l'affaire Jean Moulin (Paris: La Decouverte, 1993). For a review of the 
latter book, see Sabine Jansen, "L'Affaire Jean Moulin", Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine, 41 (1994): 
710-715. 
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Robert Gildea, can be classified in this group. Each of these historians provide general 
literature surveys of historiography in the area of the Second World War, or of writings from 
within the three ideological currents, or parts thereof. In general, their approach has been one 
of producing thorough summaries of the key publications, accompanied by interpretative 
comment. In The Past in French History Gildea discusses examples of historical writings and 
employs carefully chosen textual references as supporting evidence to his analysis of political 
culture . 
22 
An examination of the first work which is broadly representative of this approach 
suggests a number of its strengths and weaknesses. This early practitioner of a traditional 
approach to war historiography was Henri Michel, as demonstrated in his Bibliographie 
critique de la resistance. " His critical bibliography established a major review of the state of 
French and international publishing on the war. In so doing, Michel discovered the mass of 
Fourth Republic publications which were of apparently little academic value but which sought 
to explain the war in a highly ideologically marked style. He recognised the existence of a 
significant number of biassed accounts and sought to categorise them. In an original manner 
for 1964, he claimed that a Franco-French civil war had taken up the interpretation of the 
resistance as a central vehicle for its quarrels. The topic was therefore part of a `climat 
passionne' in which much of the history writing continued to possess `une actualite vivante'. 24 
This was a political phenomenon. According to Michel, the general survey of works in the 
field had demonstrated that the wartime past had been almost constantly mobilised by 
ideological commentators. 
22 Robert Gildea, The Past in French History (London: Yale University Press, 1994). 
23 Henri Michel, Bibliographie critique. 
24 Ibid., 27 and 202. 
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The Bibliographie was informative, highly detailed and apposite. Michel's knowledge 
had led to a number of general conclusions which foreshadowed later interest in the guerre 
Franco franýaise, and as we will see, to an extent Rousso's Vichy syndrome argument on the 
Fourth Republic period. The majority of the studies within the traditional historiographic 
approach demonstrate similar qualities. These practitioners are efficient, often revealing, and 
always stimulating. For example, several of the essays of Azema and Bedarida neatly delineate 
the general developments in resistance and Vichy historiography . 
25 Works which focus on a 
single ideological current also provide helpful background information, as well as a more 
thorough political consideration. In the sub-topic of French Communist Party historiography, 
this is the case in the work of David Caute and Stephane Courtois. 26 Like Michel, their studies 
typify much that is good about this approach towards understanding war historiography. These 
historians are precise and use interesting and valid source material to illustrate communist 
historical publishing. In terms of right-wing historiography, the field is somewhat less 
developed with Robert Gildea and Olivier Dumoulin recently offering review summaries. " 
Prior to this Stephen Wilson's work on the inter-war historians of the Action Francaise remains 
an exemplary source. 28 Although his study focuses on an earlier period it is relevant as a model 
of the traditional approach as applied to the careers of Bainville, Gaxotte, Funck-Brentano and 
25 Francois Bedarida, "L'Histoire de la resistance: lectures d'hier, chantiers de demain", Vingtieme siecle, 77 
(1986): 75-89; Jean-Pierre Azema and Francois Bedarida, "Vichy et ses historiens", Esprit, 181.5 (1992): 43-51; 
Jean-Pierre Azema, "Vichy et la memoire savante: quarante cinq ans d'historiographie", in Azema and Bedarida 
(eds), Le Regime de Vichy et les Francais (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1992), 23-43; Jean-Pierre Azema and 
Francois Bedarida, "L'Historisation de la resistance", Esprit, 198.1 (1994): 19-35. 
26 David Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals 1914-1960 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1964), 276-299; 
Stephane Courtois, "Luttes politiques et elaboration d'une histoire: le PCF historien dans la deuxieme guerre 
mondiale", Communisme, 4 (1983): 5-25. 
27 Robert Gildea, The Past in French History, 298-339; Olivier Dumoulin, "Histoire et historiens de droite", 
in Jean-Francois Sirinelli (ed. ), Histoire des droites en France, Vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard/NRF, 1992). 356-398. 
28 Stephen Wilson, "A View of the Past: Action Francaise Historiography and its Socio-Political Function", The 
Historical Journal, 19.1 (1976): 135-161. 
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others. Surprisingly, on a less positive note, the traditional historiographers have not 
substantially addressed the complex role of Gaullist historiography, its concerns and interests. 
Nevertheless, Francois Bedarida has discussed the role of History in the political thought and 
action of de Gaulle. 29 Equally, Footitt and Simmonds' essay examined examples of Gaullist 
historiographic treatments of the debacle. 3o 
The advantages of the traditional historiographic approach can also be limiting, 
however. More often than not, its advocates are satisfied with the identification of ideologically 
marked accounts, or specific interpretative controversies. Representative samples of historical 
texts are rarely discussed in detail. Frequently history writing is not illustrated as being the 
result of a complex political and cultural process. Whilst books, their authors and publishers 
are listed and outlined it is less usual that they are examined as illustrations of a particular style 
of writing or structure of argument. Considerations of narrative technique, characterisation and 
rhetorical strategy are overlooked. For example, this tends to be the case in the work of 
Azema, Bedarida, Wieviorka, Bosworth and to a lesser extent Laguerre. 31 
In the more sophisticated examples of the type most of these problems can be 
overlooked. For example, both Michel's and Gildea's work are important sources. Notably, 
Gildea's impressive review of history writing since the Revolution, and of its impact on the 
nation's political culture is a major contribution. In its detail and encyclopaedic depth, the 
29 Francois Bedarida, "L'Histoire Bans la pensee et dans faction du general de Gaulle", in Institut Charles de 
Gaulle (ed. ), De Gaulle et son siecle, Vol. 1 (Paris: La Documentation francaise/Plon, 1991), 141-149. 
30 Hilary Footitt and John Simmonds, "Destroying the Myths of the Debacle", in A. C. Pugh (ed. ), France 1940 
(Durham: Durham Modern Languages Series, 1991), 19-33. 
31 Michel, Bibliographie critique; Azema and Bedarida, "Vichy et ses historiens"; Azema and Bedarida, 
"L'Historisation de la resistance"; Olivier Wieviorka, "La Memoire des resistants face ä Vichy", in Azema and 
Bedarida (eds), Le Regime de Vichy et les Francais (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1992), 68-76; Bernard Laguerre, 
"Les Biographies de Petain", in Azema and Bedarida (eds), Le Regime de Vichy et les Francais, 45-57; RJB 
Bosworth, Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima: History Writing and the Second World War (London: 
Routledge, 1992). 
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work is a vital reference point, being particularly helpful in terms of its longer time frame 
which illustrates continuities in ideological interpretation across time and subject matter. The 
detailed historical background of the ideological currents, presented in Chapter II below, owes 
much to the principles of enquiry and investigation manifest in Gildea's broader brush 
examination of comparable issues. 
The Literary Approach 
The second methodological approach taken by those interested in ideological history succeeds 
where the traditional historiography has sometimes proved problematic. Predominantly literary 
specialists and some political scientists, for example Georges Lavau, Marie-Francoise 
Chanfrault-Duchet, Francois Quesnoy, Bernard Alluin, Joseph Boly, Jean Marie-Paris, Robert 
Pickering and Alan Pedley, have examined the `factual' writings of the PCF, Maurice Thorez 
and Charles de Gaulle as literary texts. This second approach towards ideologically marked 
historiography can be broadly labelled as developing within the paradigm of literary studies. 
In so doing, a range of different techniques have been applied to the study of two of the central 
ideological historians in whom I am interested: Maurice Thorez and Charles de Gaulle. They 
include formal structural and semiotic criticism, as executed by Lavau and Chanfrault-Duchet, 
as well as the more traditional style of literary appreciation adopted by Quesnoy, Alluin, 
Pickering and Pedley. 32 The literary approach to the subject redresses a number of the general 
32 Georges Lavau, "L'Historiographie communiste: une pratique politique", in Pierre Birnbaum and Jean-Marie 
Vincent (eds), Critique des pratiques politiques (Paris: Editions Galilee, 1978), 121-163; Marie-Francoise 
Chanfrault-Duchet, "Pere, Parti et parti-pris narratif: Maurice et Paul Thorez", Cahiers de semiotique textuelle, 
12 (1988): 103-124; Francois Quesnoy, "De Gaulle portraitiste", Nord, 14 (1989): 11-35; Bernard Alluin, 
"Elements d'un autoportrait: Naissance d'un heros epique daps le premier tome des Memoires de guerre", Nord, 
14 (1989): 35-41; Robert Pickering, "The Writing of Action in de Gaulle's War Memoirs", in Hugh Gough and 
John Home (eds), De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), 51-69; Alan 
Pedley, As Mighty as the Sword: A Study of the Writings of Charles de Gaulle (Exeter: Elm Bank Publications, 
1996). 
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criticisms which can be levelled at the more traditional historiographers. They have all focused 
on historiography as writing, they consider their texts often in the utmost detail, and 
furthermore they are, although not exclusively, interested in issues of style, structure and 
techniques of characterisation. 
Many of those working within this sub-field are uniquely interested in single authors 
or individual texts. The disproportionate number of monographs devoted to de Gaulle as a 
literary personality is noteworthy. This specialisation has proved narrow in scope, with Lavau 
and Chanfrault-Duchet proving to be the exceptions who have discussed PCF writings. At best, 
the work of one literary figure is often discussed in the light of another, de Gaulle being 
famously compared with Chateaubriand and Charles Peguy, amongst others. 33 Whilst this kind 
of literary allusion is of interest, when considering the constellations of ideological 
historiography of the Fourth Republic one needs to employ a wider survey of writings. On the 
whole, this group of scholars fail to contextualise de Gaulle in relation to other Gaullist 
historians, and to a lesser extent Thorez in relation to the comparable activities of the PCF. 
In addition, specifically in regard to the studies of de Gaulle, `the writer', there has 
been a warping tendency. More often than not, his historical or military writings, are 
considered as belle litterature. The consequence of this tends to be a disregard for the political 
on the part of the critic. Ignoring the implications of the wider political context is a tendency 
which marks elements of Alan Pedley's otherwise informative study, As Mighty as the Sword. 
For instance, the following passage describes two post-war commentaries which were made 
on de Gaulle's Vers l'armee de metier. Using the work of Jacques Laurent and Alfred Fabre- 
Luce, Pedley discussed their criticism. He writes, 
33 Joseph Boly, "De Gaulle et Peguy ecrivains", Etudes gaulliennes, 41 (1983): 9-18; Jean-Marie Paris, "De 
Gaulle ä la rencontre de Peguy", Nord, 14 (1989): 65-77 
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A less conventional view of the work is offered by Jacques Laurent, who 
considers that the dominant theme of the book is the need for a professional 
army. [... ] For Laurent, `Vers 1'armee de metier ne contient que quatre pages 
consacrees ä definir techniquement la nature et 1'emploi de l'armee blindee. En 
outre, leur originalite est nulle'. Indubitably, the importance of tank warfare 
had already been demonstrated by the writings of Generals Estienne, Fuller, 
Von Seeckt and Guderian, along with Liddell Hart, and de Gaulle acknowledges 
them in his Memoires de guerre. The notion that de Gaulle had `discovered' the 
enormous potential of tanks is of course merely a popular and naive 
misconception. [... ] 
Finally, the issue of air power has also proved controversial. Did de 
Gaulle underestimate the role of fighter aircraft in his recommended strategy? 
Hitler certainly did not when he planned his attack on France in 1940. An 
embarrassing interpolation in the 1944 edition of the book was detected by 
Alfred Fabre-Luce in 1960. The sentence (which magnified the importance of 
air power) did not reappear in subsequent editions but did re-open the 
controversy. This blatant piece of Gaullist hagiology should not however 
obscure the fact that a close reading of Vers 1'armee de metier reveals three 
forceful references to the importance of air power in the `Comment' section of 
the book, 34 
Although Pedley appears to defend de Gaulle against Laurent's and Fabre-Luce's criticism he 
omits to mention the ideological nature of the wider dispute. What we are not told is that 
Fabre-Luce's Le Plus Illustre des Francois and Laurent's Mauriac sous de Gaulle, which he 
cites, are both examples of a long current of extreme right-wing attacks on de Gaulle. This 
interpretative evidence is necessary if we are to assess either Laurent, Fabre-Luce or indeed 
the inter-ideological impact of Vers 1'armee de metier. Not only does it reveal the potential 
motivation of de Gaulle's detractors but it also indicates the cultural milieu in which all of his 
works were published. Of course, Jacques Laurent was not sympathetic to de Gaulle, but on 
the other hand, his interpretation was highly conventional when compared with other extreme 
right-wing writings. Writers such as Laurent and Fabre-Luce have spent much of their careers 
34 Alan Pedley, As Mighty as the Sword, 21. 
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criticising de Gaulle. 35 Indeed, the source from which Pedley quotes, Mauriac sous de Gaulle, 
ultimately led to Laurent's prosecution and to the censoring of the book. Instead of noting these 
important considerations, Pedley perceives the work of the two anti-Gaullists as almost neutral 
sources which are to be evaluated. The specific example is helpful in that it shows the 
sometimes confined focus of the literary mode, and more importantly its relatively limited 
concern for the political environment in which all of the ideological historians were writing. 
Historical and Political Studies of the Ideologies 
Several major works have discussed Gaullist, extreme right-wing and French Communist Party 
activities throughout the Fourth Republic. Research across the three currents includes 
monographs, theses and collections produced by Rene Remond, Michel Winock, Ariane 
Chebel d'Appollonia, Jean-Francois Sirinelli, Jean Chariot, Jean Touchard, Philippe Robrieux, 
Georges Lavau, Marie-Claire Lavabre and others. The sources are more valuable than simple 
background material because they sometimes specifically address the ideological interpretation 
of history. For example, in his contribution to Winock's collection on the extreme right, Jean- 
Pierre Rioux suggested that a defence of the Marshal's honour was vital to the current 
throughout the post-liberation period. 36 Comparable discussion has focused on Gaullism or 
communism and their use of the resistance heritage. As one would expect, it is almost 
universally recognised that both groups exploited the positive legacies of having mobilised 
35 For a brief summary of Jacques Laurent's oeuvre see, Colin Nettelbeck, "The Chameleon Rearguard 
Tradition: the case of Jacques Laurent", in Nicholas Hewitt (ed. ), The Culture of Reconstruction: European 
Literature, Thought and Film 1945-1950 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 153-171. 
36Jean-Pierre Rioux, "Des clandestins aux activistes (1945-1965)" in Michel Winock (ed. ), Histoire de 1'extreme 
droite en France (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993), 217; equally the point is underlined by Ariane Chebel 
d'Appollonia, L'Extreme droite en France, de Maurras ä Le Pen (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1988), 267- 
268. 
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against the Vichy regime and the Nazi occupiers. 37 
Scholars of the history of each current underline the resonance of 1940-1944 under the 
Fourth Republic. In varying degrees of detail they note that ideological values associated with 
each political grouping were promoted through coloured interpretations of the war. In the more 
sophisticated examples of the literature they have introduced a cross-current comparison. This 
is the case in several of the contributions to the collection edited by Courtois and Lazar, 
Cinquante ans dune passion francaise. De Gaulle et les communistes. The essays provided 
by Serge Berstein and Nicole Racine-Furland contrast the Gaullist and communist 
manipulations of the resistance record. 38 Marie-Claire Lavabre's doctoral study of the PCF 
includes a nuanced treatment of the influence of Gaullist portrayals of the resistance on 
communist writings and popular memory. 39 It is a significant work because it combines the 
methods of oral history with a more general text-based analysis of communist sources, the 
result of which is a comprehensive account. 
However, like the traditional historiographic methodology discussed earlier, very few 
scholars who have studied the extreme right, Gaullism or communism have treated the practice 
of writing history. How ideological texts were written is a question which is only rarely posed. 
The techniques used by activists to either glorify or debunk have not been closely examined. 
Whereas scholars from the literary school have been concerned with rhetoric, and other 
strategic devices in the writings of de Gaulle and Thorez, historians of communism and 
37 For example see, Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994), 204,293-294. 
38 Serge Berstein, "Le Parti communiste francais et de Gaulle sous la IV` Republique", in Courtois and Lazar 
(eds), Cinquante ans d'une passion francaise (Paris: Balland, 1991), 79-95; Nicole Racine-Furland, "18 juin 
1940 ou le 10 juillet 1940: bataille de memoire", in Courtois and Lazar (eds) Cinquante ans d'une passion 
francaise, 197-215. 
39 Marie-Claire Lavabre, Histoire, memoire et politique: le cas du Parti communiste francais (these de doctorat 
d'Etat, IEP de Paris, 1992), 468-483. 
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Gaullism have not analysed the respective currents' production. Political scientists like Jean 
Touchard provide detailed thematic reviews of the content of the ideological material which 
they study, but they have not analysed the structures of historical writing which were 
frequently employed to communicate the belief systems . 
40 
There has also been a propensity to focus on core political values instead of recognising 
the diversity of views held within an ideological school. It has often been only highly 
politically charged writings and interpretations which analysts have cited as examples of any 
given current's viewpoint. However, in reality, ideologies are composed of varying shades of 
opinion. An emphasis on central political leaders and thinkers has meant that those writers or 
historians who only partially intersect with a given ideological sphere have been under- 
researched. Comprehensive projects like Jean-Francois Sirinelli's monumental three-volume 
edited collection on the right, have not clearly tracked politically slippery figures, for instance, 
one of the first scholars of Vichy, Robert Aron. 
Finally, as Jeannine Verdes-Leroux suggested, the approach can be expanded by 
moving beyond its traditional charting of doctrines or philosophies. She writes: `une longue 
observation de cet univers chaotique qu'on appelle la politique, nous a persuade que ce ne sont 
pas des idees qui poussent ä agir, ä droite comme a gauche, ce sont des passions, pulsions, 
emotions, reves, fuites, envies, ressentiments, ambitions... ' . 
41 Without abandoning `idees' 
altogether this is a helpful advance. Whereas the work of Robrieux or Remond has been 
restricted to outlining major groups, a renewed emphasis on emotions and passions will help 
the scholar understand day-to-day ideological confrontations in more human terms. 
40 Jean Touchard, Le Gaullisme 1940-1969 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978), 93-133. 
41 Jeannine Verdes-Leroux, Refus et violences. Politiques et litterature ä l'extreme droite des annees trente aux 
retombees de la liberation (Paris: Gallimard, 1996), 5. 
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The Vichy Syndrome 
In the mid-1980s a very different angle on the role of ideologically marked historiography, 
politics and society developed. Influenced in varying degrees by each of the other approaches 
which I have discussed, the study of collective memory questioned how the French have passed 
through different stages of understanding the occupation. As is reflected in the label which I 
have used to classify those who have adopted this perspective, the leading scholar to have 
developed this approach has been Henry Rousso. 42 Indeed, his interpretation has become an 
orthodoxy. The monograph, Le Syndrome de Vichy, is generally taken to be a ground-breaking 
treatment of the wider subject. For instance, writing in the collection Les Lieux de memoire 
Philippe Burrin has described Rousso's research as, `un ouvrage remarquablement novateur', 
whilst its arguments are now becoming noted by those who are interested in analysing the 
social and cultural impact of the Second World War in Britain and Germany. ' 
Le Syndrome de Vichy and Rousso's second major work in this field, written with the 
42 Amongst Henry Rousso's many treatments of the subject are: "Memoire contre courant", in Alfred Wahl 
(ed. ), Actes des colloques de Metz: memoire de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale (Metz: Universite de Metz, 1984), 
111-124; "Vichy: le grand fosse", Vingtieme siecle, 5 (1985): 55-79; "Oü en est 1'histoire de la resistance? ", 
in L'Histoire magazine (ed. ), Etudes sur la France de 1939 ä nos fours (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985), 113- 
133; "The Reactions in France: the Sounds of Silence", in Geoffrey Hartman (ed. ), Bitburg in Moral and 
Political Perspective (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 52-65; Le Syndrome de Vichy; "La Seconde 
Guerre Mondiale dans la memoire des droites", in Jean-Francois Sirinelli (ed. ), Histoire des droites en France, 
Vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 549-620; "Une memoire en peril", Les Collections du Nouvel Observateur, 16 
(1993): 71-73; and Eric Conan, Vichy, un passe qui ne passe pas; "Le Syndrome de 1'historien", French 
Historical Studies, 19.2 (1995): 519-526; La Hantise du passe (Paris: Textuel, 1998). 
43 Philippe Burrin, "Vichy", in Pierre Nora (ed. ), Les Lieux de memoire, Vol. 3, Part 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 
337; whilst the Vichy syndrome has been borrowed for comparative purposes by Tony Kushner, The Holocaust 
and the Liberal Imagination (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 6; Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: 
History, Holocaust and German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1988), 162; 
David Cesarani, "Lacking in Convictions: British War Crimes Policy and the National Memory of the Second 
World War", in Martin Evans and Ken Lunn (eds), War and Memory in the Twentieth Century (Oxford: Berg, 
1997), 36. 
28 
journalist Eric Conan and dealing exclusively with the contemporary period, Vichy, un passe 
qui ne passe pas, have prompted a range of critical literature which addresses this field as an 
area of academic interest in its own right. For example, recent commentaries on the issues 
which have been raised by Rousso's thinking have included essays or books by Tzvetan 
Todorov, Paul Thibaud, Pierre Nora, Olivier Mongin, Sonia Combe, Marie-Claire Lavabre, 
Bertram Gordon, Sarah Fishman, Christopher Flood, Hugo Frey and Nancy Wood. " The time 
spent re-reading Rousso's work is a testimony to its value. 
Rousso's primary aim is to establish an interpretative analysis of fifty years of the 
French relationship with the legacies of Vichy. Ideological history writing is considered as one 
vector of memory within a more extensive pattern which also covers literary, filmic, overtly 
political and journalistic portrayals of the war. In his preface to the English language edition 
of The Vichy Syndrome, Stanley Hoffmann has conveniently summarised Rousso's argument. 
This is worth citing at length. He writes, 
What he [Rousso] shows, explicitly and vividly, is how the French chose to 
believe that Vichy had been the creation of a small group of rather wicked (but 
still more misguided than evil) men, that the crimes committed were crimes of 
the Germans and of very small bands of collaborationists, and that most of the 
population had resisted the occupation in some degree. The resistance 
represented French continuity - the continuity of the republican regime and of 
a patriotic nation - saved France's honor, played a major role in the liberation, 
44 Tzvetan Todorov, Les Abus de la memoire (Evreux: Arlea, 1995); Paul Thibaud "La Republique et ses heros. 
Le Gaullisme pendant et apres la guerre", Esprit, 198.1 (1994): 64-83; Pierre Nora, "Le Syndrome, son passe, 
son avenir", French Historical Studies, 19.2 (1995): 487-493; Sonia Combe, Archives interdites (Paris: Albin 
Michel, 1994); Olivier Mongin (ed. ), "Le Poids de la memoire", Espirt, 193.7 (1993): 5-72 Marie-Claire 
Lavabre, "Du poids et du choix du passe. Lecture critique du Syndrome de Vichy", Cahiers de l'IHTP, 18 
(1991): 177-185. Bertram Gordon, "The `Vichy Syndrome' Problem in History", French Historical Studies, 
19.2 (1995): 495-518; Sarah Fishman, "The Power of Myth: Five Recent Works on Vichy France", The Journal 
of Modern History, 67 (1995): 666-673; Christopher Flood and Hugo Frey, "The Vichy Syndrome Revisited", 
Contemporary French Civilization, Vol. 19.2 (1995): 231-249; Nancy Wood, "Vichy Memories", New 
Formations, 17 (1992): 148-156; Nancy Wood, "Memorial Militancy in France: `Working-through' or the 
Politics of Anachronism? ", Patterns of Prejudice, 29.2/3 (1995): 75-87. 
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and was the secular arm of the saviour Charles de Gaulle. [... ] 
But the myth could not last forever. May'68 saw young people 
challenging all the established verities and taboos of their elders... Instead of 
a (false) version in black and white, there now prevailed a picture in uniformly 
dirty grays. For a while, myth and countermyth coexisted[ ... 
]Rousso's book 
provides a subtle answer to those who still accuse the French of not having 
confronted their past or not having faced their crimes and prejudices as deeply 
as the West German's have. This certainly has not been the case for the past 
twenty years and Rousso documents the confrontation just as he unsparingly 
indicts the earlier avoidance of the truth. as 
Across Rousso's many publications, his study of the legacy of the war is founded on two 
opposing periods: the pre-1968 myth of the resistance and the post-1968 counter-myth of Vichy 
and collaboration. Thus, although sometimes misunderstood, the Vichy syndrome argument 
was about representations of the resistance and collaboration, not exclusively the Vichy 
regime. To paraphrase, Rousso suggests that during the Fourth and early Fifth Republics, the 
unpleasant facts about the war were replaced with reassuring images of the resistance and of 
a generally anti-German France. In the aftermath of the evenements of May'68 the past was 
re-conceptualised. Now it was the turn of collaboration to be obsessively scrutinised. 
In Le Syndrome de Vichy this chronology is reconstructed through a more detailed 
periodisation which runs from a decade of `Le deuil inacheve' (1944-1954) through `Les 
refoulements' (1954-1971) and `Le miroir brise' (1971-1974) to the present era of `1'obsession' 
(after 1974). This four-stage model suggests that in the first instance the French were unable 
to come to terms with the recent past, that they then sought to repress its problematic aspects 
but, by the 1970s, witnessed the mode retro obsession with Vichy. Importantly in relation to 
our interest, Rousso divided the Fourth Republic into two early stages of different 
45 Stanely Hoffmann, "Preface", to The Vichy Syndrome (Cambridge Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991), 
vii-ix. 
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representations. In the first period, le deuil inacheve', he describes a nation so traumatised 
by the war that the legacies of the occupation appear to have been a political constant. He 
claims that, from the liberation until the mid-1950s, the past was an unresolved, and ever- 
present societal problem. Thus, in terms of ideological history writing, Rousso describes the 
ways in which the war heritage was used to score ideological points. In a phrase which is 
reminiscent of Henri Michel's earlier emphasis on the role of the Franco-French ideological 
conflict, he notes: `De la Liberation ä 1954, les protagonistes de la guerre franco-francaise 
dominent la scene editoriale, en un concert de voix discordantes'. ' However, following the 
purge-amnesty debates, and the European Defence Community controversy, Rousso suggests 
that the legacies of Vichy receded. This remission in the syndrome is associated with the 
images of the war presented in De Gaulle's Memoires de guerre and Aron's Histoire de 
Vichy. 47 
Although a highly original work, Le Syndrome de Vichy reflects the earlier research of 
Pascal Ory, Colin Nettelbeck and Saul Friedländer who had previously suggested that the nazi 
period, including the occupation, had moved from a state of under-representation in European 
culture, to become a dominant theme which was the subject of high art and kitsch advertising 
culture. 48Equally, the syndrome argument has been taken up by a number of those who have 
re-articulated or referred to Rousso's work. For example one can mention the studies of Alan 
46 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 276. 
47 For Rousso's assertion that de Gaulle and Aron each served in their own way to quieting the issue of Vichy, 
see ibid., 280; 283. 
48 Pascal Ory, "Comme de l'an quarante. Dix annees de `retro satanas"', Le Debat: 109-116; Colin Nettelbeck, 
"Getting the Story Right: Narratives of World War H in Post-1968 France", Journal of European Studies, 15.1 
(1985): 78-116; Saul Friedländer, Reflections of Nazism: An Essay in Kitsch and Death (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1984). Friedländer's investigation draws on Susan Sontag's 1975 essay "Fascinating Fascism" currently 
published in Sontag, Under the Sign of Saturn (London: Vintage, 1996), 73-105. 
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Morris, Tony Judt, Lawrence D. Kritzman, Anne Grynberg, Dimitri Nicolaidis, Jean-Pierre 
Azema and Lucette Valensi, whilst Benjamin Stora has employed a version of the paradigm 
in order to examine the impact of the memory of the Algerian war on post-colonial France. ' 
What are the key methodological lessons of the Vichy Syndrome? Notably, it is a 
helpful guide because Rousso combined several of the positive features of the three other 
approaches which have been reviewed in this chapter. As has been noted, the scholar's specific 
treatment of the activist historians of the Fourth Republic is in line with the approach used by 
a number of traditional historiographers. 5° Rousso's discussion of the topic is informative. In 
addition, his depiction of Fourth Republic politics provides detailed publishing information and 
an elegant account of the milieu of ideological engagement in the 1940s and 1950s. 5' Unlike 
Michel, or more recently Azema and Bedarida, Rousso shows awareness of how 
representations of history were constructed as texts. Albeit in a less rigorous manner than, for 
example, Alan Pedley or Georges Lavau, his work draws on insights from the literary school. 
Rousso is concerned with the details of representation, as well as the content of historical 
literature. However, perhaps Le Syndrome de Vichy's most significant contribution is as a work 
in the field of political history. Notwithstanding recent criticisms of Rousso's thesis, I draw 
49 Alan Morris, Collaboration and Resistance Reviewed (Oxford: Berg, 1992); Tony Judt, Past Imperfect: French 
Intellectuals 1944-1956 (California, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992); Lawrence D. Kritzman, "In 
the Shadows of Auschwitz: Culture, Memories and Self-Reflection", in Kritzman (ed. ), Auschwitz and After: 
Race, Culture, and the Jewish Question in France (London: Routledge, 1995), 1-11; Anne Grynberg, "Les 
Camps frangais, des non-lieux de memoire", in Nicolaidis (ed. ), Oublier nos crimes. L'Amnesie nationale, une 
specificite francaise? (Paris: Autrement, 1994), 52-69; Jean-Pierre Azema, "La Guerre", in Rene Remond (ed. ), 
Pour une histoirepolitique (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1988), 373-374; Benjamin Stora, La Gangrene et l'oubli: 
la memoire de la guerre d'Algerie (Paris: La Decouverte, 1992). 
50 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 276-278. 
51 Ibid., 29-85. 
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on the interdisciplinary dynamism of Rousso's research. 52 
As a postscript it is worth underlining that as well as those who have closely followed 
Vichy syndrome arguments, Rousso's work has stimulated wider interest in comparable areas 
of research. The publications of, for example, Annette Wieviorka on French Jewish memory 
and the recent contributions of Alain Brossat on the liberation have added to the field. 53 
Although working within a similar historico-political tradition to Rousso, these studies consider 
either a specific group's view of the occupation or a more tightly focused corpus of literature 
or symbolic events. For example, Brossat's work is especially original in the manner in which 
it analyses both the historical events of 1944, as well as the meaning of their commemoration, 
fifty years on. Brossat compares at least two levels of historical representation: the original 
symbolic recovery of France from German occupation and the more recent rituals associated 
with remembering it. Whilst this means the examination of different forms of representations 
and communication, the focus offers a sharp critical edge, with Brossat knowingly exploring 
the multiple levels of discourse which are embedded in the liberation. 
A Synthetic Approach to Interpreting Ideological Historiography 
The thesis draws on the work of each of the four approaches. It can be more or less classified 
as being a combination of traditional historiography, a cultural-literary study of interpretation, 
a consideration of how political ideologies have more generally shaped the meaning of the past 
and an extension of the Vichy syndrome school. 
52 For an empirical revision of Rousso's thesis in the context of publishing history see Bertram Gordon, "The 
`Vichy Syndrome' Problem in History", French Historical Studies, 19.2 (1995): 495-518. 
53 Annette Wieviorka, Deportation et genocide, entre la memoire et 1'oubli (Paris: Plon, 1992); Alain Brossat, 
Liberation, fete folle (Paris: Autrement, 1994). 
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It follows an eminent line of traditional historiographic reviews which are important 
general accounts in their own right. The detailed work which I have conducted on the Fourth 
Republic owes much to those working in this sub-field. The history of ideological 
historiography charted in the next chapter develops on this method. However, I have sought 
to address the issue of history-writing, reviewing and publishing in a more precise way than 
has sometimes been afforded in the past. This has meant consulting a wide range of 
contemporary publications as well as numerous daily and weekly newspapers associated with 
each current of production. Through examining the pages of faits divers reports, judicial 
notices of defamation cases, popular advertising, reviews, letters and the droit de reponse, I 
aim to shed new light on the milieu of the activist historians. It is hoped that Chapter II will 
bring the reader nearer to their world. 
Moving away from the traditional historiographic works which precede it, the thesis 
is also focused on the technical strategies involved in rewriting the war. It has been the literary 
approach which has provided a general perspective on interpreting and discussing 
historiography in this way. Throughout the body of the thesis, I retain its concern for how texts 
are constructed and decoded. However, unlike many of those who already use literary methods 
in the study of historiography, I have avoided the limited single-historian approach. Instead, 
the individual publications of important writers, such as Thorez or the extreme right-winger, 
Benoist-Mechin, are dealt with as examples of key producers within the wider currents of 
representation. Later this comparative dimension has been extended to consider more neutral 
contemporary interpretations in the light of the ideological currents. " 
As a study of political writings, the thesis has drawn extensively from the many works 
54 See Chapter VIII. 
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which have discussed the history of each of the ideological currents. Rather than focus on the 
well-known issue that the wartime past was a subject for ideological manipulation, the thesis 
is concerned with examining how this process occurred in textual examples. A presentation of 
content, narrative portrayals, and rhetorical devices in ideological historiography is developed. 
To an extent this corresponds with Verdes-Leroux's belief in the importance of a cultural 
history of politics. However, rather than a rejection of the traditional history of ideologies 
approach, this is a complementary addition. 
The final key methodology with which the thesis engages and which it combines with 
the other approaches is that of Rousso's Le Syndrome de Vichy. His work, and the wider 
literature which has surrounded it, is central for a number of reasons. It has refocused attention 
on the entire area of historiography as being a public and political discourse. For instance, a 
number of works which have been cited as examples of the three other methodologies appear 
to have been in part inspired by Rousso's contributions. Nonetheless, the thesis offers a more 
precise focus than in Rousso's publications. It works with a shorter time-frame and concerns 
the more defined cultural product: ideological history-writing. It is intended that this method 
will result in an increased level of detail and a sharper clarity of interpretation. 
Beyond the more general influence which Le Syndrome de Vichy has brought to my 
work, its role in the thesis has been as an account which requires further testing and 
comparison. In part, I have used the study of ideological historiography of the Fourth Republic 
as a way of confirming or modifying several of Rousso's claims. When appropriate I discuss 
whether the three currents of ideological production I have read can be seen to support or 
revise Rousso's assertions. His specific claim that two texts - de Gaulle's Memoires de guerre 
and Robert Aron's and Georgette Elgey's Histoire de Vichy - were part of a process of national 
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repression is examined (see Chapter II below). However, that is not to say that the thesis is 
only an exercise in revision, or an interjection in an academic debate. Rather, in combination 
with the principal study of ideological history writing, I have used the Vichy syndrome as a 
platform from which to discuss wider issues, such as the internal variation of representation 
within the three ideological currents; the ways in which historians, although working from 
different ideological standpoints, created interpretations which overlapped; and the relationship 
between ideologically coloured texts and more neutral histories. 
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CHAPTER II 
IDEOLOGICAL HISTORY WRITING 1944-1958 
The present chapter outlines the history of ideological production within each of the three 
identified currents. It is argued that historical publication was not conducted in isolation but 
was part of a volatile confrontation over how the war was to be represented. After considering 
each current, two case studies of ideological combat through historical publishing are explored: 
the Täittinger affair and reaction to the publication of the first volume of de Gaulle's war 
memoirs. 
Three Currents of Ideological History-Writing 
The French Communist Party was the best and worst producer of ideological reconstructions 
of history. Its tight organisation, its affiliated press and its publishing house, Editions Sociales, 
made it ideally placed to produce and disseminate all types of printed material. A strict 
hierarchical structure marked the production of its war historiography. The head of the Party, 
Maurice Thorez was acclaimed for his ability as a historian. This fact, it was argued, was 
demonstrated in his political memoirs, Fils du peuple. l Furthermore, the Party increasingly 
sought to promote Thorez's life-story through hagiographic worship. Since Thorez was not 
only eulogised as a communist but also as a member of the resistance, biographical writing also 
had a significant role to play. 
The first post-war edition of Fils du peuple was published in 1949. This was a major 
reworking of the original 1937 imprint. The new edition encompassed the Second World War 
period and emphasised the Soviet Union's and the PCF's separate but associated roles in 
1 Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1949). 
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defeating nazism and liberating Europe. In effect, this theme marks the entire memoir. 
Specifically it is treated in over one hundred pages of writing, from `Chapitre V. La France 
devant le danger' to `Chapitre VII. Notre bataille pour la renaissance de la France ... ' . The 
reception given to it by communist reviewers demonstrates the extent to which the book was 
taken to be the most factually accurate account of the period. Often excluded from accounts 
of communist historiography because of its autobiographical form, at the time of its publication 
the work was presented as being far more than a political memoir. ' Between 1949 and 1951 
it was officially recommended as being of vital importance to the PCF's cause. In total the 
Cahiers du communisme (henceforth Cahiers) devoted four separate commentaries to 
highlighting its value. ' These reviews represented Fils du peuple as history writing and did not 
discuss it in terms of the genres of political memoir or autobiography, even though this is what 
it was. For instance, the following extract from an early communist commentary underlines 
how the text's genre was constructed around being both a PCF and a national history. Victor 
Joannes noted: 
UN MANUEL D'HISTOIRE DU PARTI COMMUNISTE FRANCAIS. Ainsi 
"Fils du Peuple" n'est pas le simple recit de la vie d'un komme ou d'un parti 
politique. C'est sous la forme agreable de l'autobiographie, un veritable manuel 
d'histoire du Parti Communiste Frangais. Si la vie et les luttes de Maurice 
Thorez, "fils et petit-fils de mineurs", mineur lui-meme, proletaire authentique, 
ne se separent pas de la vie et des luttes de la classe ouvriere, de son Parti, 
celles-ci sont sans cesse et naturellement liees a l'histoire du pays. ' 
2 Fils du peuple is all but ignored in Stephane Courtois' otherwise impressive treatment, "Luttes politiques et 
elaboration d'une histoire... ", Communisme, 4 (1983): 5-25. 
3 G. Cogniot, "Fils du Peuple le livre de la classe ouvriere et de la France", Cahiers, 9 (1949): 1086-1100; 
V. Joannes., "Fils du Peuple et la lutte pour les principes du Leninisme", Cahiers, 10 (1949): 1202-1211; 
V. Joannes, "Pour l'etude individuelle de Fils du Peuple et des oeuvres de Maurice Thorez", Cahiers, 11 (1951): 
1316-1331. 
4 V. Joannes, "Fils du Peuple et la lutte... ", Cahiers: 1203. 
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Fils du peuple was held to be a work of history, and, by implication, Thorez was taken to be 
a historian. However, the cult of Thorez stretched beyond the relatively common rhetorical 
switch of genres from political memoir to factual history. The text was also classified as an 
example of a new form of proletarian historiography. Jean Bruhat presented Thorez's writing 
as a code from which all communist historians could learn. ' He suggested that in Thorez's 
work, supported by that of the veteran communist Andre Marty, one could distinguish a new 
communist methodology in historical study. This included a privileged access to the workers' 
psyche which had been previously untouched by bourgeois historians. Through a new, realistic 
language Thorez had depicted hitherto concealed aspects of the class struggle. It was claimed 
that the new Thorezian historiography relied on an authentically proletarian source of 
documentation: personal reminiscences, parliamentary conflict, the workers' thoughts, writings 
and so on. Thereby Thorez and Marty had developed an approach which was `loin du 
formalisme qui domine l'histoire bourgeoise'. ' Their writing was also an effective `instrument 
de lutte' which depicted the PCF's glorious past and defined its future role. Bruhat concluded 
his analysis with a stark autocritique of the communist professional historians. He confessed, 
Les historiens communistes ont fait, avec l'aide de la section de travail 
ideologique du Comite central, 1'autocritique de leur activite. Cette autocritique 
qui nous a permis de decouvrir nos faiblesses: travail trop academique, 
repliement sur soi, manque de vigilance quant ä la propagande de 1'ennemi et 
au renforcement du caractere de classe de 1'Universite a tous les degres. ' 
5 Jean Bruhat wrote two historiographical analyses of Fils du peuple, "Ecrire et faire l'histoire en combattant", 
Cahiers, 1 (1950): 96-108; and "L'Apport de Maurice Thorez ä 1'histoire", Cahiers, 4 (1950): 33-48. 
6 Jean Bruhat, "Ecrire et faire l'histoire", Cahiers: 101. 
7Ibid., 107. 
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Fils du peuple had become the example of communist history writing. Author and text were 
symbols which were to be respected and praised. If the communist professional historians of 
1789 (Soboul and Agulhon) could learn from its technique and political edge, as Bruhat had 
implied, the memoir was also marketed for the ordinary card carrying members of the PCF. 
By 1951 the work was recommended as a pedagogical aid for all militants. A self-learning 
scheme was suggested around the contents of its first chapter, `L'Eveil'. This was to be an 
introduction to further enlightened study. The PCF's Programme d'etude individuelle 
suggested that Thorez's masterpiece should be studied as instructed. It advocated: 
Trois heures d'etude pourraient etre consacrees pendant la premiere semaine ä 
la lecture attentive d'un ou des deux chapitres. La plume ä la main, l'etudiant 
individuel notera sur son cahier, Bans trois colonnes, de la page de gauche, les 
faits qui retiennent son attention, - les notions theoriques qui s'en degagent, - 
les references correspondantes et, sur la page de droite, ses reflexions 
personnelles. 8 
The awe in which Fils du peuple was held by the French Communist Party as a whole was one 
aspect of the cult which had come to surround Thorez. By the late 1940s, this had developed 
to such an extent that the more easily influenced communists had begun to emulate Thorez's 
now elevated lifestyle. For example, many young supporters allegedly copied his early 
morning study of literature or Marxist theory, as well as starting to share his passion for alpine 
walking. Epitomising this era was Jean Freville's hagiography of the leader, which was simply 
entitled Avec Maurice Thorez. 9 In this work a focus on the personal and the national were 
combined in an ideological blend which went to rhetorical lengths to portray Thorez as an 
8 Victor Joannes, "Pour 1'etude individuelle - de la guerre imperialiste au congres de Tours", Cahiers, 11 
(1951): 1330. 
9 Jean Freville, Avec Maurice Thorez (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1950). 
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intellectual, a resistance-fighter, and a patriotic worker. Avec Maurice Thorez was much 
praised by the PCF's press and it remains an important example of the more ephemeral 
reportage which focused on Thorez's life and thus portrayed contemporary France through the 
leader's contribution to its history. " 
Fils du peuple and Avec Maurice Thorez have more in common than their shared subject 
and ideological slant. Intriguingly, it has been suggested that it was in fact Freville who had 
written much of the 1937 first edition of Fils du peuple. However, the historian Philippe 
Robrieux has explained that although Freville was assigned the task of writing the 
autobiography, he found it too labourious a task and passed it to a second ghost-writer, his 
anarchist friend, the Russian emigre Viersboloviez. In turn Viersboloviez, possibly with an eye 
to future blackmail opportunities, encoded the text with the acrostic: `FREVILLE A ECRIT 
CE LIVRE'. 11 Given its bizarre origins, it is all the more remarkable that by the post-war 
period the second edition of Fils du peuple had become the communists' key historical source 
and that one of its earlier ghost-writers had subsequently produced a biographical work on 
Thorez. The suspicion of burlesque comedy which surrounds this history is equally evident 
when Freville's life is scrutinised. Alias Eugene Schkaff, the son of a Russian emigre, Freville 
appears to have led a double political career. In the 1930s, `by day' Schkaff was employed by 
the government minister Anatole de Monzie to translate copies of Pravda, from Russian to 
French. In a second guise, `by night', Freville established an equally successful profile as a 
PCF intellectual and propagandist. By the beginning of the Fourth Republic, remarkably, he 
10 For example, extracts from Avec Maurice Thorez were serialised in the communist literary review France 
Nouvelle (1949-1950) cited in Jeannine Verdes-Leroux, Au service du Parti (Paris: Fayard, 1983), 195. 
11 Philippe Robrieux, Histoire interieure du Parti communiste, Vol. 4,245; Bernard Pudal, Prendre parti: pour 
une sociologie historique du PCF (Paris: Presse de la FNSP, 1989), 222; Marie-Francoise Chanfrault-Duchet, 
"Pere, Parti et parti pris narratif: Maurice Thorez, Paul Thorez", Cahiers de Semiotique Textuelle, 12 (1988): 
104-105. The latter gives the best overview of the origins of the first edition, from Stalin's commission through 
the multiple authors of Fils du peuple. 
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was at the heart of the PCF's power-structure: positioned as the chef-adjoint in Thorez's 
private cabinet. " 
Subsidiary to Thorez's contribution and the personality cult surrounding him, 
communist intellectuals provided numerous essays about the war years. These treatments were 
published alongside other political and cultural pieces in the PCF's academically styled journal, 
the Cahiers. It was in the Cahiers that a consistent communist interpretation of the war was 
developed. In marked contrast with the other ideological traditions, instead of book length 
accounts, official communist writing preferred to utilise shorter, scholarly articles. The 
exceptions - books such as Andre Simone's Les Hommes qui ont trahi la France; Ferdinand 
Bonte's Le Chemin de l'honneur and Gacon and Bouvier's La Verite sur 1939 - were 
themselves favourably reviewed and recommended in the Cahiers. 13 
The journal was the forum for presenting the party line on political, cultural and 
historical issues. In the period between 1945 and 1958 the Cahiers published thirty-six 
historical pieces (excluding book reviews) which addressed aspects of the Second World War. 
On average this meant that one major historical essay was published each quarter. However, 
in reality the war-history articles featured more regularly over the decade 1945-1955, with only 
one relevant example being published after this date. 14 Appropriately, it was Thorez himself 
12 Philippe Robrieux, Histoire interieure du Parti communiste, Vol. 4,243-246. Schkaff-Freville is one of the 
genuinely unique enigmas of the PCF. His life and writings merit further research. Robrieux implies that only 
the employ of the Soviet secret services could explain his type of trajectory. 
13 Andre Simone, Les Hommes qui ont trahi la France (Paris: Editions d'Hier et Aujourd'hui, 1941 reprint 
1945); Florimond Bonte, Le Chemin d'honneur (Paris: Editions d'Hier et Aujourd'hui, 1949); J. Gacon and J. 
Bouvier, La Verite sur 1939 (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1953). 
14 The article in question is Pierre Villon, "Les Exigences de l'internationalisme et notre politique en 1939- 
1940", Cahiers, 5 (1957): 687-701. Nevertheless, much PCF discussion of Poujadism reprised topics which 
implicitly returned to the subject of the war and the Vichy regime. For example, see W. Rochet, "Le Caractere 
fasciste du `mouvement' Poujadiste", Cahiers, 3 (1956): 194-211; A. Giovoni, "Le Fascisme, menace actuelle", 
Cahiers, 2 (1957): 247-260. 
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who signed the largest proportion of the historical articles to appear in the periodical, a total 
of four. Other major producers were Florimond Bonte, Victor Joannes and Roger Garaudy, 
each of whom wrote three major essays on Second World War history. Garaudy and Joannes 
have been especially recognised for their proximity to Thorez and his personal power-base. ls 
On the other hand, Bonte's contributions were probably derived from his official responsibility 
for international affairs. 
Cumulatively, the ten years of regular historical discourse in the Cahiers provided the 
core of the Party's writing on the Second World War. In addition, as Stephane Courtois has 
argued, the material covered by the Cahiers charts the demise of the resistance generation of 
the PCF and thus resistance-centred historiography. 16 This shift in relative influence is 
evidenced in the slow decline of publications which were devoted to examples of communist 
resistance. In their place, the Cahiers concentrated on presenting explanations of why the war 
had occurred, and to repeatedly justifying the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. For example, between 
1948 and 1950 the Cahiers printed seven articles which emphasised the `1939-41' period. In 
comparison, during the same period of publication only one article was dedicated to resistance 
activities. Whilst this material supports Stephane Courtois' well-documented reading of events, 
it should be noted that the subject of the resistance continued to be evoked by Thorez and the 
official communist discourse. The content of Fils du peuple (1949 and 1955 editions) included 
passages which glorified the internal communist resistance, as did Freville's biography of 
Thorez. Furthermore, as the internal purge was beginning, the communist mainstream writers, 
15 Philippe Robrieux, Histoire interieure du Parti comrnuniste, Vol. 4,256-257 and 333-334. 
16 Stephane Courtois, "Luttes politiques et elaboration d'une histoire... ", Communisnie, 4 (1983): 9-14. 
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Jean Dautry and Louis Pastor, published a co-authored pamphlet account of the resistance. " 
Major treatments of the resistance by dissident communists were suppressed by the Thorezians, 
but they also continued to use their resistance and anti-fascist credentials when the Central 
Committee saw fit. l 
In short, the communist historiographic core was based on the symbolic importance 
which was attributed to Thorez and his writing. The PCF employed one political memoir, Fils 
du peuple, from which to an extent all else followed. Given the personality cult which 
surrounded Thorez, this was an understandable development. At the same time, whilst the 
other ideological strands often used their associated press networks, the academic-article style 
of the Cahiers' historians was unique. 
Turning to Gaullist historiography, it is evident that two types of writing dominated its 
interpretation of the war: political memoirs and biographies of General de Gaulle. Like the 
PCF's emphasis on Thorez, much of Gaullist history was read through the life of its leader. 
However, the number of Gaullists who wrote political memoirs was far greater, and politically 
more diverse, than the tightly controlled examples identified in the communist strand of 
interpretation. The third type of writing - non-autobiographical and non-biographical history - 
was comparatively rare within the Gaullists' current. A comprehensive survey of Emilien 
Amaury's weekly newspaper, the generally pro-Gaullist Carrefour (1944-1958), and the 
Rassemblement's cultural review, Liberte de l'esprit (1949-53, edited by Claude Mauriac) 
17 Jean Dautry and Louis Pastor, Histoire de la resistance: de la dröle de paix ä la dröle de guerre, de la dröle 
de guerre ä la dröle de paix (Paris: Editions de l'Union Francaise Universitaires, 1950). Dautry was a 
professional historian who had also published on `1848' and subsequently in the communist collaboration, Jean 
Bruhat, Jean Dautry, and E. Tersen, La Commune de 1871 (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1960), a commentary on 
which is given in David Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals 1914-1960 (London: Andre Deutsch, 
1964), 289. 
18 The resistance-Party divide and its impact on PCF historiography is illustrated in further detail by Stephane 
Courtois, "Luttes politiques et elaboration d'une histoire... ", Communisme, 4 (1983): 5-25. 
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suggests a limited employment of this style of writing. The occasional examples which 
appeared were idiosyncratic. For instance, Andre Frossard's satirical account, Histoire 
paradoxale de la Quatrieme Republique. 19 Without doubt the most significant example was the 
edited collection, Trente ans d'histoire, which was published in 1949.20 
From about 1946 onwards prominent Gaullist personalities began to write about the war 
through the form of their political memoirs. A high proportion of the authors were, at the time 
of writing, also influential members of the Comite Executif/Conseil de direction du RPF, the 
steering group of the Rassemblement `movement'. Amongst those attending its first executive 
committee, on 17 July 1947, three of the thirteen present, excluding de Gaulle, had 
established, or were in the process of establishing, themselves as significant authors of political 
memoirs. Guillain de Benouville and Colonel Remy were already known for their vivid 
accounts of life in the resistance. Remy has alluded to the fact that de Gaulle was especially 
impressed by the success of his first tome, Memoires d'un agent secret de la France libre. 21 
The political scientist Jean Chariot, quoting Remy, has described a dinner party given by de 
Gaulle for Remy and his wife in the spring of 1946: 
Au printemps, Gaston de Bonneval, son second aide de camp, fait savoir au 
colonel Remy que le general serait heureux qu'Edith, sa femme, l'invite ä 
dejeuner avec Mme de Gaulle, en leur moulin de Villy, Bans 1'Eure ... Un desir 
que les Remy s'empressent de satisfaire. L'essentiel de la conversation pone sur 
le succes imprevu des Memoires d'un agent secret de la France fibre dont Remy 
a publie le premier tome au moment meme oü de Gaulle quittait le pouvoir. `Un 
livre sur la Resistance - avaient pourtant dit les grands editeurs - mais, cher 
monsieur, c'est perime (... ) la resistance n'interesse plus personne! ' De Gaulle 
se montre enchante de l'histoire de ce livre et complimente Remy : `C'est bien 
19 Andre Frossard, Histoire paradoxale de la Quatrieme Republique (Paris: Grasset, 1954). 
20 Louis-Henri Parias, (ed. ) Trente ans d'histoire - de Clemenceau ä de Gaulle (Paris: Nouvelle Librairie de 
France - Editions Saint Andrea, 1949). 
21 Remy, Memoires d'un agent secret de la France libre (Paris: Editions Raoul Solar, 1946). 
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de defendre ainsi l'honneur du navire! '22 
As a portrait of the mood within the inner circles of Gaullism the scene is a fascinating one, 
for it highlights the fact that memoir writing was perceived to be a legitimate means of 
protecting de Gaulle's political heritage. Whether or not as a consequence of Remy's 
popularity, or of a more general spirit of the times, publishers were soon willing to produce 
personal histories of the war from a wide range of ideological perspectives, including Gaullist 
ones. In the wake of Remy's success, de Benouville's Le Sacrifice du matin (1946) was also 
highly praised. This book was especially trumpeted in Carrefour, and even three years after 
its first publication it was still being advertised in the RPF's journal Liberte de l'esprit. 23 The 
Gaullist political memoirs appear to have been broadly popular. Remy's and de Benouville's 
books were highly placed in a survey of best-selling titles for fiction and non-fiction published 
in 1946.24 The third RPF committee member to have gained notoriety as a 
memorialist/historian under the Fourth Republic was its administrative director, Jacques 
Soustelle. His two-volume account of the war, Envers et contre tout, added to the ever-growing 
list of texts produced by Gaullists who were in the General's circle. Therefore one should not 
overlook the creation of something of a tradition of ideologically marked political memoirs 
prior to de Gaulle's own Memoires de guerre. 
Whilst de Benouville's, Remy's and Soustelle's books were written before and during 
22 Jean Chariot, Le Gaullisme d'opposition 1946-1958,51-52. 
23 Guillain de Benouville, Le Sacrifice de matin (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1946). For favorable review of, see 
Unsigned, "Critique des livres", Carrefour, 23 May 1946: 6. whilst for advertising see Liberte de I'Esprit, 5 
(1949): 120. 
24 Unsigned, "Les Livres les plus vendus en 1946", Carrefour, 9 January 1947: 7. The top-sellers also included 
Vercors's Silence de la mer, Daniel-Rops' history of Jesus and Les Oeuvres d'Henry Miller. 
25 Jacques Soustelle, Envers et contre tout (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1947,1950). 
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the RPF era, de Gaulle's writing, which began on the occasion of his first retirement in 1946, 
was published considerably later in the Fourth Republic in 1954 and 1956. The final volume 
appeared in 1959 after his return to office. Issued separately in three volumes, with unedited 
documentary-based appendices, they served, content aside, to maintain de Gaulle's presence 
in public life. In addition to their serialisation in Paris-Match, Memoires de guerre (volumes 
one and two) were extensively reviewed by all of the major elements of the press. Frequently, 
in sympathetic newspapers the journalists assigned to the task of writing about the books were 
themselves of a strong Gaullist pedigree. For example, it was General Billotte, a member of 
the RPF executive (1949 to 1951) who introduced Volume One, L'Appel, to Carrefour readers 
under the following headline, `L'Histoire ecrite par celui qui 1'a faite'. 26 Writings from pro- 
Gaullists permeated papers with less sympathetic inclinations, for instance Le Monde printed 
the opinions of the activist, Louis Vallon. 27 In their creation of two media extravaganzas 
column space became available for compagnons to express their adulation of the General and 
to repeat and popularise the messages found within the book itself. Similarly, the international 
reception given to the English language translations of the first two volumes, in 1955 and 
1957, created another opening for sympathetic comment. On this basis the Memoires de guerre 
should not be understood as being only advantageous to de Gaulle personally. Through their 
creation of review space and the stimulation of editorial comment and reaction, they were also 
of a wider political significance. 
Political memoirs provided a major outlet for Gaullist reconstructions of history, a 
place in the press, and a chance to maintain a discursive presence vis-a-vis the growing number 
of communist and extreme right-wing accounts of the war. Following the pattern identified in 
26 General Billotte, "L'Histoire ecrite par celui qui 1'a faite", Carrefour, 6 October 1954: 12. 
27 Louis Vallon, "Libre opinion: de Gaulle et la France", Le Monde, 31 October/ 1 November 1954: 4. 
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the communist literature, Gaullist reviews of the political memoirs tended to classify them all 
as being `history writing'. They perceived that the past could be legitimately interpreted 
through essentially personal experiences, as long as they were Gaullist ones. Politically, the 
milieu of production, criticism, journalistic review and more general popularisation was a 
major field of Gaullist activity. It is also important to recognise that in terms of sales quantity 
alone Charles de Gaulle's memoirs were triumphant. In 1961 a French `best sellers of the 
century' list indicated that they had sold 449,000 copies since their publication. This figure was 
comparable to Marcel Proust's classic, Du cote de chez Swann, and, more importantly, was 
also level with the sales figures of the competing French communist leader's equivalent text, 
Fils du peuple. 28 
Pro-Gaullist biographies of de Gaulle form an almost constant backdrop to the 
intermittent publication of Gaullist political memoirs. A review of publishing details, derived 
from the Bibliographie internationale sur Charles de Gaulle, suggests that the production rate 
of this type of treatment far exceeded the other potential means of talking about the war from 
a Gaullist perspective. 29 Several interlinking factors go some way towards explaining the 
phenomenon. De Gaulle's triumph over Vichyite collaboration and the German occupation, had 
without doubt stimulated a genuine interest in the man who had hitherto existed only on the 
edges of political life. To many people, at the time of the liberation, de Gaulle was known only 
as a voice transmitting messages of hope - or propaganda depending on your political bias - 
from London to France. In addition to public demand, a number of biographies which had been 
published in the English language for the benefit of the Allies and the French exile 
28 Theodore Zeldin, A History of French Passions, Vol. 2, Intellect, Taste and Anxiety (Oxford: OUP, 1993), 
359. 
29 Institut Charles de Gaulle, Bibliographie internationale sur Charles de Gaulle 1940-1980. 
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communities in London and the United States during the war awaited their first Paris editions. 
From 1944 onwards ideologically marked biographies which had previously only been in 
circulation amongst the Free French were available to the wider reading public for the first 
time. Furthermore, within the Gaullist camp itself, which was momentarily a very broad 
church, the establishment of de Gaulle as the new head of state could only be reinforced by the 
publication of the frequently hagiographic accounts. The combination of these forces clearly 
influenced the speed of publication of a number of works which proceeded in spite of the 
economic privations which beset France during the winter months of 1944-1945. 
One good example of the processes involved in the publication of the early biographies 
is the history of Philippe Barres's Charles de Gaulle. 30 This short pro-Gaullist book was sold 
in France for the first time in the autumn of 1944 by the publishing house, Editions MUR, but 
was then quickly reprinted the following year by the establishment Editions Plon company. 
However, both of these editions were translations from the original English language version 
which Barres, the son of the nationalist Maurice Barres, had written in exile whilst he served 
with the Free French. As with many of the other biographies which date from the era of the 
Provisional Government, de Gaulle's life story was presented as a means of `getting to know' 
the new national hero. The biographical approach to the recent past was generally well 
received by the press. A reviewer in Le Monde's literary column praised the authors of several 
of the biographies for their contribution to contemporary historical understanding. The article 
explained, 
L'histoire de cette guerre et des temps qui font precede est ä apprendre tout 
entiere, et minitieusement. Nous n'en savons ä peu pres rien, soit que 1'esprit 
30 Philippe Barres, Charles de Gaulle (New York: Brentano, 1940); Charles de Gaulle (London: Hutchinson, 
1941); Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Editions MUR, 1944); Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Plon, 1945). 
49 
de l'armistice et de la collaboration nous fait cachee ou falsifiee, soit que 
beaucoup de documents n'aient pu etre publies encore. C'est pourquoi il 
importe de recommander avec insistance ä tous les Francais la lecture des livres 
essentiels de M. Philippe Barres et de M. L. Nachin [... ]oil faction du chef est 
precisee Bans tous les ordres par ses temoins familiers, 3l 
Therefore one widely acceptable means of learning about and explaining the recent past was 
through the study of de Gaulle's life. This method, the privileging of the leader, was far more 
likely to be sympathetic than critical towards its subject. Biographical propaganda was 
developed as part of the Rassemblement's 1947 brief, as a result of which the RPF produced 
a work which was written by the already successful memorialist Remy. His De Gaulle cet 
inconnu was a natural extension of the, by now, typically Gaullist form. 32 
Quantitatively the biographies were a success. In one year, 1945, over ten sympathetic 
`lives of de Gaulle' were published for the first time in France. No single company held a 
monopoly, and several regionally published editions added to the growing number which 
emanated from Paris. The large number of biographies set a trend in writing patterns. Many 
of those who had written accounts of the General's life which were published during the 
liberation period, continued their interest by republishing new versions which corresponded 
with de Gaulle's changing career. Typical of the propensity for continued devotion was the 
biographer Georges Cattaui. In 1944 Cattaui published his first treatment of de Gaulle's life. 
Over ten years later the original text was then reprised and modified in a second work, the 
1956 Charles de Gaulle. The process did not falter, and by 1960 a new biography was 
31 Emile Henriot, "Le General de Gaulle et ses temoins", Le Monde, 19 December 1944: 1. 
32 Remy, De Gaulle cet inconnu (Paris: Raoul Solar, 1947); the work was commissioned by de Gaulle's aide, 
Claude Guy. See Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 52. 
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published to incarnate a Fifth Republic version of the General. 33 The 1956 edition demonstrates 
Cattaui's loyalty to de Gaulle. At this point in time his subject was certainly not as eminent a 
figure as he had been in 1944, or would become again in 1960. 
In comparison with the high number of pro-de Gaulle biographies and the Gaullist 
political memoirs of the era, only relatively few examples of ideologically marked history 
writing in the scholarly sense have been found from within this current. The exception is the 
major collaborative project which was edited in 1949 by Louis-Henri Parias, entitled Trente 
ans d'histoire: De Clemenceau ä de Gaulle (henceforth Trente ans). This collection of 
historical writing was divided into two substantial sections written by Jacques Boudet and 
Jacques Madaule but in addition included shorter chapters from Winston Churchill; General 
de Monsabert; Colonel 1'Hopital; Pasteur Vallery-Radot; Michel Habib; Genevieve de Gaulle; 
Andre le Troquer; Rene Cassin; Jacques Soustelle; Adrien Dansette; General Ingold; Raymond 
Aron; Jean de Fabregues; Pierre Alleray; Albert Ollivier; Edmond Michelet; Louis Vallon; 
J. A. Godin; Henri Rollet; P. O. Lapie; Rene Pinon; Edouard Dudon; Georges Cattaui; Stanislas 
Fumet and Remy. The contributors are an almost perfect reflection of the range of intellectuals 
and others who were drawn to de Gaulle at this time. On the socialist left of Gaullism we have 
the Combat journalist, Pierre Oliver Lapie. He was joined by a number of left-leaning 
Christian democrats, including the one-time MRP members Madaule and Michelet. French 
Catholic thought was also present: in the form of the editor Parias, de Gaulle's biographer 
Cattaui, Stanislas Fumet, Jean de Fabregues and General Leclerc's brother-in-law, the 
professional historian Adrien Dansette. To the centre-right Godin has been noted to have been 
on the `radicalisant' wing of the group. Furthermore, Trente ans included writing from the 
33 See Georges Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Aux Portes de France, 1944); Charles de Gaulle (Paris: 
Editions Universitaires, 1956); Charles de Gaulle: 1'homme et son destin (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1960). 
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high-ranking Gaullists who were active in the politics of the RPF: Pasteur Vallery-Radot, 
General de Monsabert (a future RPF deputy) Soustelle, Vallon, Albert Ollivier (from Andre 
Malraux's personal coterie), and the maverick Remy. The Rassemblement's `non-aligned' 
think-tank, the Comite national d'etudes was represented by Raymond Aron. As if to 
demonstrate that Trente ans was a Gaullist team publication it was favourably reviewed by two 
of its own contributors, Edmond Michelet and Adrien Dansette. Writing in the sympathetic 
weeklies, Carrefour and La France catholique they immodestly considered the collection to 
be a rewarding example of contemporary historiography. Michelet promoted the volume in the 
following terms, reporting: `Tel qu'il se presente, ce livre a sa place dans toutes les 
bibliotheques francaises'. 34 
Excluding the recognised Gaullists, it is interesting to note that the book's principal 
contributors, Parias, Madaule and Boudet were not active in the inner circles of RPF politics. 
Parias is perhaps best known within the publishing community of Paris. From 1964 to 1975 
he held the post of director of historical publications at Artheme Fayard. During the Fourth 
Republic, he edited the newspaper La France catholique (1945-1948), wrote for it under the 
pseudonym Louis Crozier, and had written a theological essay on the subject of crime and 
punishment, Justice n est pas faite. 35 In a further publishing venture, which began in 1950, he 
founded the popular history journal Miroir de l'histoire. Examples of writing from this 
periodical suggest that Parias had rather more traditionalist tendencies than classic Gaullist 
ones. For example, at least as many extreme right-wing historians wrote for the journal as did 
34 Edmond Michelet, "Trente ans d'histoire", Carrefour, 11 May 1949: 8; Adrien Dansette, "L'Histoire et le 
photographe", La France catholique, 17 June 1949: 2. 
35 Louis-Henri Parias, Justice n'est pas falte (Paris: Le Centurion, 1953). 
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those who were closer to Gaullism. 36 A case can be made for depicting Parias as essentially a 
conservative as opposed to an intimate of the RPF. Of course, these ideological positions were 
not mutually exclusive. Although Parias edited the history journal, he did not contribute 
articles to it. A clear connection can be established between his editorship of La France 
catholique and Trente ans. Four of the contributors to the book had also written for the 
newspaper during Parias's editorial control and it seems likely that he had encouraged these 
contacts. Michel Habib, Adrien Dansette, Jacques Madaule and Genevieve de Gaulle had all 
worked with Parias on La France catholique and went on to contribute significant chapters to 
Trente ans. Indeed, the task of narrating the war years fell to Madaule. Like Parias, at first 
glance, Jacques Madaule's intellectual itinerary appears distanced from the RPF. His political 
origins were on the Christian democratic left. For instance, in the 1930s he had worked 
extensively with Emmanuel Mounier on the journal Esprit. 37 It has recently been confirmed 
that, during the war itself, Madaule followed Mounier and participated on the fringes of the 
Ecole des cadres project which was created at Uriage. 38 However, from 1946 onwards 
Madaule was an MRP national and local politician, elected as Mayor of Issy-les-Moulineaux 
36 Articles in Miroir were regularly written by the extreme right-wingers Pierre Dominique and Frederic-Yves 
Jaffre. From the Gaullist current occasional pieces were contributed by General de Monsabert and Rene Cassin. 
37 For details of Madaule's long standing involvement with Esprit see Michel Winock, Histoire politique de la 
revue Esprit (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1975); and the autobiography, Jacques Madaule, L'Absent (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1973). 
38 For Madaule's work with Urtage see, John Hellmann, The Knight Monks of Vichy France: Uriage 1940-1945 
(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1993), 115; John Hellman, "Wounding Memories: Mitterrand, 
Moulin, Touvier, and the Divine Half-Lies of Resistance", French Historical Studies, 19.2 (1995): 467-468, 
note 27. Of course Madaule's wartime contribution to the ultra-Catholic, Petainist, review Demain was exposed 
with characteristic enthusiasm by the extreme right-winger Henry Coston, Dictionnaire de la politique francaise 
(Paris: Diffusion librairie francaise, 1968), 656. After the war Madaule was elected as an MRP mayor (1949) 
and briefly served as a conseiller to Minister of State, Francisque Gay. A similar political portrait could be 
sketched for fellow contributor to Trente ans, Jean de Fabregues. 
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on the basis of RPF support. It is here that he was most obviously within the Gaullist orbit. 39 
The third major contributor to Trente ans, Jacques Boudet, also appears removed from 
the upper strata of Gaullist politics. Boudet was a popular historian who specialised in 
photographically illustrated collections of French history. A relatively unknown figure, he 
nevertheless provided a fascinating narration of the inter-war years in the Trente ans collection. 
In a subsequent work, also based on a combination of photographs and textual commentaries, 
Histoire de Paris et des Parisiens, he again displayed a Gaullist eye with an ideologically 
coloured treatment of the liberation of Paris . 
40 
Regarding Adrien Dansette, the extent of his political commitment is harder to measure. 
His `Actes de liberation' chapter in the Trente ans collection certainly showed his Gaullist 
sympathies. Nevertheless, his earlier book, Histoire de la liberation de Paris, had not been 
written in this mode. Although noticeably anti-communist, it is not readily classifiable as a 
highly ideologically coloured Gaullist text. However, as we will see below, Dansette's free 
floating political status is somewhat undermined by his polemical attacks on the work of the 
extreme right-winger, Pierre Taittinger. 
Although Trente ans was a major event in Gaullist historiography, it was the exception. 
Gaullists consistently portrayed and conceived the national past through biographies of the 
General and the political memoirs of his intimates. When de Gaulle's own memoirs were 
published, these provided the ultimate layer of interpretation on which to draw. However, one 
should note that earlier Gaullist texts, written during the RPF years, had already constructed 
39 Jacques Madaule, L'Absent, 246. He recounts, `J'avais ete elu en 1949 par une coalition anticommuniste dont 
1'element le plus nombreux etait constitue par les gaullistes du RPF'. However, by 1958, Madaule was firmly 
opposed to the war in North Africa, signing social Catholic petitions against the conflict. For this further 
development in Madaule's continued life of intellectual commitment see Etienne Fouilloux, "Intellectuels 
catholiques et guerre d'Algerie (1954-1962)", in Jean-Pierre Rioux and Jean-Francois Sirinelli (eds), La Guerre 
d'Algerie et les intellectuels francais (Bruxelles: Editions Complexe, 1991), 96. 
40 Jacques Boudet, Histoire de Paris et des Parisiens (Paris: Editions du Pont Royal, 1957). 
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the foundations of this tradition of writing. 
Defeat can be a great mobiliser. This was the case in the development of a post-war 
extreme right-wing historiography of the occupation. From about 1947 onwards, political 
memoirs, biographies and histories were written and published which sought to defend 
reputations and past actions. The epuration had a major psychological impact on the extreme 
right, including the factions of authoritarian conservatives, royalists and fascists. In response 
to what was perceived to be a case of false history in the service of false justice, a welter of 
accounts of the war emerged from these broadly united extreme right-wing ideologies. As well 
as the three typical variations of writing, these publications included a fourth style which was 
derived from the post-war purges. For instance, Me Jacques Isomi published four books 
pertaining to the Petain and Robert Brasillach trials. " Similarly, the Laval case produced 
literature which focused on his trial but which was also of a broadly historical nature. 42 This 
trial reportage, which also flowered from the cases of Charles Maurras, Jacques Benoist- 
Mechin, and Maurice Pujo amongst others, was significant. Accompanied by polemical essays 
such as those written by Alfred Fabre-Luce and Maurice Bardeche, it preceded the other 
versions of writing about history, brought the extreme right wing back into the public eye and 
can be seen to have influenced the current's more general orientation towards revising the 
epuration judges' interpretation of the war. 43 
41 Jacques Isomi, Le Proces de Robert Brasillach (Paris: Flammarion, 1946); Documents pour la revision (Paris: 
Martel, 1948); Requete en revision pour Philippe Petain (Paris: Flarnmarion, 1950); Souffrance et mort du 
Marechal (Paris: Flammarion, 1951). 
42 Pierre Laval, Laval parle (Geneva: Editions du Cheval aile, 1948); J. Barduc, Dans la cellule de Pierre Laval 
(Paris: SELF, 1948); Yves-Frederic Jaffire, "La Mort de Pierre Laval", Miroir de l'histoire, 43 (1953): 783-790. 
43 See Alfred Fabre-Luce, Au nom des silencieux (Paris: L'Auteur, 1945); Maurice Bardeche, Lettre ä Francois 
Mauriac (Paris: La Pensee libre, 1947); Maurice Bardeche, Nuremberg ou la Terre Promise (Paris: Les Sept 
Couleurs, 1948). 
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Political memoirs from the extreme right-wing were common by the late 1940s. 
Discursively, these texts tended to occupy the space between the trial coverage and normal 
historical discourse. Examples of the type can be found from Louis Rougier, Yves Bouthillier, 
Pierre Taittinger, Jean Tracou and others. " In order to rehabilitate Vichy each of these writers 
sought to combine personal insight and historical judgement. 
Typical of the period and style was Rougier's Mission secrete ä Londres. 45 Rougier, a 
professor of philosophy and political economy, had been actively involved in the early days 
of Vichy. However, by the late autumn of 1940, he obtained an exit visa to spend the rest of 
the war in New York. Here he worked as an assistant professor of philosophy at the New 
School for Social Research. Amongst the French exile community he continued to support a 
Petainist interpretation of Vichy and in 1943 he preferred General Giraud to de Gaulle. At the 
end of the war, now living in Montreal, Canada, Rougier published the first edition of his 
memoirs, Les Accords Petain-Churchill, the content of which legitimated the armistice and the 
Vichy regime. Primarily he advanced the thesis that Vichy had played a `double game' and that 
in November 1940 he had negotiated an agreement between Churchill and Petain against the 
German occupiers. ' One year later these revelations were published in Europe. The Geneva 
based Editions du Cheval Aile house retitled them as Mission secrete ä Londres. 
44 For example: J. P. Abel (alias Rene Chateau), L'Age de Cain: premiere temoignage sur les dessous de la 
liberation de Paris (Paris: Editions Nouvelles, 1947); Yves Bouthillier, Le Drame de Vichy (Paris: Plon, 1950); 
Louis-Dominique Girard, Montoire, Verdun diplomatique (Paris: Andre Bonne, 1948); Henri Moulin de 
Labarthete, Le Temps des illusions (Bruxelles: Editions du Cheval aile, 1946); Pierre Taittinger, Et Paris nefut 
pas detruit (Paris: L'Elan, 1948); Jean Tracou, Le Marechal aux liens (Paris: Andre Bonne, 1948). 
45 Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres (Geneva and Paris: Editions du Cheval aile, 1948). 
46 This was followed by a second book on the war, also published in North America, Louis Rougier, Creance 
morale de la France (Montreal: Lucien Parizeau, 1946). The credibility of Rougier's work has been questioned 
in Gaston Schmitt, Les Accords secrets franco-britanniques de novembre-decembre 1940. Histoire ou 
mystification. (Paris: PUF, 1957); "Rapports avec les Anglo-Saxons (jusqu'en novembre 1942)", in Michel et 
al. (eds), La France sous l'occupation (Paris: PUF, 1959), 89-108; and Robert Frank, "Vichy et les Britanniques 
1940-1941: double-jeu ou double language? ", in Azema and Bedarida (eds), Le Regime de Vichy et les Francais, 
144-163. 
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The Editions du Cheval Aile had been founded in 1944 by the Swiss businessman 
Constant Bourquin. He disseminated titles which might otherwise not have obtained publication 
in France. A wide spectrum of authoritarian conservative, Petainist and neo-fascist writers 
found an outlet for their works which were produced in Switzerland and then imported into the 
Hexagon. As well as Rougier, the Cheval Aile published books written by Alfred Fabre-Luce, 
Pierre Dominique, Raymond Abellio, Paul Morand, Rene and Josee de Chambrun, Andre 
Therive and the Belgian economist Henri de Man. Influential in the success of this project was 
Bourquin's French colleague Jean Jardin. 47 
It is evident that Rougier's aim to rewrite the past was not conducted in isolation. From 
the time of the liberation onwards the extreme right wing had re-equipped itself as best it 
could. In addition to the formidable Cheval Aile group, a number of Paris based publishers 
such as Nouvelles Editions Latines, L'Elan, La Table Ronde, Andre Bonne, Grasset, 
Flammarion and Plon worked with its memorialists, and later its biographers and historians. 
Furthermore, the extreme right-wing producers were also supported by a growing press. A 
journalistic career in one of its newspapers was frequently the day to day employment for the 
current's prolific writers. 
Once more Rougier's path is a good example. As the 1948 French edition of his war 
memoirs was being published, he wrote a series of essays for Ecrits de Paris, the main extreme 
right-wing journal of the early post-liberation period. Here Rougier repeated the claims which 
he made in his book. In addition to this occasional journalism he also presented a series of 
lectures. In 1948, under the auspices of the Ecrits de Paris and its Centre d'Etudes des 
Questions Actuelles, Rougier informed audiences of his secret mission, the Petain-Churchill 
47 Pierre Assouline, Une eminence grise: Jean Jardin 1904-1976 (Paris: Balland/Folio Poche, 1986), 253. 
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accords and the dangers of Gaullism. 48 
By 1954 Rougier had moved to a different strand within the extreme right-wing press. 
Now he contributed to the royalist weekly newspaper Aspects de la France. As in the case of 
many other extreme right-wing intellectuals, the doctrinal differences which existed between 
royalism and hard nationalism did not deter Rougier from working for various currents within 
the broad ideological church. In fact, by the 1970s, he had become a guru of the French 
Nouvelle droite, who in turn valued his philosophical writing over his historiography. 49 For 
Aspects de la France, in the role of a prestigious historian, he reviewed the first volume of de 
Gaulle's Memoires de guerre. This enterprise ran through a series of seven articles which 
commenced in November 1954 and concluded in January 1955. Rougier's style and the anti- 
Gaullist substance of his argument had not changed from his earlier work. Meanwhile, by the 
end of the Fourth Republic, Rougier was appointed as a Professor of the Arts Faculty of the 
University of Caen. His extreme right-wing intellectual agenda had not apparently hampered 
the dissemination of his work or the continuation of his pre-war career in higher education. 
As the early political memorialists found a marketplace, a large number of pro-Petainist 
biographies of Marshal Petain were published. These treatments have been recently 
contextualised by Bernard Laguerre's short study and Henry Rousso's authoritative account 
48 For Rougier's speech-making activities see, Announcements in Ecrits de Paris, December 1948: ii. The most 
succinct account of the formation of Ecrits de Paris is found in Raoul Girardet, "L'Heritage de 1'Action 
Frangaise", Revue francaise de science politique, 11.4 (1957): 770-771. 
49 Rougier is one of the few intellectuals to have influenced both the anti-liberal French Nouvelle droite and the 
ultra-liberal Anglo-American New Right. For his inter-war liberalism see, Richard Cockett, Thinking the 
Unthinkable: Think-Tanks and the Economic Counter-Revolution 1931-1983 (London: Fontana, 1995), 9-12,86. 
For his Nouvelle droite paganism see, his Celse contre les chretiens advertised in, Votre bibliotheque pour le 
XX` siecle - Elements (Paris: Editions du Labyrinthe, 1997). 
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of the Association nationale pour defendre la memoire du Marechal Petain (ADMP). 50 For the 
most part biographies of Petain came from within the ADMP group. Rousso's description of 
it as a rightist `laboratory of ideas' is supported by my research. A brief profile of those 
involved in defending Petain and sympathetically writing about his life suggest that the point 
can be extended. A review of the intellectual trajectories of those who sat on the Association's 
Comite d'honneur demonstrates the hybrid mixture of extreme rights. On the one hand 
members included figures who personified the literary and military conservative establishment: 
General Weygand, Henry Bordeaux, Jerome Carcopino, Claude Farrere, P. E. Flandin, and 
Louis Madelin, for instance. Conversely, elements of the radical extreme right-wing press also 
formed an influential part of the group. Representative figures of this stratum are Pierre 
Dominique, the aforementioned Louis Rougier, Jean Maze, Pierre Taittinger, Louis Dominique 
Girard and Jean Tracou. General Hering, the ADMP's first active, rather than honorary 
President, was perhaps the quintessential biographer of Petain. Before writing La Vie 
exemplaire du Marechal Petain (1956) Hering had pursued an upper-bourgeois military career 
but after the war he had seen fit to write this treatment and to contribute to the hard nationalist 
press. " Just as the ADMP's committee balanced shades of extreme right-wing activity so too 
Hering's intellectual trajectory crossed the many internal borders of the right. 
The extreme right wing's production levels were so intense and sub-divided that 
biographical focus was never limited to Petain in the way in which Gaullist or communist 
biographies were strongly associated with de Gaulle or Thorez. Extreme-right publications also 
so Bernard Laguerre, "Les Biographies de Petain", in Azema and Bedarida (eds), Le Regime de Vichy et les 
Francais, 45-57; Henry Rousso, "Memoire contre courant", in Alfred Wahl (ed. ), Actes des colloques de Metz: 
memoire de la Seconde Guerre Mondiale, 111-124. See also Jacques Isorni's memoirs which are revelatory of 
much of the extreme right-wing's operations in this period, Memoires, Vol. 2,1946-1958 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 
1986). 
51 Pierre Hering, "Justice", Ecrits de Paris, May 1948: 30-32; "Justice", Ecrits de Paris, October 1948: 49-52; 
La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain (Paris: Paris-Livres, 1956). 
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covered the lives of Robert Brasillach, Pierre Laval, Charles Maurras and to a lesser extent 
Louis-Ferdinand Celine. Thereby the literary biography was itself a prolific sub-field within 
the wider school. These works are not discussed at length in this thesis. Nevertheless they are 
additional evidence of the post-war cultural recovery of the extreme right wing, and would 
prove an interesting area for further research. 
In the 1950s the third category of writing, `history' was a common medium for the 
extreme right-wing, more so than we have seen in the Gaullist current's record of production. 
The extreme right's historiographic activities were impressive in terms of diversity and 
volume. In general, those who had initially written political memoirs recast their work as 
histories, producing edition after edition. Histories included books by the ever active Rougier, 
Girard, Henry Coston, and Jacques Benoist-Mechin. Importantly, production was stimulated 
by the `purge-amnesty' debate of 1950-51 and did not decline substantially afterwards. Indeed, 
if anything, extreme right-wing production and organisation were not tamed by the gift of 
amnesty, instead they were invigorated by the release of many activists from prison. Jacques 
Benoist-Mechin is a classic example of the later extreme right-wing historians. Let us consider 
him in detail. 
Jacques Benoist-Mechin, man of letters, diplomat and political activist, had been fully 
committed to the Etat francais, having spent part of the war representing Vichy in Berlin and 
Paris. His right-wing credentials are immaculate. He had been a Germanophile par excellence, 
a member of Doriot's Parti Populaire Francais, a supporter of Hitler, and during the 
occupation was introduced into Admiral Darlan's cabinet. He also accepted the Presidency of 
the Legion Tricolore. His memoirs of the defeat of France, La Moisson de quarante, became 
an occupation bestseller. Despite having been part of what Marc Ferro has called Vichy's `parti 
Allemand' and having advocated French participation in the war against Britain, Benoist- 
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Mechin survived the liberation and its purges. 52 Sentenced to death, pardoned and then 
imprisoned, by the mid-1950s he had returned to the Parisian literary scene. For example, in 
the final volume of his post-war memoirs, A l'epreuve du temps, he recollects dinners with the 
publishing team at Albin Michel and the Petainist novelist Pierre Benoit. 53 It was at this point 
that he recommenced writing about French military history, and in 1956 published a three- 
volume account of the 1940 collapse and the creation of the Vichy regime. Entitled Soixante 
fours qui ebranlerent I'Occident (henceforth Soixante fours) the body of the work had been 
written during his imprisonment. The text ran to over 1500 pages: La Bataille du Nord, La 
Bataille de France and La Fin du regime. sa 
The trilogy's scope was impressive and for the extreme right wing, at least, its 
publication was a cultural event. In this milieu Benoist-Mechin's work was soon considered 
to be the definitive text published on the war period. For instance, Rivarol, the weekly 
newspaper which had developed from Ecrits de Paris, devoted three separate reviews to it. The 
first of these was an extended essay by the notorious antisemitic novelist, Lucien Rebatet. 
Enthusiastically, Rebatet announced: 
On a lu, on lira sur le printemps 1940, d'autres textes. Mais voici, apres le 
recul de seize ans normal et meme necessaire pour un tel travail, le livre qui 
sera dorenavant indispensable, qui demeurera le plus complet et le plus 
52 Marc Ferro, Petain, 306. 
53 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, A l'epreuve du temps, Vol. 3 (Paris: Julliard, 1993), 26-27. For a helpful resume of 
Benoist-Mechin's full career see, A 1'epreuve du temps, Vol. 1 (Paris: Julliard, 1989), I-XI. A posthumous 
memoir of his period in Vichy government was published as, De la defaite au desastre, 2 Vols (Paris: Bouquins 
Laffont, 1984,1985). 
54 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante fours qui ebranlerent 1'Occident, 3 Vols, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1956,1S1 
collected edition 1957). To an extent the account followed his pro-Nazi inter-war series of books on the military 
history of contemporary Germany, Histoire de l'arnxee allemande 1918-1938,2 Vols (Paris: 151 edition: Albin 
Michel, 1936-1938, definitive edition 1941-1942). A brief summary of the earlier sympathetic interpretations 
of the Third Reich and the German Army is given in Pierre Aycoberry, The Nazi Question, 90-91. 
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terriblement eloquent. ss 
For the novelist it seemed that at last `notre plus grand historien' had set the record straight. 
In return for this publicity Benoist-Mechin and Albin Michel authorised Rivarol to reprint two 
short extracts from his work. Somewhat forgotten by today's extreme right-wing community, 
who often look to others for inspiration, Benoist-Mechin represented the Fourth Republic's 
leading hard-right historian. However, it was not only Rivarol which enjoyed his work. For 
example, Louis-Henri Parias's periodical Miroir de t'histoire gave all three volumes very 
positive reviews. Although Parias had been associated with Gaullist historiography at the time 
of the RPF, his reviewer, G. M. Tracy, favourably compared Benoist-Mechin's version of 
history with de Gaulle's Memoires de guerre. 56 
Publications from this current, supported by mainstream publishers, are a feature of the 
period. Works such as Benoist-Mechin's give the lie to claims that the war was predominantly 
a site for Gaullo-communist myth-making. As I have charted, throughout the Fourth Republic, 
historians such as Rougier (published by Cheval Aile and Grasset), Isorni, Weygand, and 
Gaxotte (with Flammarion), Paul Serant (Plon) and Thierry Maulnier (with Gallimard), and 
several others, presented extreme right-wing perspectives with the collaboration of the 
55 Lucien Rebatet, "Un film hallucinant: la tragedie de juin '40", Rivarol , 19 July 1956: 26-27. The review was 
far more complimentary than remarks which Petain allegedly made about the author during the purge. It is 
Jacques Isorni who takes up the story, `Lorsque le juge Mille se rendit ä file d'Yeu specialement pour 
interroger Petain sur un pretendu accord intervenu entre Allemagne et la France contre les Allies, et qui fut 
probablement une entreprise de Benoist-Mechin et d'Abetz, le Marechal avait repondu "Il ne faut jamais croire 
M. Benoist-Mechin, meme lorsqu'il dit du bien de moi. " Je l'avais reproduit dans mon Philippe Petain que je 
lui envoyait. Il [Benoist-Mechin] dementit avec colere'. See Isorni, Memoires, Vol. 2,96. 
-%J. M. Tracy, "Les Livres d'histoire", Miroir de 1'histoire, 85, January 1957: 147. Alistair Home has noted that 
the work `contains a mass of inaccuracies, although it made a considerable impact in France', see To Lose a 
Battle: France 1940 (London: Papermac, 1990), footnote 20,587. In 1989 one of the editors of Benoist- 
Mechin's literary estate, Eric Roussel, described Soixante fours thus: `ses Soixante Jours qui ebranlerent 
! 'Occident demeure egalement indispensable ä la connaissance de ces quelques semaines durant lesquelles, au 
printemps 1940, la France s'effondra avant de subir le joug du vainqueur', A I'epreuve du temps, Voll, I. 
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publishing establishment. " Whilst it has often been claimed that, jusqu'ä 1'elegante prestation 
de 1'ancien SS francais Christian de la Maziere Bans Francais si vous saviez..., la memoire des 
vaincus est demeuree impresentable et inaudible, reduite aux urarges, culpabilisee, ' that 
assertion is irreconcilable with the evidence. 58 
The deluge of extreme right-wing historiography of Vichy was an important feature of 
the ideology's wider survival strategies. Any type of publication which absolved or revised the 
Vichy past was of immediate political assistance. Functionally, the topic of the Second World 
War became of huge importance. The ability to publish on contemporary history was a further 
step in the rehabilitation of authoritarian conservative, royalist and neo-fascistic thought. 
Factual writing on the war can be identified as being comparable to the fictional revival 
pursued by the prominent literary Hussard group: Roger Nimier, Michel Deon, Antoine 
Blondin and Jacques Laurent. 
For communists, Gaullists and the extreme right-wingers, writing about the Second 
World War was a vital part of constructing ideological identities and creating an interpretative 
grid through which to comprehend the contemporary political world. Much of this world was 
perceived through the past. Common to each of the three ideological communities was an 
almost obsessive desire to exhume as many lessons of history as were sustainable at any one 
time. That is to say, contemporary political debate was never entirely distant from issues which 
could be located in a representation of the war. On the other hand, as I will argue below, the 
continued production of ideological history was also as much the result of inter-ideological 
rivalries as it was of any individual wish to portray one's own past advantageously. 
57 In addition to the previously footnoted examples, see Pierre Gaxotte, Histoire des Francais, 2 Vols (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1951), 568-575; Paul Serant, Oü va la droite?, Preface Marcel Ayme (Paris: Plon, 1958); Thierry 
Maulnier, La Face de meduse du communisme (Paris: Gallimard, 1951) . 
58 Alain Brossat, Liberation, fete folle, 60-61. 
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Historiographic Rivalry and Response 
Historians belonging to the three dominant ideological currents read and considered each 
other's work. More often than not history writing proved to be an area of rivalry and 
animosity. With so many actors producing slanted versions of the past, many of these 
publications were stimulated through profound disagreements with accounts which had 
emerged from the other currents. Polemical exchanges, poisonous letters to the press and the 
traditional droit de reponse were common. From time to time journalistic tempers rose to 
develop into pamphlet campaigns. Entire interpretative counter-arguments were produced and 
even personal defamation cases brought to bear. In the daily routine of writing, politicking, 
providing book reviews for the press, and in some cases teaching or giving public talks, 
aggressive exchanges with the `enemy' were vital. Confrontation provided much needed 
publicity, and equally the reassurance that `they' were wrong, and by implication that one's 
own side was right. Two detailed examples illustrate the dynamics of contestation which 
accompanied the publication of many of the politically motivated accounts of the war. The 
events of the `Taittinger Affair' (1948-1958) and reactions to the publication of de Gaulle's 
Memoires de guerre - L'Appel (1954-1955) demonstrate the inter-ideological nature of the 
historiographic production process. Communists, Gaullists and extreme right-wingers tracked 
each other's publications and conceptions of the war. Both of the cases underline the benefits 
in terms of publicity, press space and notoriety which controversy and public debate offered. 
They raise a paradox which appears to be the core of ideological history production. On the 
one hand, disagreement and debate were necessarily violent, and potentially dangerous, whilst 
conversely, over time, this very animosity could become a relatively mundane business in 
which all those involved appear to have been cynically entrenched in their views and to have 
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enjoyed `going through the motions' of disputation. 
The Taittinger Affair 
In the autumn of 1948, Pierre Taittinger, the ex-Jeunesses patriotes demagogue and champagne 
baron, published a defence of his wartime record, and thereby an account of the liberation of 
Paris. Having served as the President of the Paris Municipal Council from May 1943 until 
August 1944, Taittinger felt that he was uniquely positioned to depict this period. In Et Paris 
nefut pas detruit (henceforth Et Paris) Taittinger claimed to have played a pivotal role in the 
protection of Paris during the German withdrawal and the city's pending liberation. He argued 
that his negotiations had helped secure the `peaceful' German retreat and that this had been 
obscured by propagandistic accounts of 1944. Taittinger argued that false legends had been 
generated by a French Communist Party which needed to exaggerate its patriotic resistance 
record. At the beginning of the work, he stated, `J'ai ecrit ces lignes a 1'intention particuliere 
des Parisiens, pour les informer des efforts qui ont contribue, en aoüt 1944, a la sauvegarde 
de leur ville et sa liberation. Et afin qu'ils sachent pourquoi Paris ne fut pas detruit'. s9 
Taittinger's publishers, Les Editions de 1'Elan, were also explicit about the purposes of the 
series in which the account was distributed. Their `Temoignages Contemporains' collection had 
included titles by the extreme right-wingers Albert Paraz and Claude Jamet as well as Abbe 
Desgranges' Les Crimes demasques du resistantialisme. 60 The publishers, headed by Edmond 
Marie, sought to revise the perceived injustices of the epuration and what they identified as the 
subsequent Gaullo-communist false representation of the war which had justified it. The 
59 Pierre Taittinger, Et Paris, 9. 
60 By the time Et Paris had gone to press, L'Elan's catalogue included titles from Sacha Guitry, Albert Paraz, 
and Abbe Desgranges. 
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editor's preface to Et Paris is indicative of the enterprise. 
La Collection `Temoignages contemporains' a ete creee par les Editions de 
l'Elan dans le dessein de contribuer ä retablir la verite historique devant une 
opinion publique ä qui eile echappe trop souvent, particulierement en ce 
moment oü des courants multiples et des propagandes abusives deforment, Bans 
bien des cas, le jugement du citoyen. 61 
Taittinger and the Elan house were part of the extreme right-wing revival of the late 1940s 
(comparable to the case of Louis Rougier outlined above). However, the reaction with which 
Et Paris was greeted was both exceptional and exemplary. The controversy which came to 
surround the account justifies the label 'affair'. Historiographical dispute and debate were 
sparked by the book and its author. Taittinger's writing caused enmity from both of the other 
ideological currents for much of the lifetime of the Fourth Republic. Typical of its time, Et 
Paris stimulated conflict after conflict: from direct street protest, through legal sanction to 
furious public debate, with the former marking the 1948-1951 period and the latter continuing 
almost until the production of the book's re-edition, in mid-1958. 
On its first publication even the display of copies of Et Paris was provocative. For 
example, on 25 September 1948, a group identified as ex-resistance fighters gathered outside 
the `La Reine Christine' bookshop, on the Boulevard Raspail, to protest against the 
presentation of Taittinger's work in its window. This was an inauspicious welcome to 
Taittinger's career as an historian. 62 Indeed, this demonstration was unusual. Nevertheless, a 
similar encounter was to be repeated in 1950 between General Weygand and a group of 
61 Pierre Taittinger, Et Paris, 3. The same frontispiece is included in Claude Jamet's Fifi Roi, see Alan Morris, 
Collaboration and Resistance Reviewed, 15. 
62 Unsigned, "Anciens resistants ont manifeste contre la publication du livre de M. Pierre Taittinger", Le Monde, 
26 September 1948: 3. 
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protesters who wished to stop the sale of his historical writings. 63 These events highlight the 
sensitivity of the earlier extreme right-wing publications on the war and indicate the depth of 
feeling which continued to exist on all sides when a prominent figure sought to publish 
historiography. 
A second reaction to Et Paris came in the form of an attempted legal sanction. A 
number of weeks after the Boulevard Raspail demonstration, a group of ex-FFI officers 
(possibly already involved in the street-protest) petitioned the local Prefect of Police to ban 
Taittinger's book. This strategy was partially successful. Le Monde reported that, `M. Leonard 
[the Prefect] a repondu qu'il prendrait les mesures necessaires pour empecher 1'exposition en 
vitrine de l'ouvrage mais que son interdiction dependait du ministere de 1'Interieur'. 64 The 
localised communist reaction against the book continued. On the 13 December 1948, a PCF 
member of the Paris Municipal Council, M. Ouzoulias, demanded that its members condemn 
Et Paris on behalf of the capital. This motion was favoured unanimously and was carried. In 
response, Taittinger took up what he saw as an injustice - writing an appeal to the head of the 
Municipal Council, Pierre de Gaulle. Naturally, a copy of this letter was also printed in the 
extreme right-wing press, the royalist Aspects de la France. In it Taittinger waspishly 
concluded his defence by alluding to the Municipal Council's complicity with the PCF's 
agenda. He claimed that he had been one of those Frenchmen who had merely `fait son devoir 
de son mieux'. The following extract captures the tone and spirit of the letter. 
Le Bulletin Municipal officiel du 20 decembre 1948 m'apprend qu'au cours de 
la seance du 13 decembre 1948, j'ai ete mis en cause par le representant du 
63 Unsigned, "Faits divers: des manifestants prennent ä partie le general Weygand", Le Monde, 3 March 1950: 
8. 
64 Unsigned, "Informations divers", Le Monde, 9 October 1948: 7. 
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groupe communiste, M. Ouzoulias. Celui-ci, en se servant de textes tronques de 
mon livre, Et Paris ne fut pas detruit, a surpris la bonne foi de 1'Assemblee 
municipale et obtenu, en fin de compte, un vote d'unanimite condamnant mon 
ouvrage comme portant atteinte ä la dignite de la nation [... ] En resume, on 
comprend parfaitement l'interet du parti communiste de maintenir ä tout prix, 
contre toute verite et contre toute justice, les legendes qui font de lui le seul 
parti vraiment patriote de France' . 
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Through the FFI-Pierre de Gaulle incident Taittinger gained access to the royalist press, and 
had the rhetorical pleasure of chastising Pierre de Gaulle and the other Municipal Councillors. 
The debate highlights how quickly a range of ideological players became involved in a 
localised dispute. The anti-communist version of the liberation had drawn retaliation from the 
PCF, but it had equally led to the Gaullist mayor of Paris condemning Et Paris. This initial 
scandal meant that Taittinger could answer his critics and repeat his accusation that they were 
relying on a false, communist, interpretation of the war. 
The Taittinger affair illustrates that ideological histories of the war were not simply 
published, then forgotten. Historians kept their work in the public eye, whilst their ideological 
opponents debunked their work, or, as in this case, censored it. More often than not the 
impression of war historiography derived from the work of Jean-Pierre Azema, Francois 
Bedarida, R. J. B. Bosworth, Stephane Courtois and several others ignores the role of inter- 
ideological dynamics. ` In reality, the production of ideological history was far more complex 
a cultural phenomenon than has been presented. Intellectuals who believed their versions of 
the past to be the most plausible did not only produce their own texts, but also intervened and 
65 Pierre Taittinger, "Une lettre de M. Pierre Taittinger A M. Pierre de Gaulle", Aspects de la France, 13 January 
1949: 6. Andre Ouzoulias was also the author of, La Vie heroique du Colonel Fabien (Paris: Editions Sociales, 
1945) cited in Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Is Paris Burning?, 387. 
66 Jean-Pierre Azema and Francois Bedarida, "Vichy et ses historiens", Esprit: 43-51; Azema and Bedarida, 
"L'Historisation de la resistance", Esprit: 19-35; R. J. B., Bosworth, Explaining Auschwitz and Hiroshima; 
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counter-attacked one another. Being an ideological historian did not only mean the writing of 
history for one's own supporters and press. Instead, it was often a case of defending one's 
position against the latest aggressor. 
The Taittinger affair was not resolved in 1948. Almost one year later, the FFI group 
which had originally sought to restrict the display of Taittinger's writings continued their 
campaign by bringing a defamation action against the author and his publishers. In addition, 
two private cases were filed against Taittinger and Elan by Roger Worms and the Lepercq 
family, on behalf of the deceased ex-Minister M. Lepercq. As Le Monde reports, the first 
hearing of the FFI case involved sympathisers from both camps, including the PCF's resistance 
hero, Colonel Rol-Tanguy. The incident appears to have been as much to Taittinger's 
advantage as to anyone else's. Accompanied by the director of Editions Elan, and his barrister 
Me Maurice Ribet, Taittinger was given the opportunity to restate his case. Le Monde's 
reporter emphasised Taittinger's confidence. He commented: 
M. Taittinger, vetu de bleu marine, satisfait et abondant comme ä son habitude, 
prend tout d'abord la parole pour une declaration liminaire, dont le ton West pas 
sans rappeler celui des reunions des Jeunesses patriotes d'antan. Il evoque avec 
complaisance "ces Francais qui, ne possedant pas de compte de banque a 
1'etranger n'ont pas voulu au moment de l'epreuve quitter le sol national". " 
The direct attack on Thorez and de Gaulle was a tried formula which had been established in 
Vichy propaganda. Pleading that the ex-resistance group which had brought the case, the 
Union Nationale des Forces Francaises de l'Interieur, were largely ineligible applicants, Me 
Ribet seems to have avoided the FFI case. No further press coverage clarified the result. 
67 Unsigned, "Dernieres nouvelles - cet apres midi les FFI assignent M. Taittinger pour son 
livre Et Paris", Le 
Monde, 24 January 1950: 8. 
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Nevertheless, Taittinger was less fortunate in the subsequent private actions which he faced. 
To Roger Worms's charge, Taittinger and Elan were found guilty of a `delit d'injure' and were 
forced to pay a fine of 10,000 francs. 68 In the case brought by the Lepercq family the outcome 
also proved to be an expensive one. At the centre of his defence against Lepercq, Ribet argued 
that Taittinger's book was technically an example of journalism and that his client was only 
a `historien partiel' . 
69 This would have meant that under the Press Law of July 1881 
Taittinger's defamation hearings were now prescribed. The manipulation of the legal status of 
Et Paris, as a text, failed. Taittinger and Edmond Marie, the director of Elan, were condemned 
to pay a further fine of 100,000 francs to each of Lepercq's surviving children. 
The legal conflicts exemplified in the Taittinger affair were repeated in other cases. The 
early extreme right-wing historiographers were the ones who were the most frequently 
prosecuted. However, with the exception of the French state's actions against Maurice 
Bardeche, legal action was brought on the basis of one individual versus another. 7° In the late 
1940s, and early 1950s, Jean Tracou, Louis-Dominique Girard, Albert Paraz, the Ecrits de 
Paris and Aspects de la France all faced similar cases to those which were brought against 
68 Unsigned, "M. Taittinger n'est pas diffame mais injure", Le Monde, 2 March 1950: 12. 
69 For the Lepercq case, Unsigned, "Un jugement du proces Leperq", Le Monde, 3 March 1951: 5; Unsigned, 
"M. Taittinger versera 100,000 francs... ", Le Monde, 16 March 1951: 12. 
70 In 1948 Bardeche was prosecuted for his Nuremberg ou la Terre Promise under Article 24 of the Law of 29 
July 1881 which considered the offence of `apologie du crime de meurtre'. A number of accounts detail the case 
which marks the first attempt to combat a form of Holocaust denial literature. An extreme right-wing 
interpretation, as framed by Bardeche's barrister, can be found in Jacques Isorni, Memoires 2,199-206; whilst 
an impartial treatment is given in Nicholas Hewitt, Literature and the Right in Post-War France, 62-68. For 
Bardeche as a forerunner of the Holocaust denial literature of the 1970s, see Gill Seidel, The Holocaust Denial 
(Leeds: Beyond the Pale collective, 1986), 95-96; Ian Barnes, "Fascism and Technocratic Elitism: the case of 
Maurice Bardeche", The Wiener Library Bulletin, NS34.53/54 (1981): 36-40. The overtly antisemitic character 
of Bardeche's essay was atypical of the wider historiographic milieu in which I am interested. 
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Taittinger. 71 As with the Taittinger affair, these attempted sanctions only confirmed the 
extreme right's view of the epuration, and in turn, stimulated further publications against both 
the communist and Gaullist interpretations of the war. Of course, by their very nature, fictional 
accounts of the war such as Marcel Ayme's Le Chemin des ecoliers (1946), which subverted 
and questioned both Gaullist and communist assumptions in similar ways to the ideological 
histories, did not result in comparable court cases. 72 
The legal aspect of the affair is of interest in the questions which it raises about the 
status of Taittinger's text. By his own terms, Taittinger had claimed to be writing a `history' 
of the liberation of Paris. However, in an ideological conflict language is infinitely malleable 
and interpretation is frequently founded on expediency. When Me Ribet sought to defend 
Taittinger and use the press laws to his advantage, he did not hesitate to describe his client's 
work as 'journalism'. Now, Taittinger was to be considered a `historien partiel'. In this 
example, legal considerations had suddenly changed the genre claims which author and text 
had hitherto implied. Similarly, when it was rhetorically convenient to Taittinger, he also 
argued that his personal role in the administration of Paris meant that his was a more accurate 
insight into events than that of a mere 'historien'. 
Alongside the three defamation cases, and for some time afterwards, Pierre Taittinger 
and Et Paris caused excitement in the press. From the first reviews of the book, a long-lasting 
acrimony developed between the historian, Adrien Dansette, and Taittinger. The latter's 
71 See for example, Unsigned, "M. Kammerer assigne MM. Tracou et Girard", Le Monde, 5 June 1949: 4; 
Unsigned, "Le general de Lattre de Tassigny reclame 2 millions de dommages-interets ä M. Tracou", Le Monde, 
6 July 1949: 8; Unsigned, "Mme Leclerc de Hautecloque poursuit un journal en diffamation [Ecrits de Paris]", 
Le Monde, 2 May 1949: 4; whilst against the trend Jacques Isorni litigated against Soustelle, Unsigned, "La 
difference Chambe-Soustelle est devenu la difference Giraud-de Gaulle", Le Monde, 23 February 1951: 12. 
n' Marcel Ayme, Le Chemin des ecoliers (Paris: Gallimard, 1946). However, Ayme's play La Tete des autres 
attracted similar protests to those witnessed in the Taittinger affair. See Nicholas Hewitt, Literature and the 
Right 
in Post-War France, 62-68. 
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treatment of the liberation of Paris was at odds with Dansette's in Histoire de la liberation de 
Paris and Trente ans, and both men sought to defend their positions, whilst in so doing 
Dansette further revealed his Gaullist political sympathies. The debate was far from academic 
and was quickly reduced to the level of trading personal insults. This enmity was played out 
in a series of reviews and counter-reviews which were printed in Le Monde and in the pages 
of the conservative history review, Miroir de 1'histoire. Consistently both men sought to 
discredit the other's work. Typical was the following interchange from their dispute. In 1953, 
Dansette had written a summary of his views on the liberation of Paris. The article passed 
without note, but a reader's letter in 1954 asked for further information about the events of 
1944 and it was this missive which stirred Taittinger, providing him with the opportunity to 
write to the journal. His letter offered a critique of Dansette's work. Here then was a chance 
to respond in kind to the poor reviews Et Paris had originally received from Dansette in Le 
Monde. Taittinger wrote, 
Dix ans passent vite. Une oeuvre de rehabilitation s'impose[ ... ]Dann le concert 
d'eloges qui ont ete adresses aux uns et aux autres, on a oublie de rendre 
hommage ä ceux qui dans les Assemblees Municipales [i. e. Taittinger], et les 
Mairies de Paris et de banlieue, se sont consacres, jusqu'au bout, ä la defense 
de leurs cites, et ä la sauvegarde de leurs habitants. 73 
Instead of choosing to ignore the slight, Dansette replied. This was a relatively easy choice as 
he could rely on his original critique (1949) of Taittinger's work in Le Monde. Explicitly he 
presented Taittinger as an unreliable witness, who was motivated by bitterness and political 
frustration. The history of the liberation had already been written in Dansette's own work. Any 
73 Pierre Taittinger, "Sur la liberation de Paris", Miroir de 1'histoire, 66 (1955): 117. 
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further revision, it was argued, would lead to an excessively right-wing treatment of events. 74 
The argument did not stop after one exchange. Over the next eighteen months Taittinger and 
Dansette vigorously attempted to debunk each others respective interpretations. 75 In what was 
turning into a classic dialogue de sourds Taittinger claimed that Dansette was writing without 
any personal experience, whilst on the other hand, Dansette repeated that Taittinger did not 
have the required distance to accurately represent August 1944. 
On the level of extended polemical debate, the Taittinger-Dansette case is an extreme 
example of a common feature of ideological production. For both of the central protagonists 
confrontation brought the opportunity to air their views on the liberation. Similarly, by the 
time of the Miroir exchanges, both historians had already good reason to dislike each other, 
an obvious legacy of the earlier reviews and responses. This final element of the affair reveals 
the role of pride. Neither Dansette nor Taittinger appear to have been able to tolerate the 
challenges which the other historian's work presented. Locked in ideological and probably 
personal dispute, their campaigns against each other were likely to continue. In this detailed 
example, it is evident that the more accounts of the war an historian, or current of 
interpretation, produced, the more likely it was that rival historians who believed in a different 
version of the past would counter-attack in kind. In the case of the Taittinger-Dansette 
example, and others, there is little evidence of a psychological preoccupation with the 
collective memory of the war in the manner that Rousso would suggest. It simply was an 
unresolvable argument between authors of two conflicting interpretations of a symbolically 
important set of events. 
74 See Adrien Dansette's reply, "Sur la liberation de Paris", Miroir de 1'histoire, 69 (1955): 495-497. 
75 Pierre Taittinger, "M. Dansette veut avoir le dernier mot", Miroir de I'histoire, 73 (1956): 121; Adrien 
Dansette, "Sur la petite legende de M. Taittinger... ", Miroir de 1'histoire, 74 (1956): 248-249. 
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Opposition and Reaction to De Gaulle's Memoires de Guerre. 
The reaction of the PCF and the extreme right-wing to the publication of de Gaulle's Memoires 
de guerre reinforces a number of the conclusions which I have drawn from the Taittinger 
affair. De Gaulle's first volume of war memoirs represented a landmark in both the career of 
the General and in French historiography of the war. As has been noted above, this was also 
a major political opportunity for Gaullists to praise de Gaulle's skills as a historian and to 
suggest his continued importance to the nation. However, the publication of a major account 
of the war by the leading French protagonist within it was not ignored by anti-Gaullists. 
Instead, from all quarters, it was a signal to renew efforts to counter de Gaulle's claims. A 
brief survey of the reaction of both the communist left and the extreme right illustrates how 
the production of committed history from one current produced a series of reinterpretations 
from the other two. As witnessed in the Taittinger affair, the publication of ideologically 
marked history writing did not put an end to debate, it exacerbated it. The interjection from 
de Gaulle served only to widen the surface divisions which already existed between the three 
currents. 
The French Communist Party had deployed the `political memoir from above' strategy 
for several years before the publication of de Gaulle's book. Maurice Thorez's Fils du peuple 
had already explained the war years, and the appearance of de Gaulle's account would not alter 
this fact. Gaullist historiography did not pass without communist challenge. The first volume 
of the Memoires de guerre was reviewed and criticised in the Cahiers by Roger Garaudy. 
Indeed no other non-communist account of the war received an equal amount of coverage. 76 
The PCF had responded: de Gaulle was a bourgeois and his version of the war was a bourgeois 
one. Furthermore, it was surely not a coincidence that by the spring of 1955, a second edition 
76 Roger Garaudy, "Les `Memoires de guerre' du general de Gaulle", Cahiers, 2 (1954): 214-225. 
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of the 1949 version of Fils du peuple was republished. On this occasion the Central 
Committee's second-in-command, Jacques Duclos, promoted Thorez in the Cahiers. Although 
emphasis was placed on Thorez's working class origins and his leadership of the PCF, Duclos' 
essay also underlined communist war history. Concerning 1940, Duclos stated, 
Notre Parti avait, des les premiers jours de l'occupation, appele ä la Resistance, 
et l'Humanite clandestine publia, au debut de juillet 1940, un appel du Comite 
central de notre Parti, appel que j'eus l'honneur de signer avec Maurice Thorez. 
[... ]Cet appel devait etre entendu par d'innombrables travailleurs et patriotes 
francais ä qui notre Parti montrait la voie du combat, du sacrifice, de la 
victoire, et on ne peut lire sans ressentir une vive emotion les pages de Fils du 
peuple consacrees ä 1'evocation de quelques-uns de ceux qui sont morts pour la 
France et pour le communisme. 77 
The release of de Gaulle's war memoirs had provoked this response from the left. Gaullist 
historiography was not read solely by Gaullists, but had an immediate impact on the production 
cycles of the other two currents of interpretation. For the PCF, hostile reviews of de Gaulle's 
writing and the republication of Fils du peuple were to follow. Instead of engaging in a full- 
scale debate with de Gaulle they chose to continue to publish their own material on the topics 
which they considered to be of both contemporary and historical relevance. 
It was on the Petainist extreme right that de Gaulle's writing stimulated major reflection 
and then increased antagonism. The de Gaulle-Petain issue was not a new rivalry but a 
continuation of a wartime and post-liberation argument. Extreme right-wing reaction to the 
first volume of Memoires de guerre came in a wide variety of forms: satirical anticipation of 
their publication, a press campaign against their veracity, the recuperation of Robert Aron's 
Histoire de Vichy, which was published at the same time as L'Appel, as well as more direct 
77 Jacques Duclos, "A propos de la reedition de Fils du peuple", Cahiers, 4 (1955): 493. 
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attempts to delegitimise de Gaulle's interpretation. 
Initially, even before de Gaulle's account had been published the opportunity to criticise 
his version of events had been anticipated with glee. De Gaulle's writing would provide a 
further opportunity to present the extreme right wing's own account of the war, and potentially 
re-invigorate its separate campaigns: the rehabilitation of Petain, or the dissemination of its 
interpretation of Vichy. First and foremost, the occasion would provide a chance to re-open 
hostilities against de Gaulle. This almost pathological hatred of de Gaulle was evident in 
Rivarol's parody of the forthcoming work. The following citation is a brief example of the 
paper's satirical anticipation. Published for April Fool's Day, 1954, the quote pretends to be 
from the as yet unpublished de Gaulle memoirs: 
Quelques gros poissons ... d'avril! Exclusif Memoires inedits du General de Gaulle : De Bordeaux A Londres (juin 1940). 
`... En montant dans l'avion du general Spears, un petit accident 
m'arriva: je me heurtai durement ä la tete ä la porte de la carlingue, prevue 
pour des passagers de moindre taille. Et Spears s'ecria: - Je ne vous croyais pas 
si grand ! [... ] L'avion passait justement au-dessus des riantes campagnes de la 
Sarthe. A gauche (je suis assez fort en geographie, comme me le dit souvent 
mon ami 1'amiral Muzelier) s'etendait la peninsule armoricaine. Je lancai un 
regard vers cet inexpungable promontoire de 1'occident. Un bon mur fortifie, 
un wall comme fut le mur d'Hadrien aux confins de 1'Ecosse - et voila la 
Bretagne preservee pendant des siecles de l'invasion teutonne. Les traitres de 
Bordeaux n'avaient donc pas lu 1'histoire romaine comme moi ! '78 
The passage speaks for itself. Clearly, amongst the Rivarol team, the publication of L'Appel 
was perceived to be an occasion to remind readers of de Gaulle's personal faults, allude to his 
reputation for arrogance, as well as his alleged strategic blunders, for instance the Brittany 
retreat plan. This type of article illustrates a deep ideological fascination with the General and 
78 Unsigned, "Quelques gros poissons... d'avril", Rivarol, 1 April 1954: 10. 
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with what he would say about the war. Henry Rousso has commented that `A leurs manieres 
respectives, de Gaulle et Robert Aron ont donc incite a calmer le jeu des sequelles, Fun en 
offrant (avec contreparties) un honneur retrospectif invente, 1'autre en minorant le role nefaste 
de Vichy' . 
79 The calming of Vichy-related controversy is unlikely. Instead, the extreme right 
sought to manipulate the publication of de Gaulle's memoirs to their advantage. The media 
extravaganza of de Gaulle's first major post-war publication presented the opportunity to return 
to the mainstream arena and to defend very publicly the Marechal and Vichy's heritage. De 
Gaulle's publication had acted as a stimulant to those working within this current of 
production. 
During the months which followed the publication of L'Appel, in October and 
November 1954, there appears to have been a semi-organised response to de Gaulle. This came 
from two closely related sources, the committee of the ADMP and General Weygand. On the 
one hand, Weygand reacted against the Memoires de guerre on the basis of a personal slight. 
Conversely, the ADMP members set about defending Main's place in history. Both campaigns 
were conducted in the mainstream press. Here then was a chance to find a wider audience for 
views which were normally voiced in the political press of the extreme right wing. On behalf 
of the ADMP, Jacques Isorni wrote about de Gaulle's memoirs in Paris-Presse, whilst 
Loustanau-Lacau contributed to Le Monde and General Hering expressed his views in the pages 
of the weekly Paris-Match. Shortly afterwards, each of the letters was published in a collected 
79 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 283. Although the phrase `honneur retrospectif may refer more widely 
than to only de Gaulle's war memoirs to include the transfer of Jean Moulin's ashes to the Pantheon, I take it 
that Rousso is implying that the publications of 1954 and 1956 somehow served to reduce interest in 
collaboration and Vichy. For instance, when again writing on historiography, he states: `Le General ne pouvait 
ä lui seul, Bans son isolement, faire passer 1'histoire de Vichy ä la trappe et abriter sous son aile celle de quarante 
millions de Franrais restes malgre eux en metropole. D'ou l'importance historiographique du premier livre de 
Robert Aron. ' cited ibid., 280-281. 
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pamphlet entitled Reponse ä Charles de Gaulle. 80 What is important in the context of this 
chapter is not the detailed content of the letters and pamphlet, but rather the fact that de 
Gaulle's writing had stimulated increased production from the extreme right-wing historians. 
Indeed, in Hering's (1956) La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain the issue of de Gaulle's war 
memoirs was re-evoked. Pointedly at the beginning of his biography, Hering cited Petain's 
consideration of political memoirs. He wrote, 
Le Marechal Petain n'a pas ecrit ses memoires et, tres spirituellement, il en a 
donne la raison: "Je ne laisse pas de memoires personnelles, car j'ai toujours 
constate que leurs auteurs, trop enclins ä se justifier de leurs erreurs, ont, avec 
la verite, des accommodements qui les rendent pleins d' indulgence pour eux- 
memes, et de severite pour les autres". 81 
This citation was often repeated by extreme right-wingers. Again it illustrates the continued 
influence of de Gaulle's writing on the ideological group, and their responsive need to de- 
legitimise it. 
Further extreme right-wing reaction to de Gaulle's historiography is also exemplified 
in the series of interventions pursued by General Weygand. In October 1954 this began with 
a complaint to Paris-Presse about the manner in which he had been portrayed by de Gaulle. 
However, revenge was not complete and the following year Weygand produced a detailed 
volume of historical writing which countered de Gaulle's perspective in further detail. 
Published by the establishment house Flammarion, Weygand's En lisant les memoires de 
guerre du general de Gaulle provided a complete counter-reading of de Gaulle's argument. 
80 ADMP, Reponse 6 Charles de Gaulle (Paris: Millet pour ADMP, 1954). 
81 Pierre Hering, La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain, 9. The extreme right had unashamedly published a 
collection of Petain's war speeches, Quatre annees au pouvoir (Paris: La Couronne litteraire, 1949). 
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Reaction had developed from the level of the popular press to that of Weygand's monograph. ' 
Once more, this type of escalation is hardly indicative of the Memoires de guerre's alleged 
capacity to quieten controversy or to repress debate about the Vichy past. Indeed, in the light 
of the evidence one wonders precisely what Alan Morris meant when, repeating aspects of 
Rousso's interpretation, he described the publication of the war memoirs in the following 
terms: `when all three volumes were published in the 1950s, few unappreciative voices could 
be heard'. 83 
Supplementary to the extensive press criticism and the publications mentioned above, 
the extreme right quickly capitalised on the coincidence that Robert Aron's and Georgette 
Elgey's Histoire de Vichy had been published at approximately the same time as de Gaulle's 
first volume of memoirs (in the autumn of 1954). The coincidence of publication was 
manipulated. In the first instance, Robert Aron's work received ambivalent reviews from 
Rivarol and Aspects de la France. On a more positive note it was already seen as a stick with 
which to beat de Gaulle. The extreme right wing's recuperation of Aron's work had 
commenced. For instance, Rivarol directly compared the early sales figures for the two books. 
This article championed Robert Aron against de Gaulle. The short notice read: 
Les Memoires du general de Gaulle ont eu un gros tirage initial: 100,000 
exemplaires. Jusqu'ä present il n'y en a guere que les deux tiers qui aient ete 
demandes malgre la tres considerable publicite faite par la maison Plon et la 
publication prealable de certain fragments Bans des journaux ä fort tirage. En 
revanche, 1'Histoire de Vichy de Robert Aron s'est dejä vendus ä plus de 50,000 
84 et sur le simple vu du titre. 
ffi For example, see Maxim Weygand, "Le general Weygand contre les fantaisies du general de Gaulle", Rivarol, 
28 October 1954: 3; En lisant les memoires de guerre du general de Gaulle (Paris: Flammarion, 1955). 
83 Alan Morris, Collaboration and Resistance Reviewed, 30. 
84 Unsigned, "La vie litteraire", Rivarol, 9 November 1954: 12; for a more ambivalent review see, M. G., 
"Robert Aron historien vaut mieux que Robert Aron philosophe", Rivarol, 25 November 1954: 6. 
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In reality, Aron's writing was neither explicitly sympathetic to Gaullism nor to the extreme 
right wing. Nevertheless, it is evident in the reporting of the extreme right-wing press that 
Aron's work was manipulated in order to undermine de Gaulle's interpretation. Finally, one 
should note that by 1956 Robert Aron was also prepared to use his links with the extreme right 
to his commercial advantage. For instance, at this time he was willing to participate in a book 
signing colloquium with the Rivarol journalist, Pierre Dominique, and the star historian of the 
extreme-right Jacques Benoist-Mechin. 85 This event exposes the degree of complicity between 
the recuperated and the recuperators. 
Concluding Discussion 
To review, the three main currents of interpretation produced accounts of the war from the 
immediate apres-guerre to the fall of the Fourth Republic. The history of their production 
illustrates the contained nature of communist writing and publishing, whilst at the same time 
it points to a number of hitherto unrecognised intersections between the Gaullist, conservative 
and extreme right-wing arenas of publishing, journalism and politics. Evidence suggests that 
one should not underestimate the extreme right's recovery. The Taittinger affair and reaction 
to de Gaulle's writing shows that production was part of a cycle of provocation. Counter- 
arguments and counter-interpretations were produced with the clear aim of debunking the 
opposing currents. We have seen that what Rousso called the `voix discordantes' of the 
ideological historians were rarely silent, and then only when pausing before the next 
85 A short advertisement in Rivarol, 23 February 1956: 12, reads `Pierre Dominique dedicacera ses oeuvres le 
samedi 25 fevrier de 15h ä 18h ä la vente des livres des Science Po' oil vous pourrez egalement rencontre de 
nombreux ecrivains: Robert Aron, Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Antoine Blondin, Stephane Hecquet etc. 
Venez 
nombreux ä cette grande manifestation litteraire, 27 rue Saint-Guillaume, VII` metro Bac'. 
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encounter. 86 The portrayal which has been sketched confirms and advances Michel's suspicion 
that the subject of the occupation was more often than not possessed by contemporary 
politics. 87 
Evidence from the world of journalistic history writing, the three currents of 
production, and political publishing such as the communist journal Cahiers does not indicate 
a sudden repression of interest in the war. Certainly, de Gaulle's war memoirs and Aron's and 
Elgey's history did not have the impact ascribed to them in the popular Vichy syndrome model. 
On the contrary, there was already a vibrant culture of committed historiography in which the 
extreme right appears to have been disproportionately powerful when compared with its 
parliamentary status. 
86 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 276. 
87 Henri Michel, Bibliographie critique de la resistance, 27 and 202. 
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CHAPTER III 
PORTRAYALS OF WAR 
This chapter begins the detailed consideration of the nine selected ideological texts. It shows 
that they were far more complex than has been suggested in much of the secondary literature. 
The starting-point is a discussion of the content which the historians covered. This is followed 
by a comparison of the three mythopeic portrayals which they developed to represent the war 
as a single event. A concluding review will consider the political function of the three 
interpretations of the war. 
Content 
The activist historians, supported by journalists, claimed to have produced the definitive 
history of the occupation. In reality all of the writers were selective. We know that the 
communist and Gaullist historians had a propensity to focus on their respective contributions 
to the resistance while their extreme right-wing counterparts established versions of what it had 
meant to collaborate. This corresponds to the picture of post-war historical writing offered by 
Rousso, Olivier Wieviorka, Courtois, Azema, Francois Bedarida and others. ' 
The pattern can be sharpened. The content of the communist current went beyond the 
topic areas for which it is known today. As well as writing on the resistance, its historians 
included passages on the nature of Vichy and collaboration. This subject was presented as a 
critique of the regime's authoritarian social policies. Gaullism was also examined; Thorez, 
Dautry and Pastor argued that de Gaulle was a member of the bourgeoisie who represented his 
1 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy; Olivier Wieviorka, "La Memoire des resistants face ä Vichy", in Azema 
and Bedarida (eds), Le Regime de Vichy et les Francais, 465-485; Stephane Courtois, "Luttes politiques et 
elaboration d'une histoire: le PCF historien... " Communisme: 5-25; Jean-Pierre Azema and Francois Bedarida, 
"L'Historisation de la resistance", Esprit: 19-35; Jean-Pierre Azema and Francois Bedarida, "Vichy et ses 
historiens", Esprit: 43-51. 
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class. He was compared with the Marshal Petain. The PCF historians not only aimed to 
support the Party but also to highlight the weaknesses of its challengers. Furthermore, all of 
the communist historians portrayed the communists' resistance activities in the light of the 
politics of the inter-war years. The 1934-1939 era was central to the PCF's view of the war. 
The communists examined the period which immediately preceded it in considerable detail. 
The conflict between anti-fascists and fascists was used to anticipate the division between 
resistance and collaboration. Material referring to the riots of 1934, the Spanish Civil War, and 
the Popular Front was included to indicate that communist resistance to fascism had been a 
long-term policy. 
Like the communists, the second ideological current, the Gaullists covered ground 
which went beyond the stereotypical aspects of resistance. Jean-Pierre Rioux's survey 
summarises much of their position. The historian reported: 
it was by constantly harping back to the historic events of 1940 and to the 
triumphant events of August 1944 that de Gaulle intended to preserve his own 
stature as a leader and convince France of the need to return to the path of her 
great historical and moral destiny. 2 
However, while 1940 and 1944 were of course important, a wide range of other topics were 
also confronted. All of the selected Gaullist historians focused on the early colonial support 
for the Free French movement and de Gaulle's victory over the ex-Vichyite General Giraud, 
in Algiers in 1943. The acts of resistance in the Empire were used to presage those that 
followed in metropolitan France. Often played down in traditional historiographic reviews, or 
even in more specialised literary accounts, de Gaulle's intransigence towards the Anglo-Saxon 
2 Jean-Piepe Rioux, "De Gaulle in Waiting 1946-1958", in Gough and Home (eds), De Gaulle and Twentieth 
Century France (London: Edward Arnold, 1994), 39. 
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Allies (notably the United States) over colonial rights of possession was highlighted in the 
Gaullist accounts. 
The Gaullist historians contrasted de Gaulle's trajectory with that of the Vichy regime. 
The movement to resist the occupation was personified in de Gaulle's actions, whilst the choice 
to collaborate was identified with Philippe Petain. The two courses which emerged on the 17 
and 18 June 1940 were examined and presented in a sophisticated fashion. Several of the 
historians differentiated between collaboration which emanated from Vichy and that pursued 
by the fascistic milieu of Paris. They did not overlook the history of collaboration. Naomi 
Greene's view that `De Gaulle carefully avoided any mention of the fraticidal ideological 
struggles which had marked the period of the occupation and liberation' is an exaggeration of 
how the subject was handled by the General and the wider current of historiography. ' 
Nevertheless, the balance of coverage given by the Gaullists naturally favoured their own 
movement. For instance, in Trente ans the Vichy regime was discussed in one substantial 
section of the book, whilst resistance was afforded an equivalent section as well as three 
thematic chapters: `La France libre', `La France combattante' and the `Actes de la liberation'. 
The extreme right-wing historians wrote on a selection of topics centred on the Vichy 
regime, although not exclusively so. The material which they incorporated into their writings 
varied. The key text, Rougier's Mission secrete ä Londres described life among Vichy's 
competing ministries, Churchill's London and the exiled French community in New York. 
Examining Rougier's career as an informal Vichyite diplomat, the work compared French and 
British foreign policy, Gaullists and Petainists. Normally, the secondary literature has not 
associated all of these topics with the extreme right-wing's accounts. Even Robert Frank's 
3 Naomi Greene, "La Vie en rose: Images of the Occupation in French Cinema", in Kritzman (ed. ), Auschwitz 
and After: Race, Culture, and `the Jewish Question' in France (London: Routledge, 1995), 285. 
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scholarly refutation of Rougier's claims only sketched over the range of issues which were 
raised in the historian's interpretation. ' 
The often forgotten trilogy, Benoist-Mechin's Soixante fours, was idiosyncratic in its 
focus. The historian's profile of the collapse of the Republic and the birth of the new regime 
provided a detailed ideological commentary on the major questions of the occupation and 
purge, while in so doing it avoided having to make a point by point defence of Vichy. Hering's 
biography La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain was the most predictable of the three books 
from within this current. Like the many other biographies of Petain studied by Bernard 
Laguerre, it presented the Marshal's life story from the First World War to his imprisonment 
and death. ' Its central part entitled `Chef d'etat' reviewed Petain's role in June and July 1940 
and what Hering felt were the positive effects of this decision. 
A number of general topic areas were explored by all of the historians. Notably, 
considerable coverage was devoted to international history. They gave significant text-space 
to present the progression of the war around the world. The historians combined military and 
political history to form synthetic overviews of the major battles. International politics was 
conscripted to the respective ideological camps, notably with the communist and extreme right- 
wing historians looking to the Soviet Union and the Third Reich. The communists argued the 
case in favour of the former's actions between 1939-41. As Kedward and Courtois have 
shown, this topic produced its own significant literature and debates. ' More surprisingly given 
4 Robert Frank, "Vichy et les Britanniques 1940-1941: double jeu ou double language? ", in Azema and Bedarida 
(eds), Le Regime de Vichy et les Francais, 144-163. 
5 Bernard Laguerre, "Les Biographies de Petain", in Azema and Bedarida (eds), Le Regime de Vichy et [es 
Francais, 45-57. 
6 Stephane Courtois, "Luttes politiques et elaboration d'une histoire: le PCF historien", Communisme: 5-25; 
H. R. Kedward, "Behind the Polemics. French Communists and Resistance 1939-1941", in S. F. Hawes and Ralph 
White (eds), Resistance in Europe 1939-1945 (London: Allen Lane, 1975), 94-117. 
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the shame associated with nazism in the early post-war period, the extreme right-winger, 
Benoist-Mechin, implicitly contrasted the weaknesses of the Republic in 1940 with the 
discipline, efficiency and prowess of Hitler's Germany. Communists and extreme right-wingers 
looked outside France in order to understand the significance of the war. Rhetorically, the two 
totalitarian regimes to the East of the Rhine served equivalent functions: they provided models 
to compare with domestic politics. Gaullist historians, who celebrated French nationalism, did 
not select a foreign power to fulfill an equivalent role. Often they denigrated De Gaulle's 
international allies. 
Traditional historiographic, Vichy syndrome and other commentaries have tended to 
ignore the biographical or autobiographical content of several of the publications. This is a 
major oversight. In each of the currents the lives of Thorez, Petain and de Gaulle were 
presented. They gave the reader an accessible introduction to complex economic, social and 
political events and showed him, or her, an intimate portrait of a key personality. Michelle 
Perrot has emphasised the importance of Fils du peuple. Writing on working class culture, she 
underlined: 
Tel quel, ce texte a fascine: les ouvriers, les intellectuels aussi. Les futurs 
adherents ou compagnons de route de la Resistance et de 1'apres guerre ont 
souvent lu Fils du peuple plus que Marx. Leader charismatique des foules du 
Front populaire, Thorez a incarne pour eux la figure virile de la classe ouvriere 
montante, heritiere de toute une tradition. ' 
There is little doubt that de Gaulle's war memoirs and the many autobiographical works of the 
extreme right fulfilled a comparable role for their supporters. Moreover, straightforward 
histories often included a high proportion of biographical information. This is the case in the 
7 Michelle Perrot, "Les Vies ouvrieres", in Nora (ed. ), Les Lieux de memoire, Vol. 3, Part 3 (Paris: Gallimard, 
1992), 96. 
86 
Trente ans collection, which reviewed the lives of Clemenceau and de Gaulle. 
History was personalised and content marked accordingly. The decision to include or 
exclude historical material was balanced with the biographical objective of narrating the 
subject's career. Descriptions detailing Thorez's childhood in the mining fields of the North, 
or Petain's or de Gaulle's military careers, were offered at length. ' Politically sensitive 
information, such as Thorez's period in Moscow, or the realities of Petain's health, was 
astutely disregarded by those historians who were sympathetic to the respective figures. 
All the texts had their omissions. Communists did not write at length about the 
American forces of liberation. To do so would have diminished the role of the Soviet Union 
and given succour to Cold War adversaries. Similarly, extreme right-wing historians 
whitewashed many aspects of the Vichy regime. Providing a favourable account of the Etat 
francais meant that many of its actions were overlooked. Selectivity was less obvious in the 
Gaullist current. They wrote commentaries on all of the major topics of the occupation. 
Nonetheless, some areas, like the Free French resistance, received proportionally more space 
than episodes like the purge. 
Commonly, it has been argued that historiography did not provide an adequate account 
of the persecution of the French Jewish community. Many of the essays which form Lawrence 
D. Kritzman's collection, Auschwitz and After, imply that for twenty years after the war the 
French had not confronted the topic. ' Aspects of this premise are repeated in numerous other 
works including Conan's and Rousso's Vichy, un passe qui ne passe pas. The content of the 
8 Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple, 7-40; Pierre Hering, La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain, 15-60; Georges 
Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle, 11-41. 
9 See, Lawrence D. Kritzman, "In the Shadows of Auschwitz: Culture, Memories, and Self-Reflection", in 
Lawrence D. Kritzman (ed. ), Auschwitz and After: Race, Culture and the Jewish Question in France, 2,4; Naomi 
Greene, "La Vie en rose: Images of the Occupation in French Cinema", in Kritzman (ed. ), Auschwitz and After, 
283,285. Rousso and Conan, Vichy, un passe qui ne passe pas, 22. 
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ideological histories partially supports this perspective. However, the activist historians were 
not completely silent on the Vichy government's antisemitism and the nazi Holocaust. 
In Trente ans the subject is discussed in the light of another issue, or classified as a sub- 
topic. Genevieve de Gaulle wrote a chapter entitled `La France prisonniere' in which she 
examined the treatment of French prisoners in Germany. She framed the extermination of the 
Jews through the national perspective of the history of the Republic's prisoners. Her 
comparison of racial victims with resistance deportees and STO workers meant that the 
specificity of Jewish suffering was relativised. On the other hand, in the same chapter the 
historian frankly addressed the issue of France's collective response to these events. She 
underlined that many citizens had been aware of the plight of the Jewish community but that 
antisemitism had blunted their response to the atrocities. She confessed: 
Le sort des Juifs paraissait plus inquietant. Mais l'arrestation de centaines de 
milliers d'hommes, de femmes et d'enfants s'etait faite progressivement, en 
commencant par les etrangers. Et comme disait certain honorable bourgeoise, 
elite de sa paroisse: `C'est triste, evidemment, mais ce ne sont que des Juifs'. lo 
The quotation is significant because it shows Genevieve de Gaulle's knowledge of the 
`honorable bourgeoise' and their attitude towards the Jews. While it does not provide a step 
by step account of Vichy's complicity in genocide it points to the nation's apathy at `le sort des 
Juifs'. Paradoxically, by underlining the view that French public opinion had turned away from 
the horrors of deportation, the author recognised the scale of what had occurred between 1940 
and 1944. One can speculate that even this limited allusion to the Holocaust would have 
registered with Genevieve de Gaulle's readership. 
An equally ambiguous treatment of the topic was presented in another part of the Trente 
10 Genevieve de Gaulle, "La France prisonniere", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 306. 
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ans collection. Jacques Madaule's account of Vichy included a sophisticated analysis of 
antisemitism. ll Evidence from his writing does not support Anne Grynberg's simplification 
that, `dann ces annees de l'immediat apres-guerre, il faut, pour que puisse accomplir le travail 
de deuil, considerer l'antisemitisme comme un monstrosite historique fondamentalement 
etrangere a 1'histoire et aux mentalites francaises'. 12 Madaule explained that France had created 
its own brand of antisemitism and that during the occupation this tradition had thrived. He 
reported that French antisemitism had welcomed nazism to the hexagon. The historian 
denounced the attitude of a number of his compatriots. Solemnly, he admitted: 
Il existait un antisemitisme francais, mais on aurait pu esperer que le spectacle 
meme des pogroms hitleriens, qui avaient souleve de degout le monde civilise, 
qui avaient amen le pape Pie XI ä s'ecrier un jour: `Spirituellement, nous 
sommes des Semites' aurait detourne les antisemites francais de ceder ä leur 
haine sous la botte allemande. C'est tout le contraire qui arriva. [... ] 
Accepter, en France, une legislation d'exception contre les Juifs, c'est 
prendre ä notre compte, que nous le voulions ou non, 1'essentiel du national- 
socialisme. Il ne sert ä rien de dire qu'il existe aussi en France des traditions 
antisemites. Les problemes n'ont pas toujours le meme aspect. Aucun 
comparaison n'est possible entre l'atmosphere de 1'Europe et du monde en 1890 
ou en 1900 et cette meme atmosphere en 1940. Que les antisemites frangais ne 
1'aient point alors compris, rien ne montre mieux le funeste aveuglement de leur 
haine. 13 
There is little doubt that Madaule recognised the influence of endemic antisemitism. He 
associated its rise with the period of the Dreyfus affair which predated Hitler. By stating that 
French and nazi antisemitism were not comparable, Madaule was implicitly making a 
comparison. He did not spell out Petain's legislative programme or Laval's role in the 
11 Jacques Madaule, "Au lendemain de 1'armistice", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 232-233. 
12 Anne Grynberg, "Les Camps francais, des non-lieux de memoire", in Dimitri Nicolaidis (ed. ), Oublier nos 
crimes (Paris: Autrement, 1994): 61. 
13 Jacques Madaule, "Au lendemain de 1'armistice", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 232-233. 
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deportation of children. Nonetheless, pointing the way to these revelations, he wrote: 
`1'antisemitisme etait une des signification profondes et secretes du conflit mondial'. ` He and 
Genevieve de Gaulle offered at least a limited discussion of what has been sometimes thought 
to be a taboo subject. 
Unlike the samples from the Gaullist current, the communists rarely mentioned the 
horrors of the nazi regime. Not one article in the Cahiers was devoted to it. When the 
Holocaust was referred to, as in Dautry's and Pastor's Histoire de la resistance, it was in the 
context of describing the barbarity of nazism. 15 Under the heading `Les Camps de la Mort 
Lente', they argued that the key victims of the occupation had been members of the resistance. 
Little was offered which provided a history of Jewry under the occupation. Simply, as analysed 
in the sample texts, this subject did not fit into the PCF's discourse. 
The same can be said of the extreme right-wing's writings. Generally, the historians 
omitted the subject from their work. 16 Nevertheless, rather like the examples of Genevieve de 
Gaulle and Jacques Madaule, they did not all overlook the issue in the straightforward manner 
which some scholars have recently argued. In Mission secrete ä Londres Louis Rougier gave 
a cogent summary of the point that Vichy antisemitism was a product of the Etat franfais and 
not a result of external nazi encouragement. The philsopher-historian considered the shameful 
aspect of its governance: 
Le gouvernement de Vichy, au lieu de se considerer comme un conseil de 
gerance charge d'expedier les affaires courantes, pretendit operer une 
Revolution nationale assortie d'une Reforme intellectuelle et morale qui, quelles 
14 Ibid., 232. 
15 Jean Dautry and Louis Pastor, Histoire de la resistance, 33-34. 
16 The exceptions are the unrepresentative cases of Holocaust denial writing in which nazi atrocities were 
debated. See Maurice Bardeche, Nuremberg ou la terre promise; Paul Rassinier, Le Mensonge d'Ulysses (Paris: 
Editions Bressanes, 1950, collected edition L'Amite Par le Livre, 1955). 
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qu'en eussent pu etre les intentions, etaient compromises ä l'avance en portant 
les stigmates de la defaite et l'indignite de l'occupation etrangere. Chose plus 
grave, il endossa des lois incompatibles avec l'honneur, comme les Lois racistes, 
au lieu d'en laisser 1'odieux ä l'occupant s'il n'etait pas en mesure de les 
empecher. l' 
The soft condemnation of Vichy's execution of the race laws, produced by an extreme right- 
wing writer, highlights the complexity of the material covered in all of the texts. As we have 
seen, the selection of content was not always a crude process. Albeit abruptly, an extreme 
right-wing historian acknowledged the Vichy regime's failings. Professor Rougier knew that 
the best way to handle an uncomfortable issue was to partially accept it, and then to quickly 
progress on to different ground. Neither Benoist-Mechin or General Hering were as open. As 
one would expect they did not mention this topic. The Rougier case is a rare example of 
writing from the extreme right-wing which, in a limited fashion, confronted rather than 
avoided questions of race or antisemitism under the Vichy regime. 
The patterns of coverage in the histories were a matter of proportion rather than 
outright inclusion or exclusion. Several of the texts were not as limited in scope as is implied 
in the secondary literature. The act of writing history meant that a broad range of topics had 
to be considered for the work to gain a minimal authority. Even a loyal reader would not be 
impressed by a weak argument or a restricted focus. Soixante fours, Trente ans and several of 
the articles in the Cahiers were substantial works. It was not that a single writer provided a 
conclusive history but rather that, despite their ideological colouring, many historians offered 
a great deal more than straightforward images d'Epinal. Ideological colouring did not prescribe 
the historians' scope or their desire to delineate what they believed to be a comprehensive 
survey that would be acceptable to the public. Long, sophisticated, histories were the vehicles 
17 Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres, 18. 
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for persuasion. 
War Mythology 
The three sets of historians created different mythopeic narratives to represent the war. It will 
be shown that writing on the occupation provided a significant opportunity to communicate the 
historians' ideological values. The following pages compare the interpretations of the 1940- 
1944 period, as seen from the perspective of each political group. 
The Myth of Communist Anti fascism 
We know that Thorez, Dautry, Pastor, Freville and the many historians writing in the Cahiers 
supported their party's track record and enhanced its claim to be the parti des fusilles. As 
Jeannine Verdes-Leroux has noted, their historiography was often made up of `falsifications, 
trucage des textes par coupures et additions, reinterpretations des faits, destruction des 
documents, fabrication de document, multiplication des versions' and so on. 18 What has been 
less apparent is that the historians communicated their versions of the war through a 
comprehensive story. Central to the communist current was the myth of anti-fascism. 
Consistently, the historians presented the war through a narrative of heroic opposition to 
fascism in which they portrayed the PCF as the eternal protector of France. The key claims 
were that the resistance was a continuation of the Party's inter-war activities; that the Party had 
always represented a moral force for good and that its resistance was only one example of this 
role. For instance, Thorez summarised the successful stages of the Party's record: 
La clairvoyance du Parti, dans les annees d'avant guerre, sa lutte incessante 
18 Jeanine Verdes-Leroux, Au service du Parti, 26-27. 
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contre la politique dite de 'non-intervention', contre la trahison de Munich, 
contre les agissements de la Ve colonne, qui frayaient la voie ä la guerre et ä 
1'hitlerisme; 
L'attitude exemplaire du Parti dans la guerre contre l'envahisseur 
allemand et contre les traitres de Vichy; le courage, l'abnegation de ses 
militants, se sacrifiant par dizaines de milliers, pour le salut de la patrie et pour 
le triomphe de leur ideal communiste. 19 
The passage shows that history writing was not merely an opportunity to promote separate 
issues but to present a series of themes in a narrative sequence. The anti-fascist story was not 
exclusively about the resistance, instead it linked the maquis to a much wider network of 
communist actions, including, for example, its attacks on the Munich agreement, and its inter- 
war politics, which they describe as having been based on fighting Fifth Columnists. 
In the context of the Cold War, when communism was taken by non-communists to be 
a dangerously subversive idea, the anti-fascist view of the previous twenty years proved the 
contrary. In their interpretation of history, the French Communist Party was portrayed as 
always speaking for the nation: they had fought against fascism in 1934, led the Popular Front, 
attacked appeasement and resisted Vichy and Hitler. Their Soviet counterparts had been 
responsible for the destruction of nazism in Berlin in 1945. The mythopeic construction asked 
`what justification could there be in any accusation which claimed that the PCF had 
collaborated or was now a threat to France? ' 
A central message of the myth was that Thorez and the PCF had dedicated themselves 
to France. Correctly, specialists on communist politics have underlined the significance of this 
theme in the Party's intellectual life The anti-fascist myth was about a working class defence 
of the nation. David Caute's succinct judgement on the post-war period is germane: `the more 
senior of the Party intellectuals emerged from the resistance speaking of family, religion, 
19 Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple, 249-250. 
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morality and Patrie' . 
20 The anti-fascist myth of the war provided a key element in the 
communication and dissemination of the new patriotism. 
Of course, anti-fascist patriotism did not rely on the nationalism of a de Gaulle or a 
Maurras. 21 The mythic view echoed a classic Marxist-Leninist dialectical theory of history. 
Thorez explained that progress towards social revolution was propelled by the fascist/anti- 
fascist confrontation. He wrote: 
Une pensee maitresse de Marx s'imprima dans mon esprit: le mouvement 
dialectique emporte la revolution et la contre-revolution daps un combat 
incessant; la revolution rend la contre-revolution toujours plus acharnee, 
toujours plus entreprenante; a son tour, la contre-revolution fait progresser la 
revolution et l'oblige ä se donner un Parti veritablement revolutionnaire. 
Je devais en eprouver la profonde justesse plus tard, quand a partir de 
l'agression fasciste du 6 fevrier 1934, les masses laborieuses s'organiserent en 
vue d'une resistance croissante et passerent ä la contre-offensive. 22 
The PCF-leader and historian took the anti-fascist era as an element in the longer struggle 
between revolution and counter-revolution. The dialectic movement caused by the battle would 
ultimately produce a socialist revolution. This was a distinctively PCF perspective which 
balanced the lessons of 1789 and 1917. As Gildea and Hazareesingh have explained, resistance 
and the Jacobin heritage were blurred together. 23 In the anti-fascist myth the resistance formed 
part of the Republican revolutionary tradition. However, as the passage from Thorez indicates, 
20 David Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals 1914-1960,163,199. 
21 Although as Marie-Claire Lavabre has shown this did not stop the recuperation of Joan of Arc as an historical 
reference in the communist Almanach (1950). See, "La Collection des almanachs edites par le Parti communiste 
franrais: un exemple de tradition", Pouvoirs, 42 (1987): 112. 
22 Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple, 65. 
23 Robert Gildea, The Past in French History, 55; Sudhir Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France, 
83. 
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it was framed through a Marxist philsophy of history in which the Party's actions acted as a 
dialectical motor in the inevitable progression to communism. Whilst the key actors - the anti- 
fascists - were profiled within a French cultural paradigm, their behaviour and meaning were 
classified through the typical Marxisant understanding of history. Moreover, rhetorically, the 
historical determinism evident in Thorez's view was advantageous. As Christopher Flood has 
suggested, it enabled the historian to `affect an Olympian detachment by claiming that it is 
history which passes judgment' . 
24 It also meant that inevitable post-war conflicts could be 
placed in a well-established interpretative grid. Just as the forces of revolution and counter- 
revolution had been represented by anti-fascist and fascist, in the future they would be replaced 
by new actors, playing comparable roles. As Thorez remarked elsewhere, `aujourd'hui, comme 
hier... ' . 
25 
The PCF historians' narrative of the war as a continuation of an anti-fascist conflict 
marks this current apart from the other historians' interpretations. Of course, Gaullists were 
concerned with the history of the resistance, but they did not construct it in this manner. 
Moreover, as might be expected, only the PCF historians understood historical progression 
through an explicitly dialectical perspective. 
The Gaullist Rise-Fall Myth 
Gaullists were also fascinated by nationalism. As Jean Touchard's analysis of the ideology 
suggests, they emphasised the values of patriotism, national independence, leadership and 
unity. 26 The typical Gaullist portrayal of the war, as a whole event, is captured in the 
24 Christopher Flood, Political Myth, 153. 
25 Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple, 22 
26 Jean Touchard, Le Gaullisme 1940-1969,100,106-108. 
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introduction to the Parias collection. Its editor wrote: 
C'est un fait que le dernier trentenaire francais offre, ä un esprit curieux des 
lecons de l'histoire, un enseignement extraordinaire. Une victoire sans 
precedent dans les annales des peuples; un prestige qui fait de notre pays le 
second Empire du Monde; une richesse que les fautes politiques n'arrivent pas 
ä dilapider; une guerre foudroyante qui nous jette sous la botte allemande, 
confirmant le vieil adage: `il n'y a pas loin du Capitole ä la Roche Tarpeine'; 
un renversement des Puissances qui, nous arrachant a 1'abune, nous enleve 
brusquement sur les ailes de la victoire: telles sont les alternances boulversantes 
de ce pays entre 1918 et 1948. 
La volonte d'un homme saura imposer peu ä peu le prestige de la France 
aux allies. Mais les convulsions d'une apres-guerre dont nous ignorons encore 
l'issue laisseront le lecteur sur l'inquietude d'une actualite brulante qui le rendre 
plus attentif ä 1'evenement. 27 
From this outline one can quickly identify how Parias portrayed history as a passage through 
periods of spectacular national glory and equally dramatic national decline. In the three 
selected texts the Gaullist historians identify the Second World War as having been profoundly 
marked by two stages: first, the degradation of inter-war politics and the defeat leading to 
further collapse via the Vichy regime, while simultaneously, there is the incessant rallying of 
the Gaullist resistance. 
In this representation the historians deny Petain all possibility of creating the necessary 
conditions of recovery through the collaborating regime. The line is repeated in Madaule's 
contributions to Trente ans, de Gaulle's memoirs and in Georges Cattaui's biography. Cattaui 
mused that France could not possibly recover from the humiliation of defeat `sous le joug 
meme de 1'occupant'. 28 De Gaulle's memoirs work around a similar approach. Commenting 
on the Vichy forces' defeat in the Levant campaign against the British, de Gaulle waspishly 
27 L. H. Parias, "Avertissement", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans d'histoire, vii. 
28 Georges Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle, 59-60. 
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writes: `En signant cette capitulation, Vichy se montrait fidele ä sa triste vocation' . 
29 Decline 
is shown to follow inevitably from the very origin and nature of Vichy. 
In contrast with Vichy's development, de Gaulle and Gaullism are represented as 
having personified a trajectory of national recovery, or as de Gaulle expressed it: `A mesure 
que declinaient la pompe et les oeuvres de Vichy, se formaient, de-ci, de-lä, dans la 
Metropole, des noyaux de resistance'. 30 In all three examples of the current, they narrate the 
development of the Free French movement as a course of magnificent rise, the origin of which 
is 18 June 1940. It is de Gaulle's first `Appel' which is located as the signal of national 
recovery after the battle of France. They show this process continuing throughout the war up 
to and including de Gaulle's famous victory parade through the streets of Paris. 
Philippe Burrin, Pierre Nora and Christopher Flood have each noted the presence of 
the rise-fall myth in de Gaulle's speech-making or in the composition of Gaullist ideology. " 
Its dominant presence in the historiographic texts which I have reviewed confirms its centrality 
within this political strand. In re-interpreting the Second World War the rise-fall construction 
of history allowed the historians to talk about traditional Gaullist beliefs while also producing 
a credible overview of historical events. This was because, on the one hand, the course of 
national recovery could be associated with positive Gaullist virtues whereas, on the other hand, 
the historians linked the process of national decline to what they perceived to be political sins. 
For instance, all the accounts, clearly imply that politics, corruption and the weak 
constitutional order of the Third Republic were responsible for decline in 1940. Conversely, 
29 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 1,165. 
30 Ibid., 227. 
31 Philippe Burrin, "Vichy", in Pierre Nora (ed. ), Les Lieux de memoire, Vol. 3, Part 1,338; Pierre Nora, 
"Gaullisme et Communisme", in Nora (ed. ), Les Lieux de memoire, Vol. 3, Part 1,369; Christopher Flood, 
Political Myth, 197-226. 
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the historians argue that when France has witnessed periods of greatness this has been because 
of strong leadership, unity and patriotism. So, without explicitly listing the benefits of Gaullist 
values, the historiography uses the rise-fall myth to symbolically test their effectiveness in 
given historical contexts. On the political level, the interpretation works as an injunction for 
the present to bring back the last successful guardian of national triumph, Charles de Gaulle. 
Francois Bedarida highlighted the didactic nature of the General's view of history. He 
noted that, `Dans 1'esprit de Charles de Gaulle, l'histoire, tout ä la fois pensee et verbe [... ] 
a pour fonction de servir de lecon tant pour l'intelligibilite du temps present que pour la 
construction de l'avenir'. 32 It was the rise-fall myth which was used to instruct the French. This 
was a significantly different construction of the national past from either the communists' or 
extreme right-wingers' interpretations. Although Gaullists and communists shared a belief in 
the sanctity of the resistance, the perspectives which they offered were radically different. 
Contrary to the claims of contemporary extreme right-wing and conservative intellectuals, 
there is no evidence of a single Gaullo-communist vision of the past. 33 Comparing the two 
narratives reveals the groups' marked difference of view on the meaning of the war. Actually, 
in its focus on decadence and national regeneration, the rise-fall construction recalls Roger 
Griffin's study of the palingenetic myth of fascism. 34 He writes: 
the mythic core that forms the basis of my ideal type of fascism is the vision of 
32 Francois Bedarida, "L'Histoire dans la pensee et dans faction du general de Gaulle", in Institut Charles de 
Gaulle (ed. ), De Gaulle et son siecle, Vol. 1,143. 
33 For recent examples of this perspective see Dominique Venner, Histoire critique de la resistance (Paris: 
Pygmalion, 1995); Raoul Girardet and Pierre Assouline, Singulierement libre - Entretiens (Paris: Perrin, 1990), 
74; Michel Deon, Parlons-en... Conversation (Paris: Gallimard, 1993), 91. For further discussion of Venner see 
Hugo Frey, "Dominique Venner: Arms and the Man", Modern and Contemporary France, NS 4.4 (1996): 509- 
512. 
34 Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London: Routledge, 1991); Fascism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995). 
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the (perceived) crisis of the nation as betokening the birth-pangs of a new order. 
It crystallises in the image of the national community, once purged and 
rejuvenated, rising phoenix-like from the ashes of a morally bankrupt state 
system and the decadent culture associated with it. 35 
The rise-fall narrative is about the national community, its rejuvenation through the resistance 
struggle, and the decline of the bankrupt Vichy state. As Griffin suggested ultra-nationalists 
and fascists share the palingenetic representation. The Gaullist rise-fall account shows that a 
variety of ideologues have used palingenetic myths without being fascist. Equally, as we will 
see below, extreme right-wingers who were close to the fascist tradition, such as Jacques 
Benoist-Mechin, did not always employ this perspective. 
Revisionist Myths 
The extreme right wing's portrayal underlines the diversity of interpretations which were in 
circulation under the Fourth Republic. At the heart of its narrative was the claim that the 
history of the war had been misinterpreted during the epuration. Its historians suggested that 
communist and Gaullist politicians, judges and historians had deliberately perpetrated a lie 
about the war years. The historians argued that they were providing the truth: that Vichy had 
been a necessary and at times successful strategy. For this reason this current's general 
interpretation can be called revisionist. The essence of the writing exemplified across the 
selected texts is reflected in the following passage which forms part of the preface to Soixante 
fours: 
Si la signature de l'armistice et la liquidation de la IIIe Republique ont suscite 
de part et d'autre des prises de position aussi contradictoires, c'est qu'ils ont ete 
a la fois la conclusion d'un drame militaire et le point de depart d'un drame 
35 Roger Griffin, Fascism, 3. 
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politique. La Liberation a efface ce qu'elle a pu des vestiges du premier, mais 
eile a considerablement envenime les consequences du second. En invitant le 
peuple frangais ä fletrir comme un crime, en 1944, ce qu'il avait accueilli 
comme un acte sauveur en 1940, les successeurs du Marechal ont rendu un bien 
mauvais service ä la Patrie. Its ont encore aggrave le desarroi des esprits, et ont 
amen les Francais ä se dechirer eux-memes. Its ont introduit Bans notre 
Histoire une sorte de prisme qui en detruit 1'unite, en nous faisant apparaitre les 
memes faits sous des couleurs inconciliables. Comment n'ont-ils pas vu qu'en 
brisant l'unite de notre Histoire, ils compremettaient dangereusement l'unite 
morale de la nation et dressaient un obstacle supplementaire sur sa route? 
Il est temps d'en finir. 36 
The simple perspective which the quotation illustrates, and which can be found repeatedly in 
the sources, is a revisionist myth of the war. Here, the dominant framing of the occupation 
stands on the claim that history has been misrepresented by other schools of thought and that 
through the extreme right's own publications the truth has emerged. The extreme right-wing 
story is about history-writing itself, documentation, allegations of political bias, and the 
national historical record. The writings of Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Louis Rougier and General 
Hering are self-consciously corrections, produced to contradict and revise other, `false' 
accounts of the war. 
Margaret Atack has described fictional narratives of the war which emerged from the 
extreme right (i. e those of Marcel Ayme, Roger Nimier and Drieu La Rochelle) as `novels of 
ambiguity'. She concludes that these writers produced accounts which `encode the values of 
the resistance as hopelessly simplistic or simply unrealisable' . 
37 Indeed, many extreme right- 
wing writings, fictional and non-fictional, sought to undermine the legitimacy of the resistance 
past. This was an important part of the revisionist strategy. 
However, the historians were not producing equivalent `histories of ambiguity'. Instead 
36 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante jours, Vol. 1,12. 
37 Margaret Atack, Literature and the French Resistance (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 232. 
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each of the historians promoted himself as the rectifier of the injustices of 1944. This reading 
directly contested the foundations of the post-war order. For the extreme right wing Vichy was 
not a past to be ashamed of, but rather to be recognised as a heroic protection of the nation. 
In order for this `truth' to be revealed the need for a major revision of interpretation was 
stressed. The myth-makers' interest in falsifications, concealment and injustices avoided a 
direct confrontation with what actually occurred under Vichy, or through its laws. At the heart 
of the discourse is a foregrounding of the purge and the claim that it promoted lies about the 
Vichy heritage. For this current, criticism of the perceived deceptions perpetrated by the 
authors of other historical representations was an easier task than asserting original claims 
about the Vichy regime's actions. 
As an account of contemporary politics and history, the revisionist stance functions 
through a similar dynamic to Raoul Girardet's portrait of `conspiracy' as a form of political 
myth. 38 The extreme right-wing sources construct reality around the claim that a secret source 
of power had malignantly tarnished the popularity of Vichy and Petain, post-1944. This 
argument is based on the view that the occupation had been demonised by Gaullo-communist 
conspirators at the time of the liberation. Conversely, the historians present themselves as a 
counter-group dedicated to asserting the truth. As we will see later, themes of conspiracy 
colour aspects of the other two currents' explanations of the 1940 defeat. Nonetheless, only 
in the revisionist narrative is a conspiracy theory deployed in order to underpin the longer 
reading of the war. 
38 Raoul Girardet, Mythes et mythologies politiques, 25-62. Helpful accounts of conspiracy theory discourse can 
also be found in Michael Billig, "The Extreme Right: Continuities in Antisemitic Conspiracy Theory in Post-War 
Europe" in Roger Eatwell (ed. ), The Nature of the Right, American and European Politics and Political Thought 
since 1789 (London: Pinter, 1989), 146-167; Norman Cohn, Warrant for Genocide (London: Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, 1967); David Brion Davis (ed. ), The Fear of Conspiracy: Images of Un-American Subversion from 
the Revolution to the Present (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971). 
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Concluding Discussion 
To recapitulate, all the activist historians presented detailed accounts of the Second World 
War. Their work was sophisticated and far richer than is often acknowledged. Fundamental 
differences existed among the three currents' representations of war and occupation. As one 
would expect, and as has been suggested by many others working in the field, interpreting the 
entire war in the same way as a Gaullist or an extreme right-winger would have been 
remarkable for a communist, and vice versa. 39 
As myth-makers the activist historians acted in similar roles to each other, regardless 
of which set of political views their publications supported. Despite the many differences of 
interpretation between the currents, the narratives distilled a record of the war which served 
the ideological needs of the present. In the context of the Fourth Republic the myths functioned 
as assertive/defensive accounts. On the one hand, in varying degrees, each of the stories 
strongly promoted the politics of the ideological current in question. For example, the anti- 
fascist myth articulated the patriotism of the PCF. Similarly, the rise-fall myth outlined the 
Gaullist rise to recovery. To a lesser degree, through their rehabilitation of Vichy, the extreme 
right-wing historians proclaimed the importance of their ideological tradition. In each case 
militant claims to have acted in the national interest, formed a central element of the narratives. 
Nonetheless, a strong defensive function also marked each of the accounts. Instead of 
popularising a range of new ideological values, the historians portrayed the past in terms which 
combatted potential criticism, rejection or condemnation by opponents. This is self-evident in 
the communist and extreme right-wing currents whose anti-fascist and revisionist stories 
defended group and personal reputations. Much of their interpretation of the history of the war 
sought to defend the ideology from any blame. Of the three representations, the defensive 
39 The general position is evident in the publications of Azema and Bedarida, Wieviorka, Gildea and others. 
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aspect is less marked in the Gaullists' writings which provided a more open vision, which did 
not necessarily shield past iniquities from view. However, its strong association of the Vichy 
regime with decline suggests a fear of conservative scorn for de Gaulle's actions. Removing 
any credibility from the Petain government was one way of limiting its supporters' future 
political role. 
Analysis clarifies several issues raised in the literature of the Vichy syndrome. To an 
extent the evidence from the ideological histories is compatible with aspects of Rousso's 
broader claims. That the stories served to avoid, conceal or reject what was politically 
embarrassing to each ideological group supports the popular view that the French were unable 
in any real sense to confront the past in this period. As Jean-Pierre Rioux's account of the 
Fourth Republic underlined: `what is really striking is the obstinacy [... ] with which France 
refused to look herself squarely in the face' . 
40 
However, it would be difficult to imagine that the existence of three competing 
ideological versions of a recent period of history functioned as Lucette Valensi has suggested. 
Providing the introduction to a special issue of Annales ESC, she writes: 
La part de l'histoire: on a mis longtemps, en France, ä consentir ä faire 1'etude 
de Vichy. Les motifs de cette reticence et de ce retard sont maintenant connus: 
il faut rappeler, apres Gerard Namer et Henry Rousso notanunent, qu'un accord 
tacite s'est conclu, des la Liberation, entre divers courants de l'opinion 
francaise, pour faire le silence sur la defaite de 1940 et sur le regime de Vichy. 
Mus par des interets differents, gaullistes, communistes, Juifs, anciens 
collaborateurs ou citoyens ordinaires, tous s'emploient cependant ä la 
construction du mythe d'une resistance massive et victorieuse et d'une memoire 
nationale heroique. 41 
40 Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic 1944-1958 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 191. 
41 Lucette Valensi, "Presence du passe, lenteur de l'histoire", Annales ESC, 48.3 (1993): 491. 
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Even when considering the shared assertive/defensive function of the mythopoeic accounts, 
evidence does not support Valensi's interpretation. It has been clearly documented that there 
was no silencing of discussion on the topic of the defeat or the Vichy regime. Research has not 
shown that a single heroic myth of the resistance was triumphant, either by the late 1940s or 
in the mid-1950s. Communists, Gaullists and `anciens collaborateurs' did not portray the war 
in a strictly compatible light. The works which have been analysed did not collectively favour 
a united `mythe d'une resistance massive et victorieuse et d'une memoire nationale heroique'. 
Instead, the activist historians offered three different claims to patriotic honour, articulated 
through distinctive and competing narrative constructions. The continuation of political conflict 
through historical interpretation consistently acted against the creation of a uniform reading of 
the occupation. 42 Even if by the mid-1950s the wider public wanted to believe in a harmonious 
view of the resistance, the ideological historians did not provide it in their publications. 
42 See Chapter II. 
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CHAPTER IV 
MANIPULATING THE DEBACLE 
While the previous chapter explored the political function of writing on the entire war 
experience, the following four chapters will take episodes from the occupation to discuss 
structural aspects of the ideological writings. Here, I focus on how the historians wrote about 
the debacle. I demonstrate that at least two overlapping accounts emerged: first I compare 
communist and Gaullist explanations, and secondly, Gaullist and extreme right-wing versions. 
It is argued that writings which depicted 1940 reveal similarities across the currents. 
Communist and Gaullist Accusations of Conspiracy and Subversion 
Communists analysed the debacle as a middle class attack on the proletariat and its political 
representative, the Party. From non-intervention in the Abyssinian crisis through the Spanish 
Civil War to the Munich agreement, capitalism and its class allies were shown to have taken 
a pro-fascist and anti-communist line. Referring to the heritage of the Paris Commune, Thorez 
sketched the class dynamics which he perceived to have been at play prior to the defeat: 
L'effondrement moral de la bourgeoisie francaise s'est traduit par une lassitude, 
une paralysie et une frayeur croissantes. La bourgeoisie ne pence qu'ä ses 
interets de classe, qu'ä ses profits menaces. Ses gouvemements, comme celui 
des Thiers et des Trochu en 1870, ne sont que des gouvernements de la 
`defection nationale'. Desormais, c'est seulement la classe ouvriere qui a le 
souci du pays, et qui veille ä sa securite et ä son independance. l 
In most of the texts the economically defined group of the `bourgeoisie' were characterised as 
having betrayed their fellow Frenchmen in favour of, as Thorez noted, `ses profits menacees'. 
A series of different, interchangeable labels were used to denote the culpability of the anti- 
1 MauriceThorez, Fils du peuple, 135. 
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national group. These included: `les trusts cosmopolites', the `bourgeoisie reactionnaire', 
`cosmopolitisme du capital' and the sinister `classes dirigeantes'. 2 This set of anonymous but 
highly significant actors was held responsible for the defeat. 
The communist historians also identified a pro-German conspiratorial faction, or fifth 
column, which had emerged from the bourgeoisie and acted for it against the Republic. Unlike 
the broad categorisations used to implicate the general class based groupings, this cabal was 
pictured as a small network of politicians, industrialists and opinion formers. They portrayed 
them as preparing the way for Hitler. The communist historians suggested that parliamentary 
ministers manipulated and organised the armistice and the collapse of the Republic. This body 
was associated with having banned the Party (1939) and subsequently persecuted its deputes 
and membership. They showed that high ranking ministers from all of the non-communist 
political parties had used the dröle de guerre to plan a war against the Soviet Union instead of 
the Third Reich. Customarily, the historians cited General Weygand's military campaign in 
the Bakou region as an example of this course. ' 
This was a depiction of a bourgeois coup d'etat against the Republic. Defeat at the 
hands of nazi Germany and the creation of the Vichy regime followed. However, the sources 
are inconsistent in their attribution of responsibility for the defeat to an entire social class, as 
well as to the supposedly conspiratorial actions taken by government ministers. The imagery 
employed by the PCF historians linked, blurred and conflated the two parties. A second 
example from Fils du peuple illustrates the emphasis which was placed on the interpenetration 
between business interests and the political-military elite. The Chairman of the Party explained, 
2 Respectively, Jean Dautry and Louis Pastor, Histoire de la resistance, 8; Jean Freville, Avec Maurice Thorez, 
22; Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple, 127. 
3 Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple, 163. 
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Les hommes des deux cents families, les futurs collaborateurs, n'esperaient pas 
seulement s'entendre avec Hitler, ils commercaient dejä avec lui. Comme le 
revela une revue americaine, Harpers Magazine, en mars 1940, des industriels 
francais vendaient aux Allemands les materiaux qui servaient ä fabriquer les 
obus et les canons, destines ä tuer les soldats francais. 4 
Thorez was advocating a deeply conspiratorial interpretation in his evocation of the infamous 
deux cents families of capitalists who, so the story went, had managed the economic and 
political affairs of France since at least the Revolution. Ironically, he referred to the profoundly 
middle class Harpers Magazine to prove his case. He melodramatically claimed that instead 
of providing the much needed ammunition for the defence of the Republic, in 1939-1940, 
profit motives led industrialists. This meant selling equipment, explosives and armaments to 
Germany. These very weapons were soon to be trained on the innocent men of the French 
army. The images and associations that Thorez made between `big business', capitalism, and 
the defeat are typical of the selected texts' approach to the subject. 
Conspiracy myths of the right and left are a deeply ingrained part of French political 
culture. ' This was another variation on the theme, reflecting the many classic elements which 
Girardet has outlined as forming one of his four ideal myth types. Now a conspiracy was used 
to present the critical 1939/1940 scene from the war. Many of the lessons which were drawn 
from the communist historians' reading of 1940 focused on the nature of the class system and 
the propensity of the bourgeoisie to follow its own interests, no matter what the national 
consequences. This conspiracy placed social groups, and the notion of collective class 
responsibility, at the centre of its explanation. The historians perceived that the occupation was 
4 Ibid., 164. 
5 Raoul Girardet, Mythes et mythologies politiques, 25-62. 
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the direct consequence of the thoughts and actions of the middle class and their shadowy 
activities. 
Writing on `myths of the debacle', Hilary Footitt and John Simmonds have argued that 
accounting for the defeat was critical to several ideological groups, both during and after the 
war. 6 However, they do not comment on the anti-bourgeois manipulation carried out by the 
communist writers. The perspective was not marginal, however. It was used to exemplify more 
general conclusions about the position of the class in, and its influence on, society. An explicit 
example was an article produced by Florimond Bonte, and published in the Cahiers (1951). 
Tellingly it was entitled `Trahison nationale et cosmopolitisme de la grande bourgeoisie, 
patriotisme et internationalisme de la classe ouvriere'. He prefaced his historical essay with a 
citation from Karl Marx's writing on the Paris Commune which stated: 'C'est une vieille 
histoire. Les classes superieures se mettent toujours d'accord pour tenir sous leur talon la 
classe ouvriere'. ' He continued to argue that the history of the debacle was emblematic of the 
grande bourgeoisie's historical role. Despite the liberation, Bonte suggested that the politics 
of the Fourth Republic remained threatened by middle class interests which had not changed 
from those which were evident during the inter-war period. The historian drew analogies 
between the Franco-Prussian War, the Second World War and the Cold War. He rhetorically 
compared the three dates: 
En 1871, des gouvernants dits francais livraient la France au roi de Prusse, 
pour etouffer la Commune. En 1940, des gouvernants dits frangais livraient la 
France au fiihrer Hitler, pour etrangler la democratie. En 1951, des 
gouvernants dits francais livrent la France au potentat Truman pour maintenir 
6 Hilary Footitt and John Simmonds, "Destroying the Myths of Debacle", in A. C. Pugh (ed. ), France 1940,19- 
33. 
7 Florimond Bonte, "Trahison nationale et cosmopolitisme... ", Cahiers, 3 (1951): 293. 
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la domination du grand capital. 8 
The moral is easily decoded. Bonte's contention, derived from his reading of 1870 and 1940, 
was that on any given occasion the bourgeoisie would place their own interests above those of 
the nation. The history of the debacle, and that of the Commune, highlighted the constant 
unreliability of middle class politics. 
The reasoning illustrated above marked several of the communist histories. In another 
Cahiers article, Francois Billoux stressed how this social group had been consistently anti- 
national. He taught that the collapse of the Republic offered `quelques enseignements' to his 
post-war readership. Billoux claimed that in 1939, 
La grande bourgeoisie francaise se montre sous son vrai jour en tant que classe, 
n'ayant plus rien de commun avec la Nation, prete ä se jeter dans les bras de 
l'etranger plutöt que de ceder une partie de ses privileges. 9 
Jean Freville's biographical portrait, Avec Maurice Thorez, raised a similar point. In the 
context of describing a conversation between the author and Thorez, he remarked that having 
abandoned the nation in 1940 the middle class had lost their mandate to govern the people. 10 
The historiography reinforced what Georges Lavau rightly identified as one of the 
Party's key strategies: the symbolic portrayal of the bourgeoisie as bearing responsibility for 
`la violence du capitalisme'. 11 This was a vital strand of PCF rhetoric. Whilst journalism and 
speech-making addressed similar themes, historiography of the defeat provided concrete 
8 Ibid., 293. 
9 Francois Billoux, "Notre lutte pour la pair en 1939", Cahiers, 8 (1949): 985. 
10 Jean Freville, Avec Maurice Thorez, 58. 
11 Georges Lavau, A quoi sen le Parti Communiste Francais (Paris: Fayard, 1981), 242. 
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examples of middle class betrayal and brutality. The historians recycled the formula to smear 
an array of the bourgeoisie's contemporary actions. In the previously cited article, Bonte 
indicated that one could witness a comparable treason in Rene Pleven's rapprochement with 
the West German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer. Deliberately rephrasing the earlier passage, 
he declared, `En 1940, Petain etait avec Hitler. En 1951, Pleven est avec Adenauer' . 
12 
The communist account was also a means of coming to terms with how nazi Germany 
had defeated the Party and the people. It underlined that it was not that Hitler or his French 
allies were intrinsically stronger than their opponents, rather that they had captured the running 
of the state. The historians presented their Party and its ideological ally, the Soviet Union, as 
having been the innocent victims of the bourgeoisie's machinations. This contributed to the 
wider attempt to legitimate the role of the Soviet Union during the period of the Molotov- 
Ribbentrop Pact. They alleged that whilst the middle classes had prepared their own nation's 
collapse, their diplomats had sought to turn the Third Reich to war against the flourishing 
Soviet Union. Repeatedly, communist historians suggested that the inter-war foreign policy of 
the Western powers, `dit de non-intervention', had intended to facilitate a Nazi-Soviet 
skirmish, with the West financially sponsoring Hitler. By 1939, post-Munich, they depicted 
Stalin escaping from an anti-communist entrapment. Dautry and Pastor, in their history of the 
resistance, explained, 
Desireuse d'echapper au piege que lui tendent des allies felons, amplement 
renseignee sur leur intention qui est de faire retomber sur eile tout le poids du 
Wehrmacht, I'URRS, parant au plus presse, assure sa propre securite et se 
donne par le pacte de non-agression germano-sovietique le repit necessaire ä 
1'achevement de sa preparation militaire (23 aoüt 1939). 13 
12 Florimond Bonte, "Trahison nationale et cosmopolitisme...... Cahiers, 3 (1951): 302. 
13 Jean Dautry and Louis Pastor, Histoire de la resistance, 10. 
110 
The historians depicted the Soviet Union as having been gradually forced into a policy of 
containment to negate a potential fascist attack. The image of victimage which resulted was 
helpful because it removed all responsibility from the USSR for its actions. The PCF historians 
portrayed the Soviet Union as the innocent party in world affairs. 
Victimage was also a significant notion in describing domestic politics. The historians 
represented the Party as the prey of the Daladier government's anti-communism. Thorez 
justified his own flight into clandestinity in these terms. He noted, 
[... ] la direction du Parti prit la decision juste de me faire passer ä l'activite 
clandestine. Le Parti et sa direction avaient le devoir de prendre les mesures 
permettant de faire echec au complot des hitleriens, qui visaient ä l'invasion et 
ä I'aneantissement de la France. 14 
Instead of confronting the reality of the PCF's disarray in 1940, the historians emphasised their 
unity. They pictured its position as akin to that of the Soviet Union. They retrospectively 
portrayed both the USSR and the PCF as the victims of the capitalist world. 
The class-conspiracy and victimage dimension of the communist account was often 
exchanged for a polemical enquiry into the role of the other political parties during the 
1939/1940 period. Wrongly, much of the secondary literature on historical memory and the 
PCF has ignored the importance of history-writing in day to day political conflict. Communist 
historiography was not exclusively a matter of theoretical enquiry, or self-commemoration. 
Inquisitorial probing into the socialist left's actions was a common theme. In Fils du peuple 
14 166. This is one of the few albeit oblique references from Fils du peuple which reminds the reader that Thorez 
had spent much of the occupation in Moscow. Equally it could be interpreted as signaling Thorez's career as a 
resistance fugitive. 
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Thorez gradually argued that socialist deputies had ignored the communists' plight and sided 
with their middle-class allies. " The historians often made this dimension of the manipulation 
of 1940 as an aside, or as a passing judgement. Specifically, they ascribed guilt for the defeat 
onto the socialist left, more often than not personified by Leon Blum. A forceful example of 
the rhetoric is found in a short article written by Roger Garaudy, entitled, `Silhouettes, Leon 
Blum, Paul Reynaud' (1948). Fulfilling David Caute's characteristic role of the communist 
intellectual, `political agitation', the historian turned elements of the wider conspiracy 
explanation of the debacle against Blum. 16 He portrayed the Jewish SFIO leader as having 
abandoned the Popular Front to capitalism and fascism. It was implied that in so doing Blum 
had been one of the many bourgeois politicians who had prepared the way for the defeat. 
Garaudy addressed Blum's nefarious record: 
La reaction contre-attaque. Des ouvriers sont frappes ä Clichy par la police que 
Blum laisse proteger les provocateurs Croix de Feu. Les masses populaires 
grondent contre les entreprises de la Cagoule. Blum est contraint d'arreter 
Deloncle et Dusseigneur pour empecher que 1'enquete ne revele les liaisons de 
Weygand et de Petain avec les conspirateurs [... ] Blum ferme les yeux. 
La reaction passe ä l'offensive avec ses armes secretes: un milliard de 
francs passe chaque mois hors de nos frontieres. Le peuple exige que Fon mette 
fm ä la desertion des capitaux; la City de Londres demande ä Blum de laisser 
faire. Blum suit les ordres de la banque anglaise et non ceux des travailleurs 
frangais: c'est au peuple et non aux trusts qu'il demande de faire `la pause'. 
La reaction a atteint son premier objectif: grace ä Leon Blum l'elan du 
Front Populaire est brise: au dehors par la farce sanglante de la pretendue 'non- 
intervention'; au dedans par le mensonge de la `pause' . 
17 
is For example, Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple, 174, where Thorez reminds his readers that in 1940, `un 
ministre socialiste, Serol, decreta la peine de mort contre les Francais suspects de propagande communiste, tandis 
que traitres et espions hitleriens avaient le champ libre'. 
16 David Caute, Communism and the French Intellectuals, 34-35. 
17 Roger Garaudy, "Silhouettes: Leon Blum, Paul Reynaud", Cahiers, 9 (1948): 978. 
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The allegation that Blum was negligent in his attitude towards the rise of fascism is strangely 
similar in tone to the extreme right-wing antisemitism which he had faced during the Popular 
Front years. Without identifying his race, Garaudy characterised Blum through a vector of 
coded antisemitic references. `La City de Londres' , `la banque', and `les trusts' were all well 
known watchwords used to indicate the presence of a global network of Jewish influence. 18 
Immediately after the liberation, this rhetoric was unusual. However, by the time the PCF had 
been excluded from tripartite government, fault-finding with Blum and the socialist left, 
specifically for their behaviour leading up to the debacle, was increasing. 
To recap, communists mobilised the historical explanation of the defeat to serve several 
political ambitions. These encompassed the unremitting exposition of middle-class treason, and 
a portrayal of the innocent victimage of the Soviet Union and the Party. This bolstered a key 
element in communist propaganda, the accusation that social elites were either `traitre' or 
`ennemi'. Capitalism was associated with one the nation's darkest episodes. Equally, the 
selection of individual politicians for questioning because of their perceived complicity in the 
debacle was a normal feature. It was not only Petain, Laval or the literary stars of 
collaborationist Paris who were questioned after the war. On the contrary, this was an 
opportunity to connect the non-communist left, the SFIO, with the shame of the defeat. 
Communist historiography on 1940 supports the claim that the wider post-war 
intellectual milieu was pre-occupied with the notion of treason. 19 As I have already suggested 
the evidence is equally in accord with the general issues raised in Girardet's description of 
conspiracy myths. Within the orbit of the PCF this contributed to the creation of a political 
18 The example of Garaudy's soft antisemitic style is entirely consistent with Winock's analysis of the post- 
liberation period's left antisemitism. See Michel Winock, Nationalisme, antisemitisme etfascisme en France, 
186-217. 
19 Tony Judt, Past Imperfect, 51-52. 
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culture which was willing to believe these types of account of history and thus also of 
contemporary politics. 
Conspiracy was also a strong theme in Gaullist historiography. In accounting for the 
debacle the two currents overlap. Whereas the middle classes were not blamed by the Gaullist 
historians, the military hierarchy of the armed services and specific individuals were seen to 
be culpable of pursuing policies which had led to the armistice. The Gaullist historians saw the 
final humiliation of military defeat as treason. They hinted at evil machinations in high office, 
specifically manipulated by the Marshal and his henchmen. De Gaulle even wryly noted the 
misjudgments of the upper classes before 1940. He wrote, in the context of the general 
rejection of his plans for a professional army: `Premier episode d'une longue serie 
d'evenements, oü une part de 1'elite francaise, condamnant chacun des buts que je serais amen 
a poursuivre, [... ]' . 
20 This was perhaps the nearest de Gaulle came to the communist discourse. 
The Gaullist representation of politics in 1939 was consistently divided between those 
who favoured war against the Reich and the conspiratorial `parti de la paix' headed by Pierre 
Laval. 21 The historians contended that a small, but influential, sect appeased Germany and Italy 
and thereby sought self-aggrandisement. To reinforce the point, they described the politics of 
the time as an intrigue. For instance, Jacques Madaule wrote, 
Au Senat, ce fut Pierre Laval, sortant de l'ombre, qui meng la bataille. 
L'objectif en etait fort clair: il s'agissait, sous pretexte de reprocher au 
ministere son impuissance dans l'affaire de Finlande, de ramener au pouvoir le 
parti de la paix: 60 voix se prononcerent contre le gouvernement. 22 
20 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 1,17. 
21 Jacques Madaule, "La Fin", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 211. 
22 Ibid., 211. 
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The historian portrayed Laval secretly plotting his own objectives. Note how Madaule's 
language and his choice of vocabulary highlighted his sinister agenda. He was pictured `en 
sortant de 1'ombre' planning `sous pretexte' his ambitions of peace with Germany. Later in a 
similar mode of writing, the historian implied that the speed with which Petain had formed his 
first Bordeaux cabinet was evidence that his assumption of power had been the result of 
suspicious forward planning. 
Cattaui's treatment illustrates a comparable conspiracy. Throughout 1939, he noted that 
secret groups and factions had worked within the parliament to transfer authority away from 
Paris towards Berlin. De Gaulle was similarly forthright in his allegations. He declared, 
without explaining in detail, `les intrigues bruissaient dans les coulisses'. 23 De Gaulle linked 
Petain and Laval as partners who were, it was rumoured, willing to take power and to offer 
an armistice. In the wider background a grouping of politicians, `certains milieux"', 
comparable to Madaule's `le Parti de la paix', were also implicated in undermining France. All 
the Gaullist historians repeated the word `jeu' to describe the chaotic period prior to the 
debacle and the armistice. The word was advantageous in that its ambiguous meaning 
suggested malevolent intrigue and the inability of the Third Republic to do anything other than 
play political games. 25 
As in the communist historiography, the conspiracy theory simplified the highly 
complex web of factors which had resulted in defeat and the creation of the Vichy regime. 
23 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 1,25. 
24Ibid., 26. 
25 For a different interpretation of `jeu'/`game-playing' in de Gaulle's writing see Quesnoy's analysis of his 
writing on military strategy as a `game', "De Gaulle portraitiste", Nord, 14 (1989): 24-25. 
115 
Generally, both sets of historians condemned figures from within the extreme right-wing for 
having sabotaged the nation. The language of conspiracy which they used also makes their 
work appear similar. To an extent they had common targets. Moreover, both groups needed 
to validate the claims of the epuration courts that the nation had been betrayed in 1940 and that 
the crimes of treason and indignite nationale were the appropriate device through which to 
condemn collaboration. The two currents of historiography intersected in a more complex way 
than has been recognised in the traditional historiographic reviews or the Vichy syndrome 
analysis. Whilst there was not direct collusion between communist and Gaullist historians, who 
fundamentally disagreed about other aspects of the war, the two accounts of subversion in 1940 
partially reinforced each other. 
Nonetheless, despite the similarities with the communist account, the Gaullist 
disposition was significantly different. Their belief that a small group of conspirators had 
betrayed France provided an explanation which minimised what had occurred and thus also the 
range of social groups who could be held responsible for it. This contradicted the communist 
outlook. Instead of alleging that a class was to blame, they expanded on the war broadcasts of 
de Gaulle and the Free French, in which Petain alone had been damned as `Pere la Defaite'. Z6 
The post-war accounts both drew on, and re-legitimated, the Gaullist war propaganda. 
On this episode, the extreme right's traditional argument that communists and Gaullists 
misinterpreted the war in a similar light is almost vindicated. There was an overlap between 
the two currents. The Gaullist and communist historians shared the premise that the armistice 
had been planned by those who had most to gain from it. However, as a number of differences 
have also been distinguished, this was far from a collective illustration of events. The 
26 Charles de Gaulle, "Discours prononce ä la radio de Londres, 23 octobre 1941", Discours et messages, Vol. 1 
(Paris: Plon, 1970), 122-123. 
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relationships which existed across the three currents were more complicated than a 
straightforward Gaullo-communist symmetry. As we will see below, just as an aspect of the 
Gaullist account formed a bridge to the communist interpretation, the Gaullist interpretation 
presented further explanations of 1940 which touched on themes which can be closely 
associated with extreme right-wing thinking. 
Stigmatising The Republic 
In addition to the conspiracy view of defeat, Gaullist historians emphasised a series of fatal 
flaws in the governance of the Third Republic. It had failed to intervene successfully in 
international relations, and there was an absence of political leadership to steer the nation 
towards victory. I will show that this was a deeply traditionalist attitude towards governance 
which was echoed in extreme right-wing writing. 
At the beginning of the first volume of his war memoirs, de Gaulle criticised the 
Republican system for how it had operated in the inter-war period. Recalling his secondment 
to the Secretariat general de la defense nationale (1932-1937) he recollected: 
Car c'est l'inconsistance du pouvoir qui s'etalait en ce domain. Non, certes, 
que les hommes qui y figuraient manquassent d'intelligence ou de patriotisme. 
Au contraire, je voyais passer ä la tete des ministeres d'indiscutables valeurs et, 
parfois, de grands talents. Mais le jeu du regime les consumait et les paralysait. 
Temoin reserve, mais passionne, des affaires publiques, j'assistais ä la 
repetition continuelle du meme scenario. A peine en fonction, le President du 
Conseil etait aux prises avec d'innombrables exigences, critiques et 
surencheres, que tout son activite s'employait ä derouter sans pouvoir les 
maitriser. Le Parlement, loin de le soutenir, ne lui offrait qu'embüches et 
defections. Ses ministres etaient ses rivaux. L'opinion, la presse, les interets, 
le tenaient pour une cible designee ä tous les griefs. Chacun, d'ailleurs, - lui- 
meme tout le premier, - savait qu'il n'etait lä que pour une courte duree. De 
fait, apres quelques mois, il lui fallait ceder la place. En matiere de defense 
nationale, de telles conditions interdisaient aux responsables cet ensemble de 
desseins continus, de decision müries, de mesures menees ä leur terme, qu'on 
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appelle une politique. Z' 
As is well known De Gaulle contended that the machinery of state which he had encountered 
between 1932 and 1937 had produced an environment which was incapable of guaranteeing 
national security. 28 He suggested that a number of features of the Third Republic had impinged 
on the efficiency of its executive offices. Firstly, he identified specific characteristics as having 
contributed to this condition, for instance, le Parlement', and `1'opinion, la presse, les 
interets. ' He argued that the constitution had created an ineffective and divisive system. Hence, 
instead of the President du Conseil working with his cabinet, his fellow ministers were more 
often than not `ses rivaux'. Similarly, a reflexive knowledge of the regime amongst its 
politicians had produced a propensity for short-termism. De Gaulle suggested that everyone 
in office had been conscious that positions of power were quickly exchanged, typified in his 
dry condemnation, `apres quelques mois, il lui fallait ceder la place'. In the second volume of 
the memoirs de Gaulle's view of the Third Republic was forthright. He claimed that the defeat 
had been caused by `les consequences d'une longue infirmite de 1'Etat'. 29 
This was another version of the collapse which removed responsibility for it from the 
people or nation. Shortly after the cited passage from Appel, de Gaulle emphasised that, when 
the war swung in Germany's favour, it was the state rather than the nation which was incapable 
of adopting the measures which were needed to guarantee its safety against enemy 
occupation. 3° This implied that however heroic individual soldiers or citizens had been in the 
27 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 1,4. 
28 For discussion of the Gaullist condemnation of `politics' and the Third Republic, see, among others, Jean- 
Christian Petitfils, Le Gaullisme (Paris: PUF, 1977), 18-19; Rene Remond, Les Droites en France, 248,249. 
29 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 2,69. 
30 For example, De Gaulle wrote, `Il faut dire qu'au moment supreme le regime n'of-rait aucun recours au 
chef du dernier gouvernement de la III` Republique', in Memoires de guerre, Vol.!, 66. 
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Battle of France, the governmental system's perceived long-term paralysis had already sealed 
their fate. As Hilary Footitt and John Simmonds have underlined, this proved to be a 
reassuring nationalist image which served to inspire resistance. 31 Instead of there having been 
an ethnic or endemic reason why Germany had devastated France in 1940, national humiliation 
became explainable through a quasi-scientific expose of the Republican regime's incapabilities. 
Was de Gaulle arguing that the Third Republic had caused its own downfall? Was this 
a further example of anti-republicanism within the Gaullist current? The majority of Gaullist 
writers who criticised the Third Republic's system of government did not ascribe blame for the 
defeat to the Republic as an ideal, but rather to the machinery of government which was in use 
at that time. Nevertheless, by implication this type of criticism was closer to a conservative 
understanding of the defeat than that of the Gaullists' fellow resistance fighters, the French 
Communist Party. It seems likely that for the influential ex-Action Francaise Gaullists the 
problems of running the Republican system and rejection of the Republic, in principle, were 
probably only two sides of the same coin. As Henry Rousso has recognised: `De meme, ä 
l'origine heritier du gaullisme de guerre, le RPF devient dans ces annees-lä une sorte de 
creuset oü s'opere un amalgame entre les gaullistes de stricte obedience et les democrates 
chretiens rallies, avec une partie de 1'electorat encore fidele au marechalisme'. 32 Thus, the 
intersection with an orthodox right-wing interpretation of the debacle was politically valuable, 
especially in the task of attracting catholic conservative cohorts away from the MRP and the 
smaller right-wing parties. At the time of the RPF, the use of an implied anti-republicanism 
provided a device with which to stake out Gaullism's more general right-leaning identity. This 
31 Hilary Footitt and John Simmonds, "Destroying the Myths of the Debacle", in Anthony C. Pugh (ed. ), France 
1940,26. 
32 Henry Rousso, "La Seconde Guerre mondiale dans la memoire des droites francaises", in Jean-Francois 
Sirinelli (ed. ), Histoire des droites en France, Vol. 2,570. 
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was another demonstration of the pose. 
The traditionalist slant to explaining the defeat was present in many of the Gaullist 
historians' writings on the inter-war period. The popular historian Jacques Boudet, contributing 
to the Trente ans collection, chided the post-1918 Republic from this perspective. He provided 
a hard conservative portrayal of a morally sick Republic. As well as political and social 
commentary, which was akin to de Gaulle's, he included the following description of the mood 
of the. 1920s literary scene . He commented, 
Quel lecteur populaire se reconnaitrait dann la memoire proustienne, la negation 
gidienne, 1'ironie giralducienne, la grandeur claudelienne, la purete valeryenne, 
la libido freudienne, la douceätrerie de Pierre Benoit? Ces adjectifs eux-memes, 
ces gros tirages sont faits par des bourgeois pour une civilisation bourgeoise; 
et le surrealisme qui, dans un supreme effort individualiste, rejette en bloc 
toutes les traditions et insulte l'armee n'en est en definitive qu'une effloraison, 
une deviation derniere. 33 
As in de Gaulle's account of the governmental system, Boudet's brief treatment of cultural 
history assumed that there had been a potentially fatal subversion of military strength. Boudet 
concluded his list of literary woes with the implication that surrealism had presented an internal 
threat to national `traditions' and had insulted, or undermined, the army. As we will see, this 
detailed reasoning was not unlike that employed by historians who were associated with the 
extreme right-wing. It is a further example of the conservatism which was evident in 
Gaullism's explanation that the defeat had been the product of the Third Republic. 
In addition to the frequently hard-right tone of the analysis, it is important to underline 
that many of the Gaullist historians' discussions of governance in 1940 were rehearsals of their 
political movement's view of the Fourth Republic. Their commentaries on the Third Republic's 
33 Jacques Boudet, "L'Espoir 1919-1931", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 28-29. 
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politichiens and its `ministrables' acted as an implicit judgement on the current system. 34The 
passage from de Gaulle's memoirs, cited above, was typical of the RPF's propaganda which 
attacked the new constitutional arrangements of the Fourth Republic. 35 Gaullist historical 
writing on the faults of the 1870-1940 constitution functioned as a coded critique of the newly 
framed Republic. Like the propagandists, the historians commonly attacked the political 
parties. They were seen to be incapable of placing the nation above their own `feudal' interests. 
The historians' understanding of the war and contemporary politics became conveniently 
blurred. For example, Albert Ollivier, one of de Gaulle's preferred writers and the one-time 
director of the RPF's broadsheet Le Rassemblement, summarised the history of the political 
parties in terms of their preference for self-preservation over national progress. Concluding 
his review essay, `Les Partis politiques', published as part of the Trente ans anthology, he 
considered that the attitude of the parties had not changed from the time of the defeat to the 
present day. Implicitly this was an ominous judgement. In 1939 they had been a `faiblesse 
interne' which had contributed to the debacle. Now, under the Fourth Republic little of their 
demeanour had changed. Ollivier remarked, 
On retrouve pleinement la feodalite sous sa forme degeneree des coalitions 
d'interets: les meilleures intentions politiques se trouvent compromises, 
sterilisees par les concessions tactiques; l'on se partage les postes administratifs, 
les avantages materiels et les honneurs, mais l'on n'envisage aucun avenir pour 
le pays, occupe que Fon est ä defendre la bastille du regime. 36 
34 The term `Les Ministrables' is used by Jacques Boudet as the title of the first book of the second part of the 
Trente ans collection, 134. 
35 The RPF's antagonistic relationship with the Fourth Republic is widely covered in Jean Chariot, Le Gaullisme 
d'opposition 1946-1958; and Francois-Georges Dreyfus, De Gaulle et le Gaullisme (Paris: PUF, 1982), 124. 
36 Albert Ollivier, "Les Partis politiques", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 388. 
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The criticism is almost identical to de Gaulle's 1954 analysis of the Third Republic. Ollivier 
implied that the Fourth Republic parties were a disappointing continuation of the 1940 system, 
hence, the opening remark `On retrouve'. A central ploy in Gaullist historiography was the 
indirect criticism of the post-war order. By the time de Gaulle's political movement against the 
new regime had fallen, de Gaulle's memoirs provided a second timely attack. Before their 
publication, the war in Indochina had been lost and once more the issue of governance was 
high on the political agenda. The Gaullist historiographical account of the weakness of the state 
in 1939/1940 supported the call for constitutional reform of the Fourth Republic, implicitly to 
avoid a repetition of the events which they perceived as having led to the occupation. As I have 
illustrated, in so doing it revealed the profoundly conservative aspect of Gaullist thinking 
towards the Third Republic. 
If the state had been absent in 1940, so too were its natural leaders, the Gaullists 
claimed. The historians implied that had Charles de Gaulle already been in office in 1939, with 
his military modernisation programme under way, then the defeat would not have occurred. 
Consistent with the RPF's political promotion of de Gaulle, its mass rallies and formal 
propaganda, historiography provided a further opportunity to establish myths of leadership, 
and its absence. 37 The subtitle of the Parias collection carried much of this notion about it. De 
Clemenceau a de Gaulle: between the two `great' war leaders, the title hinted that there had 
been a fatal leadership-gap during the inter-war period. The theme manifested itself primarily 
in two interdependent ways. On the one hand, the Gaullist texts emphasised the lack of 
authority displayed by the politicians and military elites of the inter-war period, whilst on the 
other hand, there was an equally elaborate portrayal of de Gaulle as the 'prophet-leader'. Again 
37 For the role of `de Gaulle' in de Gaulle's own propaganda pronouncements during the RPF era see Jean 
Touchard, Le Gaullisme 1940-1969,129-131. 
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the historiography commented on Fourth Republic politics, at least as much as the Third. 
In the Parias collection, Cattaui's biography and de Gaulle's own writings, there are 
frequent suggestions that the politicians of the Third Republic had been incapable of the task 
which was required of them: to defend the patrie. Whilst this was occasionally mitigated by 
the failings of the wider state system to provide leadership, the historians developed the 
explanation on the level of judging personal ability. This was especially true of Boudet's 
account of the inter-war period (1918-1938). Repeatedly as he charted the rise and fall of 
presidents, ministers, and political figures, the popular historian questioned whether the given 
politician was capable of the leadership of France, post-Clemenceau. The inter-war period was 
constituted as a trough of `decline' and could therefore, almost metaphysically, not produce 
a leader of the equivalent stature of a Clemenceau or retrospectively a de Gaulle. This 
corresponded to the wider Gaullist narrative of a national rise and fall (analysed in the previous 
chapter). In a helpful summary of the Gaullists' belief that there had been a collective failure 
of inter-war political leadership, Boudet argued that all of the post-First World War political 
generation were incapable of the necessary patriotic will to govern. He wrote, 
Vingt ans en 1900. [... ]la generation qui vient, celle des Tardieu, des Flandin, 
des de Monzie, des Laval est celle de la facilite. 
Elle a eu vingt ans en 1900, la belle epoque; eile n'a connu que les 
echos affaiblis des grandes batailles d'idees de la fin du XIXe siecle, eile a 
trouve la Republique fermement etablie, l'Europe prospere. A 1'ecole du 
dilettantisme politique eile a appris les methodes de compromis ou de 
compromissions et a fourni toute une vaste equipe de techniciens, de ministeres 
interchangeables selon les humeurs de Parlement, toujours prets a simplifier les 
problemes, ä les jeter en päture a une opinion non preparee a les recevoir. 
Qui s'etonnerait si Henri Beraud remplace Peguy et trouve une audience 
incalculablement plus large? 3ß 
38 Jacques Boudet, "L'Espoir 1919-1931 ", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 28. 
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The influence of cultural choices, such as the preference for Beraud's work instead of Peguy's, 
reflected a weakening of the political class. The men who thrived in this environment were 
invariably weak: for instance, Tardieu, Flandin, de Monzie and Laval. Their failure to know 
how to lead with honour was cast almost as an inevitability, a product of their ignorance of the 
great republican debates of the previous generation. 
De Gaulle's exploration of the theme was more impressionistic than the nationalistic 
delineation of the leadership question in Trente ans. Nevertheless, again authoritative 
leadership was depicted as having been decisively absent when the Third Republic had needed 
it most. As Francois Quesnoy and Bernard Alluin have shown, de Gaulle sketches the portraits 
of a number of politicians. 39 As well as describing his own progress, as in Alluin's terms as 
an `extraordinary hero', he depicts a number of negative exemplars. 40 Writing on General 
Weygand, he memorably deduced: 
Weygand etait, en effet, par nature, un brillant second. [... ]Prendre faction a 
son compte, n'y vouloir de marque que la sienne, affronter seul le destin, 
passion äpre et exclusive qui caracterise le chef, Weygand n'y etait, ni porte, 
ni prepare. D'ailleurs, qu'il y eüt en cela l'effet de ses propres tendances ou 
d'un concours de circonstances, il n'avait, au cours de sa carriere, exerce aucun 
commandement. Nul regiment, nulle brigade, nulle division, nul corps d'armee, 
nulle armee, ne 1'avaient vu ä leur tete. al 
Alongside the contemptuous images of absent leadership, de Gaulle and his fellow- 
travellers asserted positive images. As noted above, the negative examples of leadership were 
39 Francois Quesnoy, "De Gaulle portraitiste", Nord, 14 (1989): 11-34; Bernard Alluin, "Elements d'un 
autoportrait: Naissance d'un heros epique daps le premier tome des Memoires de guerre", Nord, 14 (1989): 35- 
40. 
40 Bernard Alluin, "Elements d'un autoportrait", Nord, 37. 
41 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 1,40. As we know Weygand would respond in his own terms, 
see Chapter II. 
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taken as implicit contrasts with de Gaulle's career. No better example of this strategy can be 
found than in the writings of de Gaulle's three-time biographer, Georges Cattaui. He 
consistently highlighted the General's ability to lead and represent the nation, even before the 
outbreak of war. The chapters which chronologically preceded the 18 June decision indicated 
de Gaulle's strength vis-a-vis his contemporaries. In contrast with the view that de Gaulle's 
heroism was all the greater for his initial position of weakness, Cattaui's favoured 
characterisation was of de Gaulle `the prophet' . 
42 For example, had not de Gaulle predicted the 
nature of mechanised warfare, but perhaps what is more important, also the requirements of 
national leadership? Citing the General's inter-war writings, Cattaui noted, 
En vertu d'une sorte de vue prophetique, c'est son propre portrait que de Gaulle 
avait dejä trace lorsque, dans Le Fil de 1'Epee, il campait la figure du chef: 
L'homme de caractere incorpore ä sa personne la rigueur propre ä 1'effort. Les 
subordonnes l'eprouvent et, parfois, ils en gemissent... Mais dans faction, plus 
de censeurs! Les volontes, les espoirs, s'orientent vers lui, comme le fer vers 
l'aimant. Vienne la crise, c'est lui que Von suit... 43 (italics in original) 
De Gaulle had already displayed all the necessary qualities of military leadership and planning. 
He had even written the outline of his own future. This was the Gaullian myth of de Gaulle at 
one of its most lyrical moments. The historians had created a discursive polarisation which 
worked to their ideological advantage. They illustrated that the inter-war period had witnessed 
many failed attempts to lead the nation whilst de Gaulle was presented as the leader-in-waiting. 
Again, there was a useful correspondence between the politics of the Fourth Republic and the 
past. From January 1946, de Gaulle was once more a leader-in-waiting/prophet, a coincidence 
42 For an outline of the alternative view that de Gaulle's `Faiblesse initiale' in June 1940 was part of his 
greatness, see Bernard Alluin, "Elements d'un autoportrait", Nord, 14 (1989): 36. 
43 Georges Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle, 45. 
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which meant that this aspect of the historiography remained resonant. The parallels which were 
implied between the late Third and early Fourth Republics underlined that it was possible, and 
desirable, that de Gaulle would once again lead France. That de Gaulle should continue to use 
this type of argument in 1954, after his failed leadership of the RPF, is a good example of his 
self-confidence and his profound belief in the importance of leadership. 
This portrayal legitimated and popularised value judgements which were founded on 
personality politics rather than other political considerations. Much in the manner that the 
communist discourse had emphasised class as the defining lesson of the defeat, the Gaullist 
accounts positioned part of their evaluation of history and politics on the ground of strong 
leadership attributes. As we will see, a valorisation of leadership also formed a major element 
in the extreme right's portrayal, the primary difference being that they looked to Petain instead 
of de Gaulle. 
Like the Gaullist historians, the extreme right-wingers argued that the debacle 
illustrated the weaknesses of the Republic and an absence of leadership. Elements of the 
interpretation provided by General Hering and Louis Rougier intersected with the Gaullists' 
treatment in its portrayal of an ineffectual Republic which was unable to defend the nation in 
1940. The extreme right-wing historians cited the political culture of the Third Republic as 
having been a decisive cause of the defeat. They claimed that it had not provided sufficient 
national strength or leadership to fight the Germans. General Hering argued that only Petain 
had attempted to avert disaster prior to 1940. It was suggested that he had been stopped from 
doing so by the structures of Third Republic bureaucracy. This version of events was 
comparable to the Gaullist representation of de Gaulle's inter-war career. For example, Hering 
wrote, 
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Il [Petain] s'occupe tout d'abord de renforcer la position de 1'Armee Bans la 
Nation, de former et d'entretenir 1'esprit patriotique avant et apres le service 
militaire, notamment en luttant contre la doctrine perilleuse d'objection de 
conscience et contre les tendances nefastes que certain propagandistes 
cherchent ä faire penetrer au sein du personnel enseignant.... Jusque-lä tout va 
bien, ou ä peu pres. Les difficultes vont commencer lorsqu'il s'agira de lutter 
contre la demagogie du Parlement, non seulement pour freiner les reductions 
de credits, mais pour obtenir des credits supplementaires. " 
As we have seen, Georges Cattaui's understanding of de Gaulle's role in this period was very 
similar to this. The citation illustrates another lone military figure who was shown attempting 
to save France. Again the historians protested that the institutions of the Third Republic had 
weakened the nation and inspired disaster. As has been suggested by Robert Paxton, `De 
Gaulle and his former mentor and adversary Petain resembled each other in many respects, but 
in none so closely as when they talked contemptuously of the regime of parties'. 45 Accordingly, 
the Gaullist's and extreme right-wing's retrospective portrayals were also close to each other 
on this issue. The important distinction in relation to the Gaullist account was that here it was 
Petain, and not de Gaulle, who was struggling against the `demagogie du Parlement'. 
Nevertheless, the political purpose of the reading was akin to that suggested in the analogous 
Gaullist writings: to explain the defeat in terms of the failures of the state system rather than 
of the French or France. Hering's criticism of the inter-war period demonstrated that decision- 
making had not sufficiently allowed for military considerations. A preference for committees 
and consultation had failed to establish firm leadership. Hering wrote: 
Au lieu d'un simple Secretariat, le Marechal demande un veritable Etat-Major 
44 Pierre Hering, La Vie exen plaire du Marechal Petain, 69-70. 
45 Robert Paxton, Vichy France, 351. 
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de la Defense Nationale, ayant ä sa tete un Chef de Etat Major de Guerre. 
Mais les Gouvernements qui se succedent preferent assurer la 
coordination des departements ministeriels par des Conseils ou des Comites, 
procede cher ä nos Dirigeants, mais dont l'inconvenient majeur est de 
supprimer les responsabilite et d'exclure les decisions viriles. ' 
Apart from the presence of Petain, this is highly comparable with the Gaullist treatments. The 
Republican regime had emasculated the nation. As the phrase `exclure les decisions viriles' 
indicates, Hering saw the Republican elite as a sterile caste. Although this language is typical 
of extreme right-wing writing, it is also reminiscent of the explanations offered by Jacques 
Boudet. His accusation of a `generation de la facilite' had addressed a kindred desire to awaken 
national pride and to free the nation from the Republican apparatus which was felt to have 
imprisoned it. 47 
Louis Rougier's treatment underlines the intersections which I have located. For 
instance, his characterisation of Paul Reynaud as an unscrupulous politician, a product of the 
Third Republic, mirrored the Gaullist perspective. Rougier portrayed Reynaud as a selfish, 
proud man who had valued his own reputation over that of the nation. Explaining his 
resignation on 16 June 1940, and his alleged failure to inform the new Bordeaux cabinet of 
Britain's acceptance of a separate French armistice with Germany, Rougier noted: 
Les mobiles de Reynaud sont clairs. Persuade que l'armistice est inevitable, lui, 
le signataire de 1'accord du 28 mars, il ne veut en porter la responsabilie ni 
devant le Gouvernement britannique ni devant le peuple francais. 11 pense s'en 
tirer elegamment par un tour de prestidigitation. Mais, ce qui n'est pour lui 
qu'un jeu de passe-passe ministeriel pour sauver sa reputation va engendrer la 
46 Pierre Hering, La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain, 68. 
47 As we know, a comparable view of sapped national virility emerged within the conservative right to explain 
defeat in Indochina. It is best paraphrased by one of its exponents, Raoul Girardet, La Crise militaire francaise 
1945-1962 (Paris: Cahiers de la FNSP/Armand Colin, 1964), 169-172. 
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tragedie. Sa mystification va faire couler le sang francais et mettre son pays ä 
deux doigts de la guerre avec 1'Angleterre. ' 
Whilst the Gaullists tended not to focus on Reynaud, this extreme right-wing description of 
another bankrupt politician reminded the reader of the tone of the Gaullists' accounts of 
politicians in 1940. 
The two right-wing currents wrote from a similar perspective and to a comparable 
effect. Their propensity to blame the Republican system and its lack of forceful leadership for 
the collapse is marked. To borrow from Fred Kupferman, this is a case of petaino-gaullisme. a9 
The discourse also forms a backcloth to the infamous Remy affair in which the RPF chief of 
propaganda resigned after printing a pro-Main piece in Carrefour. 50 That RPF members 
regularly expressed historiographic opinions which approached the extreme right wing, made 
it easier for Remy to take the interpretation a stage nearer to Petainism. We know that de 
Gaulle did not accept the realignment. Nonetheless, he continued to express his critique of the 
Third Republic in a manner which was not dissimilar to the extreme right-wing historiography. 
Jacques Benoist-Mechin's gloss on the collapse moved away from the Gaullists' 
concerns. The subtleties of their critique of the Fourth Republic, via a reading of the collapse 
of the Third, were altered significantly. For Benoist-Mechin the lesson of the Battle of France 
was the relative merits and weaknesses of the three main belligerent nations: France, Germany 
and Britain. His account suggested that it was because France was a Republican democracy that 
48 Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres, 27. 
49 Fred Kupferman, Les Premiers beaux jours 1944-1946 (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1985), 58-59. 
50 Remy, "Justice et 1'opprobre", Carrefour, 11 April 1950: 1,3; and "Faut-il se rallier au jugement de Remy? ", 
Miroir de l'histoire, 61 (1950): 147-148. Remy had also previously advanced a defence of Charles Maurras, 
"Faut-il reviser le proces Maurras", Carrefour, 20 December 1949: 4. His De Gaulle cet inconnu had implied 
support for Petain. However, his preface to the anonymous memoirs of a member of the LVF do not reveal 
closet support for the author. See anon, Vae victus ou deux ans dans la LVF (Paris: La Jeune Parque, 1948), I- 
VII. Accounts of the Remy affair are found in Jean Lacouture, Charles de Gaulle, Vol. 2 (Paris: Editions du 
Seuil, 1985), 357-358; Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 48-55. 
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she had lost in 1940; as for the nazi system, it was credited with having forged an impressive 
military capacity. As a result of the NSDAP, Germany had been more successful than France. 
The vision of the Third Reich as a flourishing society in 1940 was not achieved through a neo- 
nazi tirade but by an ironic comparison with France's readiness for war. The following passage 
is exemplary of Benoist-Mechin's argument, and of his stylish execution of it. He wrote: 
Aujourd'hui, bien que ce ne soit plus la paix, ce n'est pas encore la vraie 
guerre. Il est encore permis d'etre insouciant, de rever ä 1'amour, de jouir du 
printemps, de ces vergers radieux qui forwent ä la nuit les seules taches 
lumineuses du paysage, maintenant que les villes ont sombre Bans les tenebres. 
Ce soir la radio joue Monica ou J'attendrai, et l'on songe avec regret aux 
derrieres vacances. [... ] 
En Allemagne, tout est pret pour passer ä faction. La passivite et la 
resignation qui ont pu se faire jour au debut du conflit - surtout parmi les 
generations plus ägees - ont fait place ä des sentiments ä la fois ardents et 
graves. La Feldheer est tout entiere derriere son Führer. Le moral des troupes 
a ete porte ä son sommet. Elles brülent de se battre. Un seul point obscur 
subsiste dans leur esprit: la ligne Maginot. On le dit imprenable. Mais y a-t-il 
un obstacle dont on ne puisse venir ä bout, quand on sent bouillonner en soi tant 
de vitalite, quand on voit autour de soi un tel deploiement de forces? " 
Through the mocking juxtaposition of a France which was pictured as being more interested 
in its dernieres vacances with the Germans' unified readiness for war it is not difficult to 
establish which society the historian felt was the better equipped of the two. On the one side 
of the Rhine, he characterised France as having literally fallen asleep, (lulled by its popular 
chansons? ) whilst on the other bank Germany awaited the coming battle, confident of victory. 
In this light, Benoist-Mechin also uncritically cited the German High Command's report on the 
invasion campaign, which had stated that: les raisons des succes allemandes sont [... ] 
profondes: il faut les chercher lä oü les ennemis de l'Allemagne croyaient voir une faiblesse, 
51 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante fours, Vol. 1,89-90 
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dans le dynamisme revolutionnaire du IIIe Reich, et de sa direction national socialiste'. 52 
The historian illustrated the state of neglect into which France had fallen due to its 
republicanism, and by implication suggested the advantages which the totalitarian state had 
created for Germany. This controversial picture was reinforced by Benoist-Mechin's clever 
citation of a comment from the memoirs of the British General Spears. The historian employed 
his laconic style to support an argument about the nature of government and society in 1940. 
Quoting Spears, Benoist-Mechin emphasised France's weakness: 
`La democratie, a ecrit le general Spears, est une conception splendide. Mais 
eile offre le desavantage, ä certains moments, de hisser au pouvoir les 
hommes... qui acculeront une grande nation ä la defaite, en 1'espace de quelques 
jours'. 53 
Benoist-Mechin completed his own case without having to spell it out in his own words. The 
use of the British source provided further legitimacy to the extreme right-winger's argument. 
The ideologically marked point carried greater authenticity when it was delivered by a non- 
French commentator. 
As well as comparing France with Germany, Benoist-Mechin also discussed British 
policy. Britain was cast as an external danger, only too willing to betray her ally. He depicted 
perfidious Albion as living up to her reputation and abandoning the French to their fate. 
Although Britain was a parliamentary democracy, its national will, embodied in the 
Machiavellian Churchill, was prepared to betray France to protect herself. 54 The national trait 
52 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixantejours, Vol. 3,112. 
53 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante fours, Vol. 1,63. 
sa The classic examples of which, the Dunkirk episode and the Mers-el-Kebir raid, are described by Benoist- 
Mechin in detail. 
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of cunning was seen to have helped the British but to have been entirely absent from the naive 
French. Trapped between a treacherous ally and a virile enemy, France was shown to have 
been completely unable to defend herself against either side. As such, this interpretation was 
significantly different from the Gaullists' critique of the Third Republic. 
Apart from discrediting democratic republicanism, the attribution of the main 
responsibility of the defeat to the Republic justified the Vichy regime's radical departure from 
parliamentarianism to authoritarian governance. This brings us to the third feature of the 
extreme right wing's interpretation of the history of 1940: the rehabilitation of Petain. All three 
representative historians demonstrated that Petain's assumption of office was based on his 
personal sacrifice. In the wake of the self-destruction of the Republic, Petain's leadership was 
interpreted as having been a heroic decision to protect France. The extreme right opposed the 
communist and Gaullist accusations of conspiracy. Typical of this legitimation of the Marshal's 
actions was Hering's depiction of a conversation which had allegedly taken place between 
General Franco and Petain, who in 1940 had been Ambassador to Spain. It read: 
[Franco] - N'y allez pas, Marechal; alleguez votre age avance. Que ceux qui ont 
perdu la guerre la liquident maintenant et signent 1'Armistice... Vous etes le 
Soldat Victorieux de Verdun; ne donnez pas votre nom a ce que d'autres ont 
perdu. 
[Petain] - Je le sais, mon General; mais ma Patrie m'appelle et je me dois 
ä eile. 
ss C'est peut-etre, celui-ci, le dernier service que je pourrai lui rendre. 
An image of innocent sacrifice rather than conspiratorial intrigue was constructed around the 
role of Petain in 1940. Instead of having planned his future role, he showed Petain taking 
office at a time when no other Frenchman had been prepared to do so. This view can be seen 
55 Pierre Hering, La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain, 77. 
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to have been drawn from earlier, longstanding, interpretations of Petain's career. It reflected 
both the propaganda efforts which elements of the extreme right had produced in the inter-war 
period, which had promoted Petain as a potential national leader, as well as the orchestrated 
`mythe de Petain' which was constructed immediately after his assumption of office. 56 The 
view was also reflected in well known wartime posters which proclaimed the Marshal's fidelity 
to France, his personal sacrifices and symbolic virtues. " In the context of post-war ideological 
historiography this was a counter-argument to the accusations of conspiracy which had been 
levelled by the communist and Gaullist historical traditions. The extreme right-wing historians 
replied to the anti-Petainist currents. Benoist-Mechin tried to refute the Gaullist claim that the 
speed at which Petain had formed his cabinet was evidence of there having been a prior 
conspiracy. He wrote, 
Alors, tandis que le President Reynaud se retire, accompagne de MM. Mandel, 
Louis Marin, Rio et Campinchi, M. Lebrun prend le Marechal ä part et lui dit: 
- `Voulez-vous constituer le gouvernement? ' 
Aussitöt le Marechal sort une liste de son portfeuille, la tend au President 
Lebrun, et lui dit: 
- `Le voici! ' 
Cette rapidite - dans laquelle on a voulu voir, par la suite, l'indice d'un complot 
- fait, sur le moment, une tout autre impression sur le President. 
56 For example one inter-war pro-Petain journalist, writing in a style which anticipated Vichy's own propaganda 
efforts, had noted, `Marshal you represent the French victory, and the most noble fusion there has ever been 
between the poilus and their leaders. There is in France no personality more symbolic than yours, to transmit 
to the men of today the sense of the sacrifice made by the men of yesterday', cited by Richard Griffiths, Marshal 
Petain (London: Constable, 1970), 185. 
57 A selection of typical posters are reproduced in Dominique Rossignol, Histoire de la propagande en France 
de 1940 ä 1944: l'utopie Petain (Paris: PUF, 1991), 106-112. Similar themes were reflected in the moving 
image, a good range of examples of which are used in Claude Chabrol's film, L'Oeil de Vichy, Scenario Jean 
Pierre Azema and Robert Paxton, (Production: Fit Production, INA, TF1 Films, Production Sylicone, 1993). 
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`Je n'etais pas habitue ä une teile rapidite, ecrit-il dans ses Memoires. 
Je me rappelais, non sans amertume, les conditions de ministeres si penibles 
auxquelles j'avais preside pendant mon sejour ä l'Elysee'. Et il ajoute, dann sa 
deposition au proces du Marechal: `Dans la grande tristesse du moment, j'avais 
tout de meme un petit soulagement: alors que des constitutions de ministeres 
duraient parfois trois au quatre jours, j'en avais un ä la minute. Je trouvai cela 
parfait. La France avait un gouvernement, le decret pourrait paraitre ä 
l'Officiel, dann 1'edition du lendemain'. 58 (italics in original) 
The detailed `fact' which the Gaullist historian Jacques Madaule had cited to imply a deliberate 
conspiracy was employed by Benoist-Mechin to suggest a very different course of events. In 
this case it was used to indicate the refreshing efficiency of Petain's decision-making in 
comparison with the previous leaders of the Third Republic. Although this may have been 
coincidental, the example illustrates the extreme right-wing historians' tendency to position 
their work as a corrective to, or revision of, the other two schools. This was a denial of the 
conspiracy theory which, despite the noted overlap, distanced the current from the Gaullists' 
interpretation. Conveniently, this also excused all subsequent acts of collaboration, a view 
which again distinguished the extreme right from the other two currents of interpretation. 
Structural Overlap in Interpretations of 1940 
Gaullist writing on the debacle stands out because of its propensity to overlap with both 
extreme left-wing and extreme right-wing representations. Its historians noted that an internal 
conspiracy was the ultimate cause of the defeat. However, they also strongly criticised the 
Third Republic. It had lacked the conservative values of patriotism, governmental unity and 
leadership. 
58 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante jours, Vol. 2,270. 
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This characteristic raises the neglected issue of how interpretations inter-sected with 
each other. The ideological historians did not produce a collective version of the war, as 
suggested by Pascal Ory, Valensi and others. 59 Although all the historians were concerned with 
discussing the debacle around themes of conspiracy, their portrayals varied. Communists 
accused the middle class of being responsible for 1940, the Gaullists attributed blame to 
military leaders, whereas the extreme right-wing denied that there had been a conspiracy. 
However, some, but obviously not all, histories were in certain ways structurally alike. On this 
point, Azema's, Bedarida's, Wieviorka's, and Laguerre's view that communists, Gaullists and 
extreme right-wingers produced neatly demarcated historical accounts is problematic. 60 
Evidence from writing on the debacle suggests that the historiography neither reflected a 
unified expression nor a series of completely separate views. The writings were more complex 
than either of these positions. They do not always map out as the secondary literature has 
anticipated. 
The affinities between the currents of interpretation which I have illustrated occurred 
when shared beliefs brought the ideological groups together. For example, anti-Petainist, and 
certainly anti-Lavalian, views were common to communists and Gaullists. On the other hand, 
opposition towards the Third and Fourth Republic was propagated by extreme right-wingers 
and Gaullists. Nonetheless, different voices from within all three sets of historians remain. 
Only communists ascribed blame for the defeat to the middle classes. Distinctively, the 
Gaullists believed in the historic role of the General, a view which was unanimously decried 
59 Pascal Ory, "Comme de l'an quarante. Dix annees de `retro satanas"', Le Debat, 16 (1981). 
60 Jean-Pierre Azema and Francois Bedarida, "Vichy et ses historiens", Esprit 181.5 (1992): 43-51; Jean-Peirre 
Azema and Francois Bedarida, "L'Historisation de la resistance", Esprit 198.1 (1994): 75-89; Olivier 
Wieviorka, "La Memoire des resistants face ä Vichy", in Azema and Bedarida (eds), Le Regime de Vichy et les 
Francais, 68-76; Bernard Laguerre, "Les Biographies de Petain", in Azema and Bedarida (eds), Le Regime de 
Vichy et les Francais, 45-57. 
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by the other historians. As for the extreme right wing, its argument that Petain had not 
conspired in 1940 failed to attract all but the most maverick of hard right Gaullists. So, whilst 
writing on the debacle overlapped it did not form a single uncontested interpretation. 
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CHAPTER V 
BROADCASTS, APPEALS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS 
This chapter examines how the activist historians wrote about the three key statements which 
signalled collaboration and resistance in June and July 1940. An examination of how writing 
in one current influenced that in another is offered. It is suggested that in the specific context 
of the interpretation of the major declarations on the occupation, the Gaullist historians' 
writings on 18 June marked the treatments offered by their rivals. 
`J'entrais dans Z'aventure' 
On 18 June 1945, Gaullists celebrated the anniversary of the General's first resistance 
broadcast through a re-creation of the liberation parades from the Place de 1'Etoile to Notre 
Dame. The following summer they repeated this when de Gaulle co-ordinated his own 
commemorative activities at Mont Valerien, independently from those organised by the state, 
from the headship of which he had recently resigned. ' It is therefore not surprising that the 
Gaullist historical texts provide a valuable source of writing on the speech. 
The Parias collection's manipulation of the 18 June speech was restrained but 
rhetorically significant. Potentially targeted towards a broadly conservative audience, the 
luxury publication cast de Gaulle's act of rebellion as a logical, reasoned decision which had 
been vital to the nation. Parias included the speech as a rhetorical touchstone, which was 
repeated at different points in the book. Citation of it appeared twice in Madaule's chapters on 
the war itself, but it was also considered in the thematic sections written by Rene Cassia, 
1 Gerard Namer, Batailles pour la memoire: la commemoration en France de 1945 a nos fours, (Paris: Papyrus, 
1983), 81-89,170. 
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Jacques Soustelle, Edmond Michelet and Raymond Aron. 2 
The subtlety of the manipulation, almost a subliminal use of de Gaulle's decision to 
resist, is apparent in Madaule's detailed writing on it. He presented it in comparison with 
Petain's 17 June broadcast. First, Madaule quoted the Marshal's speech at length. 
Subsequently, he developed a critique of Petain's position. Two long sections of writing 
suggested why Petain's reaction to the defeat had been a misreading of the military situation. 
His tone was neither bitter nor recriminatory. Madaule developed a detailed discussion of why 
the Second World War had been a global conflict, in which the defeat of France had not 
signalled the conclusion of the war. This was a key element in the point-by-point refutation 
which was gradually made against Petain. For instance, Madaule showed that the Marshal and 
his coterie had underestimated the determination of Britain to continue the war; similarly he 
contended that Petain had been unable to understand the `portee mondiale du conflit'. The 
Marshal had not realised that national recovery could not occur under German control. 
Madaule explained why the strategy was false: 
La France, dans son malheur, allait provisoirement se replier sur elle-meme et 
se refaire une äme en meme temps qu'un corps. C'etait oublier simplement ä 
quel ennemi nous avions affaire, et que 1'Allemagne hitlerienne ne ressemblait 
pas beaucoup ä celle de Guillaume IL' 
This was a controlled argument which demonstrated why the armistice and collaboration had 
been wrong in 1940. The earlier conspiracy theory of the defeat, implied by Madaule, was 
2In Louis-Henri Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, the following chapters include substantial direct references to the 18 
June speech: Jacques Madaule, "La Fin de la III' Republique", 218-225; Jacques Madaule, "Au lendemain de 
l'armistice", 226-234; Jacques Madaule, "Le Comite de Londres", 256-264; Rene Cassin, "La France Libre", 
311-316; Jacques Soustelle, "La France combattante", 316-332; Edmond Michelet, "La Defense nationale", 
389-396; "Epilogue: Charles de Gaulle", 413-419; Raymond Aron, "Conclusion", 420-421. 
3 Jacques Madaule, "La Fin de la III` Republique", 219. 
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noticeably absent. Instead, there was a recognition that political errors, such as Petain's, were 
more often than not the result of circumstances. 
Madaule's comparison between the 17 and 18 June speeches has introduced the issue 
of cross-current influence. His writing was an example of a Gaullist response to Petain and the 
Petainist historians. The fact that Malaule felt it necessary to subtly undermine the Marshal 
before praising the General suggests the importance of the first speech. Aware of the symbolic 
status of Petain's broadcast, Madaule debunked its authority to support de Gaulle's actions of 
the following day. To this extent, he framed his writing as a critique of the extreme right's 
perspective. 
Although the example indicates that an important Gaullist historian compared the 17 
and 18 June speeches and engaged with the arguments of the extreme right-wing, this was not 
a dominant characteristic across the wider current of writing. As we will see it was more often 
the case that the Gaullist portrayal influenced the two other strands of interpretation, rather 
than vice versa. Thus, Madaule quickly turned to de Gaulle's broadcast. Again, there was a 
marked simplicity of tone and an economy of style in his writing. For example, this speech was 
first introduced as `une autre voix de Londres', the phrase explicitly making the further 
comparative link to Petain's `voice from Bordeaux'. Contrary to Alan Morris's depiction of 
Gaullist and Gaullian discourse, in this example there is a relative absence of retrospective 
triumphalism or gloating. ' This was continued in Madaule's second representation of the 18 
June speech. Here, the theme of fadelite was added to the strategic reasons for which de 
Gaulle's course had been the correct one. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to describe 
Madaule's writing as dispassionate. The following extract was one of the most romantic in 
Madaule's treatment of the topic. He declared, 
4 Alan Morris, Collaboration and Resistance Reviewed, 8-9,20,30. 
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Si la France doit resister, c'est parce qu'il s'agit aussi bien de sauver son 
integrite spirituelle que son patrimoine temporel. Les 1.300.000 Francais qui 
sont morts de 1914 ä 1918 ne sont pas morts en vain, aux cotes de 800.000 
Britanniques qui reposent en terre de France. Tel est le sens des messages de 
Charles de Gaulle. [... ] Il pouvait n'etre qu'un instrument aux mains de la 
propagande britannique. Il concut d'etre la France, ne reniant rien de son passe, 
rien de la grandeur. Le spectacle put paraitre grotesque ä certains politiciens 
chevronnes. Il etait tel, en verite, que rien de plus haut n'existe dans toute notre 
histoire .5 
Even so, Madaule continued to ground his representation in terms of military history. 
Note how he used the detailed figures of the First World War dead to recognise the affiliations 
which existed between Britain and France in 1940. The rhetorical acceptance that de Gaulle 
was at first `un instrument aux mains de la propagande britannique' was a modest 
understanding of the topic. The admission was a reply to the common extreme right-wing claim 
that de Gaulle had been a tool of the British. Madaule felt that by confronting the situation 
which de Gaulle had faced in 1940 truthfully, the General's actual actions, without over- 
embellishment, remained the most important decision in French history. The implication was 
that in 1940 it was clearly defensible to be in the Allied camp, as opposed to collaborating with 
nazism. 
As a rhetorical device, the presentation of the speech in Trente ans worked by surprise. 
In a collection which addressed thirty years of history a son-et-lumiere presentation of the 18 
June would have been out of place. It would have had the potential to have made the 
ideological marking of the account too pronounced, and thereby to have diminished its 
persuasive qualities. In a sense, the Gaullists did not need to dramatise what was already a 
well-known and inherently dramatic act. What the strategy of subtle argumentation indicates 
is that, in the Trente ans collection, Gaullist writers desired to explain de Gaulle's rebellion 
5 Jacques Madaule, "Le Comite de Londres", 257. 
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as a rational act of government which had been more appropriate than the Marshal's behaviour. 
In 1949, they intended this to attract those conservatives who might have otherwise been wary 
of de Gaulle as a maverick who had disobeyed his superiors. For instance, repeating the tone 
established by Madaule, even the romantic Remy (at the time of writing he was the RPF's head 
of propaganda activities) stressed de Gaulle's intellectual capabilities as a decision-maker. He 
wrote: 
Les decisions que formule le general de Gaulle surprennent le plus souvent. On 
serait tente de croire, ä 1'entendre les exprimer d'une facon presque toujours 
foudroyante, ou meme brutale, qu'elles ont ete improvisees. Quiconque n'est 
pas des familiers du general ne peut manquer d'etre teilte d'y trouver l'indice 
d'une nature impulsive et passionnee. Rien n'est plus faux, pour celui qui le 
connait un peu. Cet homme d'action, et meme de grandes actions, est d'abord 
un penseur, un meditatif et un philosophe. Cette decision dont la promptitude 
apparente etonne quelquefois jusqu'ä ses intimes, est en realite le fruit 
patiemment müri d'un tres long et tres prudent cheminement de sa pensee. 6 
The Gaullist historians used the 18 June decision as an example of controlled statesmanship. 
De Gaulle's flight to London had been heroic, but it was also based on wisdom as well. The 
historical representation served as a logical illustration of why de Gaulle had been sure-footed 
in the past, which implied that he was capable of governing in the future. 
Although Madaule's depiction was comparative and restrained, many Gaullists were 
concerned with communicating the gravity of the 18 June, an incomparable episode. It is surely 
not a coincidence that the final pages of Trente ans returned to events surrounding the first 
BBC broadcast. Raymond Aron, concluding the work, examined the condition of the post-war 
world, its dangers and the continued threat of the `paix belliqueuse' which was emerging 
between the USA and the Soviet Union. This was completed with the following statement on 
6 Remy, "L'Homme d'action", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 419. 
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the future: 
A la longue, ce n'est pas le langage de la facilite qui assure la popularite et 
consacre le grandeur. Quelles sont les paroles qui retentissent encore ä nos 
oreilles? `Je fais la guerre'. `Je n'ai rien ä vous offrir que du sang, de la sueur, 
des efforts et des larmes'. `La France a perdu une bataille, eile n'a pas perdu 
la guerre'. 
Les nations se reconnaissent ä la longue, non Bans ceux qui les flattent, 
mais Bans ceux qui les conduisent vers le salut. 7 
The concluding use of the well-known phrase, `La France a perdu une bataille, eile n'a pas 
perdu la guerre', reveals Aron's view that de Gaulle was the leader best qualified to steer 
France in an uncertain world. ' Having referred to, or cited, the 18 June speech in three or 
more different contexts of Trente ans, this final remark was a reminder of de Gaulle's decision. 
The phrase, and the speech which it echoed, were used by Aron and others as a cypher which 
denoted de Gaulle's stature in comparison to those with pretensions to lead the nation. The 
reader was left in little doubt who Aron considered would best govern France in 1949, and 
7 Raymond Aron, "Conclusion", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 421. 
8 The phrase `La France a perdu une bataille, eile n'a pas perdu la guerre' was referred to as being part of the 
18 June speech by Jacques Madaule, "La Fin", Trente ans, 219. Similarly it was included in a photographic 
illustration, entitled "L'affiche du 18 juin", 220. It read as follows: 
`A tous les Francais! La France a perdu une bataille! Mais la France n'a pas perdu la guerre! 
Des gouvernants de rencontre ont pu capituler, cedant ä la panique, oubliant l'honneur, livrant 
le pays ä la servitude. Cependant, rien n'est perdu! Rien n'est perdu, parce que cette guerre 
est une guerre mondiale. Dans 1'univers libre, des forces immenses n'ont pas encore donne. 
Un jour, ces forces ecraseront 1'ennemi. Il faut que la France, ce jour-lä, soit presente ä la 
victoire. Alors, eile retrouvera sa liberte et sa grandeur. Tel est mon but, mon Beul but! Voila 
pourquoi je convie tous les Frangais, oü qu'ils trouvent, ä s'unir ä moi Bans I'action, Bans le 
sacrifice et dans 1'esperance. Notre patrie est en peril de mort. Luttons tous pour la sauver! 
Vive la France!. General de Gaulle. ' 
However, despite Madaule's claim, it was not part of the BBC broadcast itself. It is difficult to infer whether 
Aron knew that he was citing the speech or the associated propaganda poster. 
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beyond. ' 
Unlike several of the portrayals included in the Parias collection Georges Cattaui 
focused his writing on the psychological and metaphysical meaning of de Gaulle's decision to 
resist. The history of the speech formed the central two chapters of the biography. They were 
entitled, `L'epreuve des faits' and `L'Appel du 18 juin'. De Gaulle's words, thoughts and 
actions were framed in the mode of a biblical morality tale, the focal section of which 
described de Gaulle's thoughts on the eve of his flight from Bordeaux to London. Cattaui 
wrote, 
En cette nuit du 16 au 17 juin, ä Bordeaux, de Gaulle ne dort pas. Longue nuit 
d'angoisse, oü tout est pense, pese. Partir? Passer pour un transfuge, un 
dissident, un rebelle? Il entrevoit tout ce qu'il lui faudra souffrir: le mepris des 
uns; la haine des autres; la calomnie; l'injure... I1 pressent le sort lamentable 
des emigres: 1'exil, les coteries... Il lui faudra tout quitter: son pays, ses 
soldats, sa mere - qu'il ne reverra pas. Il a pres de cinquante ans. Il est au 
milieu du chemin. Heure irreversible, il se sent vivre dans le passe, dans le 
present, dans le futur de cette France dont il assume 1'Histoire. A Taube, son 
choix est fait. A la tentation de rester, de consentir, il dit: non. Au sacrifice, il 
repond: oui. Il parie pour le combat. Tout est sauve par un triple acte de foi: 
se fier ä 1'endurance de la Grande-Bretagne sous les bombes de l'ennemi; 
prevoir que les ambitions nazies provoqueront l'entree en guerre des Etats-Unis 
et de la Russie; par-dessus tout, croire que le peuple de France n'acceptera pas 
la servitude et, sous le joug allemand, se redressera pour achever la guerre dans 
la victoire. lo 
Whereas Madaule had employed the events and speech of the 18 June as part of a detailed 
argument, Cattaui characterised the decision to resist as a quasi-religious event. As in the 
legend of Joan of Arc's visions, de Gaulle was depicted amidst an array of Christian imagery 
9 Raymond Aron's membership of the RPF and his later reactions to it are accounted for in his Memoirs: Fifty 
Years of Political Reflection (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990), 164-173. See also, Jean-Francois Sirinelli, 
"Les Intellectuels francais au temps de la guerre froide: entre communisme et gaullisme? ", in Courtois and Lazar 
(eds), Cinquante ans d'une passion francaise, 267. 
10 Georges Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle, 54-55. 
143 
and language. In high Catholic tone, Cattaui talked of a `longue nuit d'angoisse'; `tout ce qu'il 
lui faudra souffrir' ; `le mepris ... la haine' of those in authority; and finally, Taube'; `la 
tentation', `sacrifice' and de Gaulle's `triple acte de foi'. The passage was laden with Christian 
or quasi-Christian symbolism. It formed a complete micro-narrative of redemption. Cattaui 
portrayed the lonely figure of de Gaulle as having sacrificed himself to save national honour. 
The quotation of the text of the speech was less important than the decision which had preceded 
it. Appropriately its content was felt to be eternally `en tous nos coeurs'. 11 
Cattaui's introduction of de Gaulle's rite of passage towards resistance was a 
cinematically styled reminder of the General's defining moment. His language and tone provide 
further evidence of the continued influence of the work of Peguy, both on de Gaulle and a 
wider circle of Gaullists, a point which the literary critics Alan Pedley and Jean-Marie Paris, 
as well as the political historian Francois-Georges Dreyfus, have developed. 12 Published after 
de Gaulle had retired from the failed RPF project, the biographer drew on the history of his 
leader's `greatest moment'. The interpretation was a graphic reminder of what de Gaulle had 
achieved in the past. Moreover, because of the deeply ingrained religious symbolism which 
was used to describe the event, the passage was rather more than this. Its focus on de Gaulle 
as `every man' who had been presented with a decision between temptation and sacrifice 
depoliticised and universalised the events of 18 June. Instead of casting de Gaulle's decision 
as a rational act, Cattaui deliberately mystified it, and in so doing, constituted it as a deeply 
symbolic episode. This made 18 June a spiritual moment which all French men and women 
could appreciate, rather than only those who agreed with its logic based on strategy or politics. 
11 Ibid., 56. 
12 Alan Pedley, As Mighty as the Sword, 173; Jean-Marie Paris, "De Gaulle ä la rencontre de Peguy", Nord, 
14 (1989): 65-77; Francois-Georges Dreyfus, De Gaulle et le Gaullisme, 43-65. 
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De Gaulle's representation in the first volume of his Memoires de guerre can be 
reinterpreted as a synthesis of the two different approaches found in the Parias and Cattaui 
texts. He developed a logical argument in favour of resistance, whilst also alluding to the 
sacred implications which the decision had brought with it. Concentrating on his own actions, 
the famous passage which de Gaulle used to describe his first broadcast carried something of 
both Madaule's and Cattaui's writings about it: 
Naufrage de la desolation sur les rivages de 1'Angleterre, qu'aurais-je pu faire 
sans son contours [Churchill]. Il me le donna tout de suite et mit, pour 
commencer, la BBC ä ma disposition. Nous convinmes que je l'utiliserais 
lorsque le gouvernement Petain aurait demande l'armistice. Or, dans la soiree 
meme, on apprit qu'il 1'avait fait. Le lendemain, ä 18 heures, je lus au micro 
le texte que Yon connait. A mesure que s'envolaient les mots irrevocables, je 
sentais en moi-meme se terminer une vie, celle que j'avais menee Bans le cadre 
d'une France solide et d'une indivisible armee. A quarante-neuf ans, j'entrais 
dans l'aventure, comme un homme que le dentin jetait hors de toutes les 
13 series. 
De Gaulle's explanation began with the matter-of-fact reasons why he had made the broadcast. 
The speech was not cited in the text, but only referred to in the simple phrase, `le texte que 
l'on connait'. This evoked the national importance of the speech without repeating its content 
(since it was printed in the book's appendix it was unnecessary for it to be cited). However, 
the tone of writing employed by de Gaulle changes from describing the historical record to a 
mode of private reflection. Suddenly, by the fifth sentence of the paragraph, the act of 
resistance was cast as a personal transformation in de Gaulle's life, captured in the closing 
sentence of the passage, `A quarante-neuf ans, j'entrais Bans 1'aventure, comme un homme que 
le destin jetait hors de toutes les series'. De Gaulle struck a balance between reasoned 
argument and poetic judgement. His portrayal was not a stream of lyrical prose and should not 
13 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 1,70-71. 
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always be analysed as such. 14 Much of the writing in the Memoires forms a reasoned 
argumentation in favour of the decisions which he had taken during the war. Following the 
melodramatic conclusion to the passage cited above, de Gaulle employed four pages of 
explanatory discourse which demonstrated his unsuccessful search for someone of higher 
authority to lead the resistance in London. 15 This alternation between argumentation and poetic 
narration, which de Gaulle's writing on the 18 June produced, displayed two central qualities 
of leadership. It illustrated de Gaulle's thoughtfulness, reason and control. Conversely, it also 
exemplified his passionate love of France, and a psychological belief in the greatness of the 
nation. Whereas, Madaule and Cattaui had emphasised the importance of the 18 June through 
differing styles, de Gaulle's writing combined the former's modesty with the latter's 
enthusiasm. 
The Extreme Right-Wing on the 17 and 18 June Appeals 
The 17 June 1940 was important to the extreme right wing for two reasons. It signalled 
Petain's assumption of office, whilst in addition it also meant an end to the war in France and 
the search for an armistice. On both counts Rougier, Hering and Benoist-Mechin praised the 
speech. Sketching the general impact of the 17 June, Rougier summarised the state of the 
nation: 
14 There has been a tendency to ignore de Gaulle's more restrained rhetorical arguments in favour of his more 
obvious preoccupations and literary tropes. One cannot always agree with Morris's view that `the work reads 
like the cult of de Gaulle's personality', Collaboration and Resistance Reviewed, 30. 
15 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 1,70-71. Where De Gaulle writes, `Pourtant, tout en faisant mes 
premiers pas Bans cette carriere sans precedent, j'avais le devoir de verifier qu'aucune autorite plus qualifiee que 
la mienne ne voudrait s'offrir ä remettre la France et 1' Empire Bans la lutte'. 
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Le vieux marechal avait su arreter 1'hemorragie de la deroute, fixer les blindes 
allemands sur une ligne invisible de demarcation, sauver les restes de l'armee, 
garder les ports de la Mediterranee, conserver l'Empire. Il sauvait maintenant 
la France de l'anarchie, en remettant de fordre dann la maison. Sous son 
paternalisme tutelaire, comme sous la verriere d'une serre, la defaite, aux 
epines ameres, porterait des fruits savoureux. 16 
Peace and Petain's arrival in office had brought an air of calm, and even success. As Marc 
Ferro has noted the 17 June speech signalled the beginning of a period of gradual recovery, 
a view which the Petainist historians maintained. '7 However, it was also justified by a series 
of negative, rather than positive reasons. General Hering explained why Petain's decision had 
been the correct one. First, he argued that 17 June was not a capitulation because control of 
a limited army and navy had been maintained. Hering claimed that if the war had continued 
the 4 million prisoners who had fallen into captivity would have been its first bloody victims. 
He took resistance to have been impossible: 
Pour lui [de Gaulle], comme pour Sir Winston Churchill, les Francais n'avaient 
qu'ä se debrouiller en prenant le `maquis'. C'eüt ete du joli, en face d'une 
Armee Allemande victorieuse, alors que ni les Anglais, ni les Americains ne se 
trouvaient en mesure de leur venir en aide! 18 
Hering considered that Petain's nobility and his wisdom had been revealed in his decision to 
seek an armistice. The Marshal had remained in France to protect the nation. 
What was the strategy behind this type of characterisation of the 17 June speech? 
Repeated reference to, and citation of, Petain's choice to seek an armistice illustrated the 
16 Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres, 48-49. 
17 Marc Ferro, Petain, 109-110. 
18 Pierre Hering, La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain, 86. 
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positive effects of his new position. For the extreme right-wing historians, even after the events 
of the liberation, the armistice decision remained a rallying point which illustrated Petain's 
qualities. They always underlined that the decision encapsulated in the 17 June speech had 
garnered widespread popular support. It is not surprising that the historians repeatedly returned 
to the speech. In Soixante fours, Jacques Benoist-Mechin cited the 17 June broadcast in full, 
and framed it with the following reminder: 
C'est avec une emotion intense que les Francais ecoutent ces paroles. D'un bout 
ä 1'autre du pays, Bans les villes et sur les routes, une longue clameur s'eleve: 
- `Fini! C'est fini! Le cauchemar est termine! ' 
La nouvelle vole de bouche en bouche et s'enfle comme une houle. Dans les 
villes, la foule des refugies massee devant les Prefectures acclame le Marechal. 
Des gens pleurent sur le pas de leur porte, tandis qu'un grand elan de ferveur 
et de reconnaissance monte vers l'illustre vieillard qui a assume sur ses epaules, 
bien plus que le pouvoir, toute la douleur de la patrie... 1' 
The extreme right interpreted public opinion, notoriously hard for the historian to judge in any 
circumstances, as having been completely supportive of the Marshal. 2° Exposing the popular 
acclaim which Petain had received at the beginning of the occupation, the historians 
emphasised the manner in which the French had treated him after the war. 
The framing of the speech fulfilled many of the functions which Henry Rousso has 
ascribed to the lobby group, the Association pour defendre la memoire du marechal Petain 
(ADMP), of which Rougier, Hering and Benoist-Mechin were prominent members. The claim 
19 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante jour, Vol. 2,295. 
20 We now know that Petain was widely supported in June 1940. See, Robert Paxton, Vichy France, 20-38. On 
the other hand, H. R. Kedward has noted that the Southern Zone French were prepared to distrust the 
Bordeaux/Vichy government to the extent of obtaining information from Swiss radio stations, if not from the 
BBC. See, Resistance in Vichy France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 210-212. 
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that the armistice had been the only possible outcome of the circumstances of 1940 served as 
vital evidence in the ADMP's goal to open a judicial review of Petain's case. This reading of 
history always found the Marshal to be innocent. Parallels between the 1945 trial and Petain's 
decision of the 17 June, as recounted by the historians, were encouraged. For instance, the 
concluding paragraph of the Soixante fours trilogy unquestioningly cited Petain's trial plea. 21 
After the Marshal's death, the ADMP's ambition to relocate his body to the World War 
One ossuary, at Douaumont, near Verdun, was also underpinned by the manipulations of the 
17 June declaration. Jacques Benoist-Mechin's history taught that Main's actions had been 
above reproach and that there was no justification for the Marshal to remain buried on the 
humiliating Ile d'Yeu. Henry Rousso has commented, `il est important de souligner que la 
translation des cendres est en realite une translation de memoire. [... ] il s'agit bien d'oublier 
le marechal de 1940 au profit du general de 1916'. 22 The historiographic manipulation was 
more nuanced than this interpretation of memory-politics suggests. In the selected histories, 
Petain's actions in 1940 were not presented in order to be forgotten or ignored. The historians 
recorded the 17 June speech with the aim of defending and promoting its legitimacy. It was 
never a question of having to choose between either the Petain of 1916 or 1940. Benoist- 
Mechin used both aspects of Main's career. For example, it was felt that: 
Si le peuple francais adresse, ä ce moment [1940], un appel aussi ardent et aussi 
unanime au Marechal, c'est qu'il sent en lui le seul homme capable de mettre 
fin ä sa detresse. Vingt-quatre ans auparavant, tous les combattants de l'autre 
guerre ont obei ä ses ordres et se souviennent que son commandement fut 
ferme, mais paternel. [... ] Cela, les survivants ne font pas oublie. C'est 
pourquoi ils se tournent vers lui en 1940. Et cette fois-ci, ä la voix des millions 
de combattants qu'il a dejä eus sous ses ordres, se joint celle de leurs meres et 
21 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixantejours, Vol. 3,620-621. 
22 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 62. 
149 
de leurs epouses, de leurs enfants et de leurs petits-enfants. 23 
In this version Petain's contributions to 1916 and 1940 were intimately connected. The 
historians represented the Petain of 1940 as having continued to behave in the same heroic 
manner as he had during the First World War, with the memory of the battle of Verdun being 
identified as a critical factor in the people's faith in him at the time of the armistice. Taking 
into account this type of material, it seems likely that for the ADMP the removal of Petain's 
remains to the national military cemetery at Verdun would have evoked both his career of 1916 
and celebrated his later oblation. The interpretation connected both stages in Petain's life story, 
with each demonstrating his popularity, courage and self-sacrifice. Again, by proving that 
Petain's actions had been legitimate, the historians implied that his post-war punishment was 
not 
The glorious images which the extreme right created through the framing of the 17 June 
speech complimented a wider representation which included a vitriolic attack on de Gaulle. The 
ADMP's so called `Legend of the Marshal' was supported by a dynamic, powerful, myth 
which was cast against the General. At the centre of the project to defend Petain's reputation 
was a critique of de Gaulle's position, as illustrated in the 18 June broadcast. Several rhetorical 
strategies were used to achieve this effect. Probably the most powerful, and least recognised, 
device used in the portrayal was the harnessing of humour. This type of discourse was the 
complete opposite of the reverence with which Gaullist writers' treated the 18 June, as in 
Georges Cattaui's Charles de Gaulle. It also reveals how the extreme right-wing historians 
were influenced by the work of their Gaullist enemies. 
For the historians the events surrounding 18 June afforded a satirical opportunity to 
23 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante fours, Vol. 3,610-611. 
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mock both the content of de Gaulle's speech and the way in which Gaullists had retrospectively 
presented it. The following passage on the period which preceded the speech comes from the 
second volume of Benoist-Mechin's study. He employed a quotation from the war memoirs of 
the British General Spears to describe an incident which allegedly occurred during de Gaulle's 
flight from Bordeaux to London. Tongue in cheek, Benoist-Mechin cited Spears' account to 
describe the flight's brief fuel-stop on the Channel Island of Jersey: 
L'avion fait escale ä Jersey. II fait tres frais. Tandis que les mecaniciens 
remplissent les reservoirs d'essence, de Gaulle et Spears se rendent ä la cantine. 
De Gaulle commande un cafe. 
`En ayant bu une gorgee, ecrit Spears, il declare, sur le ton d'un homme qui ne 
veut faire de peine ä personne, mais qui est tout de meme oblige de proclamer 
la verite : 
- J'ai commande un cafe; ceci est du the. 
C'etait en effet le breuvage tiede qui, en Angleterre, est servi indifferemment 
pour l'un ou pour l'autre. Son martyre avait commence'. " 
The point was that de Gaulle's sacrifice had not begun with his famous BBC broadcast but was 
preceded by his insipid tea-drinking on Jersey the day before. 25 This was a trivialisation of de 
Gaulle's subsequent actions. Founded on the humour of cultural stereotyping, it positioned the 
General as a Frenchman abroad, whom Spears saw to be powerless and forced to accept 
English customs. This echoed the role that the extreme right historians contended de Gaulle 
24 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixantejours, Vol. 2,292. 
25 In the original source General Spears wrote, `... we touched down at Jersey for petrol. It was chilly. No one 
was about save a few mechanics. [... ] I asked de Gaulle if he wanted anything, and he said he would like a cup 
of coffee. I handed it to him, whereupon, taking a sip, he said, in a voice which indicated that without implying 
criticism he must nevertheless proclaim the truth, that this was tea and he had asked for coffee. It was his first 
introduction to the tepid liquid which, in England, passes for either one or the other. His martyrdom had begun'. 
Sir Edward Spears, Assignment to Catastrophe, Vol. 2, The Fall of France (London: William Heineman, 1954), 
323. 
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had played in relation to Churchill for the whole of the war. That is to say, de Gaulle's claim 
to represent France was bogus because he had left the national territory and had compromised 
himself by assisting in the ambitious plans of the British Empire. 26 
As Nicholas Hewitt has noted of Louis-Ferdinand Celine's antisemitic pamphleteering, 
the anti-Gaullist comedy was `dangerous precisely because it allows the propagandist to 
implant the seeds of hatred by disguising the serious as a joke'. 27 This humour peppers the 
three volumes of Soixante fours. Benoist-Mechin consistently portrayed de Gaulle's actions and 
motivations in an ironic mode. De Gaulle's post-war writings and the Gaullian presentation of 
the `homme du 18 juin' were mocked. The historian characterised the General as an arrogant 
but dangerous fool. For example, in volume three of Soixante fours, when summarising de 
Gaulle's career, Benoist-Mechin asked rhetorically: `Et puis, pourquoi rappeler sans cesse 
qu'on est l'homme du Destin? Napoleon ne 1'a dit qu'une fois. Cela suffit pour qu'on s'en 
souvienne'. 28 It was suggested that de Gaulle's leadership was at best comically shallow and 
at worst a threat to national unity. Furthermore, using a description of de Gaulle's relationship 
with Churchill, Benoist-Mechin implied that the self-proclaimed national champion was 
incapable of comprehending the political world around him, except through the distorting lens 
of his haughtiness. Dryly, Benoist-Mechin writes: 
- [Churchill] `Voila le connetable! ' dit-il d'un ton cordial, en prenant conge de 
ses hötes'. Le Connetable? De la part de Churchill ce n'est peut-etre qu'une 
boutade. Mais qui nous dira comment ces mots ont retenti aux oreilles de celui 
26 For example, Benoist-Mechin witheringly summarised what he perceived to have been de Gaulle's complete 
dependence on the British. In mock sympathy, he concluded, `Mais, encore une fois, que faire contre un 
gouvernement qui pent vous priver d'un instant ä l'autre tout moyen d'expression - la presse et la radio - et qui 
regle vos soldes, vos traitements et jusqu'ä vos moindres frais de bureau? ', Soixante fours, Vol. 3,145. 
27 Nicholas Hewitt, Literature and the Right in Post-War France, 29. 
2S Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante fours, Vol. 3,403. 
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a qui ils etaient destines? " 
Wit, irony and an imaginative style subverted the Gaullist representation. However, the 
strategy was not only a feature of Soixante fours but also a frequent element in other forms of 
reactionary writing of the period. Humour was a common ploy in the extreme right-wing 
journalism of the post-war era, typified in the columns and political cartoons of the weekly 
Rivarol. 3° Often the intended effect was to mock, delegitimate and thereby revise Gaullist 
historical interpretation. The comic style lampooned the high seriousness of de Gaulle and his 
hagiographers. Sharp satire highlighted the potentially ridiculous aspect of Gaullism's 
continued reverence towards the 18 June speech. Moreover, it shows the scale to which the 
extreme right-wing was marked by a desire to counter Gaullist historiography. 
General Hering was less subtle in his hatred of de Gaulle. In addition to discrediting 
his interpretation of the armistice as a capitulation, he simply stated that `les Gaullistes' had 
proved an equal danger to national security from 1940, as `le Gouvernement allemand', `le 
Gouvernement britannique', `les communistes', and the extreme collaborationist faction of `le 
groupe des Frangais pro-Allemands'. He condemned them for their deception, and attempts 
to divide society. Hering wrote: `Les Gaullistes, dont la campagne de propagande ä base 
d'imposture, a eu pour effet de diviser les Francais, alors que leur union s'imposait plus que 
j amais' . 
31 
29 Ibid., 397. 
30 For extreme right-wing satirical interpretations of the war and post-war politics, see for example, 
P. A. Cousteau, "(a va! J'ai compris... ", Rivarol, 8 July 1954: 1; Pierre Dominique, "Ugolin, le pere systeme, 
la Beule cloche des Deux-Eglises: Le General a tout pour plaire", Rivarol, 21 June 1956: 16. Note also the 
regular banner headings used by the paper which offered ironic statements such as "Un agent allemand publie 
ses Memoires sur le Tout-Paris `collaborateur'- Cocteau etait plus chaud que Celine et Sacha passait pour juif', 
Rivarol, 17 January 1953: 1. 
31 Pierre Hering, La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain, 93. 
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By 1958, as we have seen, all manner of attempts to delegitimate the 18 June speech 
were grist to the extreme right-wing mill. Although Robert Gildea sees Maurice Bardeche and 
Rene Binet as the classic extreme right-wing historians of the period, the more subtle 
strategies I have delineated were common and more powerful than the limited work of the 
fascist fringe. 32 The extreme right-wing historians were inevitably drawn to comment on their 
rivals. The 18 June speech represented a serious threat to the retrospective defence of Vichy. 
The historians' attempts to discredit the speech demonstrate its symbolic pull. Benoist-Mechin, 
Rougier and others were aware of its status and the reverence in which it was held by 
Gaullists. In reaction, it was countered. This is a signigficant example of cross-current 
influence. Like Madaule's treatment of the 17 June speech, the historians were profoundly 
aware of the opposing current's writing, and thus influenced by it. However, the extreme 
right's manipulation of the two speeches suggests that this was a more important factor in this 
current of historiography than it had been in the Gaullist strand. To a degree the extreme 
right's historical writings were shaped by the Gaullists' account. 
Comparing the Thorez and Duclos Declaration with the 18 June Broadcast 
In response to the 17 and 18 June speeches, the communist historiographical sources 
authenticated their Party's own call to resist: the L'Humanite article of 10 July. Sometimes 
known as the `Appeal to the People of France', the 10 July article's historical veracity has been 
consistently attacked. From 1948 onwards, the anti-communist Andre Rossi (alias Angelo 
Tasca) suggested in his Physiologie du Parti communiste francais that the text was a post-war 
32 Robert Gildea, The Past in French History, 330. 
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forgery designed to bolster the PCF's record. 33 However, given Rossi's well known 
motivations, a more authoritative discussion of the source is found in the work of Henri 
Nogueres. Nogueres' research indicates that while one cannot categorically confirm or debunk 
the existence of a 10 July Appeal, one can locate a PCF tract of August 1940 in which passages 
of the former appeal are to be found. " 
Notwithstanding the above debate, in PCF ideological history-writing the `Appeal to 
the People of France' is usually presented through the following passage: 
La France connait la defaite, 1'occupation, l'humiliation. La France encore 
toute sanglante veut vivre libre et independante. Jamais un grand peuple comme 
le nötre ne sera un peuple d'esclaves. La France ne deviendra pas une sorte de 
pays colonise. La France au passe si glorieux ne s'agenouillera pas devant une 
equipe de valets prets ä toutes les besognes. Ce ne sont pas les generaux battus, 
ni les affairistes, ni les politiciens tares qui peuvent relever la France. Its ne 
sont bons qu'ä la trahir et ä la vendre. C'est dans le peuple que resident les 
grands espoirs de la liberation nationale et sociale. Et c'est autour de la classe 
ouvriere, ardente, genereuse, pleine de confiance et de courage que peut se 
constituer le front de la liberte, de l'independance et de la renaissance de la 
France. " 
An identical version of the above passage was also cited in Fils du peuple. The communist 
historians described the document as evidence of the first case of organised resistance to have 
developed in occupied France. Freville's biography repeated the interpretation. Dautry and 
Pastor shortened the quotation and incorporated the final three sentences of the text as an 
33 Rossi, Physiologie du PCF (Paris: Editions Self, 1948) cited Nicole Racine-Furland, "18 juin 1940 ou 10 
juillet 1940: Bataille de memoires", in Courtois and Lazar (eds) Cinquante ans d'une passion francaise, 198. 
As well as being an embittered ex-communist, Rossi/Tasca served as Minister of Information under Vichy, his 
charges included a youthful Jacques Laurent. See Nicholas Hewitt, "The Literature of the Right and the 
Liberation: the case of the `Hussards"', in H. R. Kedward and Nancy Wood (eds), The Liberation of France, 290. 
34 Henri Nogueres, Histoire de la resistance en France, juin 1940-juin 1941 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1967), 53- 
60,461-467. 
35 Maurice Thorez, "Pages d'histoire", Cahiers 5 (1945): 22. For comparative purposes the original August 1940 
`Appel de Maurice Thorez et Jacques Duclos' is presented in Appendix I below. 
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example of the hopes of the nation in 1940.36 
It is less well known that a common secondary reference corroborated the validity of 
the Thorez/Duclos text. Unexpectedly, the communist historians cited an item from the British 
conservative newspaper, The Daily Telegraph, as further proof of the existence of the 
Thorez/Duclos appeal, and its impact. In Fils du peuple and Histoire de la resistance, they 
took the following quotation from an article which had appeared in the British press on the 20 
December, 1940. They quoted the Daily Telegraph's journalist as having written; 
Le seul parti existant, quoique illegal, est le Parti communiste et plus de mille 
de ses militants ont ete arretes le mois dernier. Its distribuent des tracts 
antiallemands, qui font appel au sentiment patriotique des Francais. 37 
Whether or not the communists knew what values The Daily Telegraph represented, it seems 
fair to assume that they would have been aware that it was not a communist newspaper. The 
source was valuable because they did not derive it from a communist or fellow-traveller group 
but it nonetheless legitimated the Party's interpretation. As Marie-Claire Lavabre has noted, 
a statement from the novelist, Francois Mauriac, was used to similar effect. 38 Mauriac's remark 
that `la classe ouvriere a ete seule fidele Bans sa masse ä la France profane, ' was also quoted 
to imply that the Party had stimulated resistance. 39 Again, that Mauriac was not a fellow 
traveller of the left made his opinion even more significant. Both The Daily Telegraph and the 
Mauriac citations confirmed the illusion of the widespread success of the 10 July statement. 
36 Jean Dautry and Louis Pastor, Histoire de la resistance, 15. 
37 The passage from the British press is cited in Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple, 184; Jean Dautry and Louis 
Pastor, Histoire de la resistance, 15. 
38 Marie-Claire Lavabre, Histoire, memoire, politique, 474. 
39 Dautry and Louis Pastor, Histoire de la resistance, 15. 
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Citation of the statement, and the corroborating material, defended the Party's war 
record and formed the discursive basis on which its historians could legitimately claim that the 
communists had been the `first to resist'. The inclusion of the L'Humanite article in 
historiography functioned as a programmatic statement of communist values which remained 
applicable after the war. By repeatedly quoting the declaration, they identified a nationalistic 
defence of France as one of the Party's historic goals. The speech highlighted Thorez's and 
Duclos's core beliefs about the role of communism. Specifically, they underlined the 
importance of sovereign independence in the phrases, `La France ne deviendra pas une sorte 
de pays colonise' and the important closing statement: `peut se constituer le front de la liberte, 
de l'independance et de la renaissance de la France'. Although included as a historical source, 
the declamatory article acted as an argument for the communists' contemporary case. The 
statement recalled that the working class, and by implication the PCF, could defend French 
independence. 
A passage from Freville's Avec Maurice Thorez adds to our understanding of the 
statement's post-war role. The biographer's reference to the 1940 appeal was employed to 
justify Thorez's post-war opposition to American influence. Freville deployed the L'Humanite 
article in the context of two other speeches which Thorez had delivered; an early anti-fascist 
speech which dated from 1936 and an appeal against US expansionism, given in 1947. In a 
comparative section of prose, which linked the three Thorez statements together, Freville 
commented, 
Quand Hitler et Petain se partagent la France, l'appel de Maurice Thorez, lance 
le 10 juillet 1940 sur le sol meme de la patrie, invite les Frangais ä `constituer 
autour de la classe ouvriere ardente et genereuse, pleine de confiance et de 
courage, le front de la liberte, de l'independance, de la renaissance de la 
France'. 
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A peine Hitler est-il abattu qu'un nouveau danger menace 
l' independance de notre pays. Dans cette ville de Strasbourg oil il avait, en 
1936, denonce les plans d'Hitler, Maurice Thorez, au congres de juin 1947, 
denonce 1'expansionnisme des Etats-Unis. 40 
The citation of the familiar Thorez-Duclos document introduced the additional speeches. The 
reference to the founding moment of the resistance functioned as a commentary on the strength 
of communist patriotism against all threats to sovereignty, past and present. It blurred the 
history of the inter-war period, July 1940, and the Cold War into a complete, single, history. 
By implication, American expansionism was cast as a comparable scenario to nazism and the 
occupation. It showed heroic communist resistance in 1940 to have continued to the present 
day. Thorez was depicted poised to confront the new dangers. 
Nonetheless, the communist historians did not treat the Thorez/Duclos statement in a 
vacuum. As in the examples from the other two currents, there was a comparative dimension. 
Nicole Racine-Furland correctly suggests that post-war communist writing on the statement 
consistently contrasted it with de Gaulle's 18 June broadcast. 41 However, the communists did 
not cite the full text of de Gaulle's speech. More often than not, they edited it in a selective 
manner which omitted its lyrical highlights. This was the case in the writings of Thorez, 
Dautry, Pastor and also in the occasional Cahiers article which addressed the subject. 42 They 
took de Gaulle's words to have been: 
40 Jean Freville, Avec Maurice Thorez, 24. 
41 Nicole Racine-Furland, "18 juin 1940 ou 10 juillet 1940: bataille de memoire", in Stephane Courtois and Marc 
Lazar (eds), Cinquante ans d'une passion francaise. De Gaulle et les communistes, 197-215. 
42 For example, see Etienne Fajon, "La Reaction au service de 1'etranger", Cahiers, 5 (1947): 364-379. 
158 
Moi, general de Gaulle, actuellement ä Londres, j'invite les officiers et les 
soldats francais qui se trouvent en territoire britannique, ou qui viendraient ä 
s'y trouver, avec leurs armes, ou sans leurs armes, j'invite les ingenieurs et les 
ouvriers specialistes des industries d'armements qui se trouvent en territoire 
britannique ou qui viendraient ä s'y trouver, ä se mettre en rapport avec moi. 4' 
The comparison between the 18 June and 10 July announcements in communist 
historiography served a range of rhetorical functions. We can see that by strategically placing 
the communist claim alongside the Gaullist broadcast, the one text became discursively 
associated with the other. The authenticity of de Gaulle's speech legitimated the communist 
document as a historical source of comparable, if not greater value. Thereby, the communist 
historians supported the Party's claim that its members had been the true force within the 
resistance from 1940, rather than after the attempted nazi invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941. 
As with the similar strategies employed to this end, the discourse denied the possibility of 
communist neutrality or collaboration. 
Apart from legitimating the historical authenticity of the 10 July article, the purpose of 
the communists' citation of de Gaulle's 18 June broadcast was to discredit post-war Gaullism. 
In a similar way to that developed by the extreme right-wing historians, they set the record 
straight. De Gaulle's message was selectively quoted to imply that the scale and intent of 
Gaullist resistance had been limited. Instead of citing the whole of de Gaulle's speech, or its 
rousing conclusion, the PCF historians portrayed it through its most banal section. His call for 
specialised workers and officers to join him in London only formed paragraph ten of the 
twelve-paragraph speech. The words which the communists' selected suggested that de Gaulle 
had aimed to attract the bourgeoisie to his cause. They identified evidence of this in the phrase, 
"' Maurice Thorez. Fils du peuple, 180. For comparative purposes the full 18 June 1940 speech is presented in 
the thesis as Appendix II. 
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'j'invite les ingenieurs et les ouvriers specialistes des industries d'armement qui se trouvent 
en territoire britannique ou qui viendraient ä s'y trouver, ä se mettre en rapport avec moi'. The 
speech displayed the nature of Gaullist resistance: it characterised it as an extra-French 
movement which was uninterested in the possible contribution of the people to the liberation. 
In so doing the PCF historians indicated that their own Party's appeal had found a popular 
response. For example, Etienne Fajon argued in the Cahiers: 
L'appel du Parti communiste est concu, redige et diffuse sur le sol meme de la 
patrie. 11 s'addresse au peuple. [... ] L'appel du 18 juin, au contraire, est congu 
en terre alliee, mais etrangere. II est lu ä la radio de Londres. Il exprime dejä 
le mepris et la haine du peuple par un silence glacial envers les masses qui vont 
pourtant jouer un role decisif dans la lutte contre l'ennemi sur le territoire 
national. 11 concerne exclusivement... 
`... les officiers et les soldats francais qui se trouvent en territoire 
britannique ou qui viendraient ä s'y trouver, ainsi que les ingenieurs et les 
ouvriers specialistes des industries d'armement qui se trouvent en territoire 
britannique ou qui viendraient ä s'y trouver'. 
Ainsi, par son acte de naissance meme, la resistance gaulliste se presente 
comme une force volontairement etroite, detachee du peuple, liee ä une grande 
puissance capitaliste etrangere, entretenue par le gouvernement britannique. W 
The essayist considered that resistance had been created in France and had been a meaningful 
force in the lives of the community, `le peuple'. De Gaulle's broadcast, the birth of Gaullism, 
in London, was perceived to be a product of British capitalism. He considered that de Gaulle 
had displayed a complete disregard for ordinary Frenchmen and women, only acting in favour 
of the professional classes of officers, engineers and munitions specialists. Fajon deduced that 
de Gaulle's intentions in 1947 were of the same kind as in 1940, and vice versa. In the light 
of the historical record, the implicit political point was that de Gaulle's new effort, the 
44 Etienne Fajon, "La Reaction au service de 1'etranger", Cahiers, 5 (1947): 368-369. 
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Rassemblement, was nothing but another middle class pressure group. The implication was that 
it was as unrepresentative and, probably, as unpatriotic as it had been in 1940. 
For both the PCF and the extreme right wing Gaullism had to be combatted. The 
reputation of the 18 June `Appel' meant that for the ideological messages of the two other 
currents to be communicated successfully, their historians had to discredit this source and its 
retrospective supporters. For the communist historians the emphasis on de Gaulle's class 
position was the obvious criticism. The power of the Gaullist interpretation influenced the 
communists's portrayal. For this reason Marie-Claire Lavabre is correct to describe de Gaulle 
as `un des moteurs de la memoire communiste'. 45 Since de Gaulle's political capital was 
intimately linked with the status of the 18 June document, the extreme right-wing and 
communist historians denigrated the episode and the Gaullist accounts of it. In so doing they 
were often drawn onto Gaullist ground. 
A Note on Cross-Current Influence 
Many of the scholars who have discussed the three currents of history-writing present them 
through neatly demarcated categorisations. From this perspective each set of activist historians 
simply wrote their own accounts and then defended them. For example, Henry Rousso, 
Bertram Gordon, Francois Bedarida and Jean-Pierre Azema present historiography in this way. 
Only the comparative perspectives developed by Serge Berstein, Pierre Nora and Marie-Claire 
Lavabre on Gaullism and communism have approached the issue of cross-current influence. ' 
Adding to the fmdings of the latter group of scholars, the manipulation of the speeches 
45 Marie-Claire Lavabre, Histoire, memoire, politique, 482. 
46 Ibid.; Serge Berstein, "Le Parti communiste francais et de Gaulle sous la IV` Republique", in Courtois and 
Lazar (eds) Cinquante ans d'une passion francaise, 79-95; Pierre Nora, "Communistes et gaullistes", in Pierre 
Nora (ed. ), Les Lieux de memoire, Vol. 3, Part 1,347-393. 
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of the summer of 1940 highlights a previously unacknowledged tension. It is evident that when 
extreme right-wing historians wrote about 17 June they were also confronted by de Gaulle's 
speech of the following day. Moreover, evidence such as the satirical comments by Benoist- 
Mechin, as well as comparable examples from the extreme right-wing press, indicate that they 
were profoundly aware of how their rivals represented both of these sources. Similarly, 
communists knew that if their declaration of resistance was to be of political value then it had 
to be favourably compared with de Gaulle's equivalent speech. For Gaullist's themselves the 
rhetorical employment of the 18 June speech was open to improvisation. Always symbolically 
important, it exemplified de Gaulle's strategic knowledge, or his willpower. To an extent its 
authority was bolstered as much by the criticism it attracted, as by the support it generated. 
Nonetheless, Madaule's writings show that for some Gaullists Petain's speech of 17 June, and 
extreme right-wing accounts of it, remained influential. 
The activist historians affected each other's writing. This was an important feature 
because it moves our understanding away from a relatively one-dimensional perspective to the 
realisation that the historians produced accounts which coloured how their opponents portrayed 
events and sources. The ideological interpretation of the war was not a static encounter. It was 
dynamic and often founded on an awareness of, and opposition to, what the different groups 
of historians were claiming. 
The evidence of intertextual overlap and cross-ideological influence discussed in 
Chapters IV and V sheds light on the activist historians and their writings. Historical 
interpretation of the occupation in the immediate post-liberation era was dependent on a 
number of factors which have been either overlooked or underestimated in the secondary 
literature of the Vichy syndrome as well as in more traditional discussions of the French 
ideological groupings. Figures such as Madaule. Benoist-Mechin and Freville produced 
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accounts of the past which were shaped in a sophisticated fashion. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PERPETUAL RESISTANCE 
This chapter will examine how the topic of the resistance was used as a blueprint for post-war 
political life. It is emphasised that, for the most part, the writers established a didactic voice 
which they used to address their readership. Concluding discussion will address the meaning 
of this common investment in the past. 
Social Heroism 
The PCF historians viewed their Party's opposition to Vichy as a quasi-revolutionary act. ' We 
know that they identified the life-blood of the fight with the proletariat, communist activists 
and the Francs Tireurs et Partisans (FTP). Courtois, Lavau, Lavabre and others have detailed 
this in their studies of communist historiography and historical memory. ' It has been less 
common to explore how the PCF historians used the history of the resistance movements to 
colour the communist perspective on the contemporary world, or to profile the figure of the 
resistant as the model communist. 
Broadly speaking communist resistance was not simply depicted as a military activity. 
As Freville explained, the battle was not only for the liberation of France, but the complete 
liberation of the people from all forms of tyranny. ' In this light Vichy was represented as a 
clique which protected the interests of big business. Conversely, communist historians labelled 
the resistance movements as social militants who were struggling for economic and political 
1 Robert Gildea, The Past in French History, 55 
2 Stephane Courtois, "Luttes politiques et elaboration d'une histoire", Comrnunisme, 4 (1983): 5-25; Georges 
Lavau, A quoi sen le Parti Communiste Francois?, 206; Marie-Claire Lavabre, Histoire, memoire et politique, 
472. 
Jean Freville, Avec Maurice Thorez, 56. 
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liberty. This aspect is evident in the historians' frequent accounts of the Pas-de-Calais miners' 
strike, which took place between May and June 1941. Thorez, Dautry and Pastor focused on 
the event. In the Cahiers, ten years after the strike, Roger Pannequin devoted an historical 
essay to the theme. The title of his piece, `La Greve patriotique des mineurs du Nord et du Pas 
de Calais (1941)', reveals its central message that the action had been taken in the national 
interest. 4 In portraying the dispute, he linked traditional notions of military resistance with 
issues of class, workers' rights and social conditions. Pannequin constituted industrial unrest 
as an act of significant resistance. The seven page history showed how the Vichy regime had 
become a cog in German imperialism's economic machine, and that under these conditions 
Germany was exploiting the proletariat. In response the communist-led miners combatted the 
tyrannical mine owners. Their success had been a victory against the bourgeoisie and the Third 
Reich. Pannequin underlined the fact that the protest had achieved more than a straightforward 
attack on the forces of fascism, for it had also produced an improvement in the treatment of 
the miners from their erstwhile employers. 
This appraisal revealed the longer struggle for social change. Classifying resistance as 
a conflict between the classes, battled out between miners and pit-owners, drew on the heritage 
of previous confrontations: 1789 and 1871. Henry Rousso has rightly identified this feature of 
communist memory. He writes: les communistes et bon nombre de resistants voient daps la 
resistance une guerre de liberation nationale, donc une lutte insurrectionnelle ä la fois politique 
et armee. Its insistent sur les aspects revolutionnaires du combat resistant'. ' The 
historiographic evidence takes this point further. The writing on the Pas-de-Calais strike, and 
4 Roger Pannequin, "La Greve patriotique des minuers du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais (1941)", Cahiers (1951): 
575-582. 
5 Henry Rousso, "Oü en est l'histoire de la resistance? ", in L'Histoire magazine (ed. ) Etudes sur la France de 
1939 ä nos jours (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1985), 116. 
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other social struggles under Vichy, emphasised the Party's role as defender of the people. 
Stories of triumphant protection of the working class interest provided detailed examples of 
how the Party, trade unionism and the workers combined to overcome exploitation. For 
instance, Pannequin concluded his essay by explaining the advantages which the strikers had 
achieved. He recorded: `Compagnie par compagnie, des avantages de salaire et de securite 
dans le travail avaient ete accordes. D'une maniere generale, le ravitaillement pour les ouvriers 
mineurs avait ete ameliore' .6 
History was a paradigm for the Party's post-war membership to 
follow. The accounts which the historians provided implicitly instructed their readers how to 
behave, differentiating between good and bad practice. The history of the greve patriotique was 
a warrant for future strike action against exploitation. 
However, it was not only through the description of symbolically important events that 
the historians showed that the past was significant in the present. In fact, at appropriate points 
in their texts, they openly told readers that war history shed light on the present. For instance, 
in the aforementioned account of the patriotic strike, Pannequin used several rhetorical devices 
to underline the contemporary relevance of his subject. The article was framed as a 
commemorative essay, celebrating the tenth anniversary of the strike. Pannequin's opening 
words suggested that the example of resistance remained important in 1951. He wrote, `il y 
a dix ans se deroulait la grande grove patriotique des mineurs du Pas-de-Calais et du Nord'. ' 
The gambit of beginning the essay through the theme of commemoration meant that although 
this was an historical piece, the reader was invited to look at the past from the vantage point 
of the present. An initial connection between the occupation and the post-war period had been 
established from the first sentence of the article. Moreover, in a rather more explicit move, the 
6 Roger Pannequin, "La Greve patriotique des mineurs du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais", Cahiers: 579. 
Ibid., 575. 
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author offered a series of interjections which spelt out the political value of his work, an 
example of which is found in the concluding paragraph of the essay. At this critical point, 
Pannequin explained that his historical review was to be understood as a lesson for the present. 
He stated: 
Le mouvement des Francs-Tireurs et Partisans, surgi au coeur des villes et des 
centres proletariens, allait s'etendre victorieusement. Tout cela malgre les 
efforts desesperes des agents gaullistes, des Mayer, des Pleven, des Andre 
Philip et des de Menthon, dont la seule preoccupation etait de limiter et 
d'empecher 1'intervention du peuple lui-meme 
Enseignement toujours actuel! La liberation et la regeneration de la 
France dependent au premier chef, aujourd'hui comme hier, de l'unite de la 
classe ouvriere et de l'union de toutes les forces democratiques et patriotiques 
autour d'elle. 8 
In addition to portrayals of general resistance activity, the historians suggested how the 
Party had related to the popular classes during the occupation. As the previous quotation from 
Pannequin asserted, unlike either Petain or de Gaulle, they had guided the people towards a 
united uprising against the nazis. However, apart from the recuperation of the resistance by 
the PCF, the historians repeatedly stressed that it had been the Party which led, and the people 
who had followed. This illustrated the bonding which existed between the two groups. Thorez 
explained, `la volonte de lutte des masses populaires est stimulee par la vaillance de nos heros 
et les exploits multiples des partisans'. ' The historians identified the Party as the vanguard of 
the people, steering and guiding their actions towards victory. Again, historiography was an 
evocation of how political life ought to be organised in the present. By implication the Party- 
mass relationship was the way contemporary struggles would also be fought. At a time when 
8 Ibid., 586. 
9 Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple, 189. 
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ex-resistance activists were tempted away from following a disciplined party-line, the need to 
assert the PCF structure against the actions of individuals was vital. The assertion that all 
resistance had developed from the PCF's leadership guarded against the dangers of personal 
egos and memories. 
On occasions the historians took the mirror between the past and the present to 
extremes. For Freville, the military tactics of guerrilla fighting revealed a significant lesson 
which extended to the political field. In support of the latter military strategy he noted that the 
cell structures of the guerilla unit were the reflection of a popular army. Whereas conservative 
generals consistently preferred a professional armed force, the people favoured troops which 
were drawn from across the community. Citing Thorez on the topic, he wrote, 
La guerilla, teile que nous l'entendions, ne pouvait etre menee qu'avec le 
concours des masses. Sans le soutien de la population, aucune resistance n'est 
possible. Rien de grand, rien d'efficace, ne peut se faire en dehors du peuple. 
Le peuple a ravitaille, protege, aide, renseigne nos FTP, qui etaient les 
meilleurs de ses fils. [... ] L'armee du peuple a vaincu ä Valmy, l'armee de 
metier a ete ecrasee ä Sedan. '° 
Freville's reference to the battles of Valmy (1792) and Sedan (1870) contextualised his 
argument in the history of revolutionary warfare. The issue falls within a longer political 
tradition of debate over the nature of state-military relations. Under the Third Republic, 
Gambetta had feared that the army had not accepted the Republic, and that it continued to pose 
a counter-revolutionary threat. " Similar anxieties surfaced at the time of the Dreyfus affair, 
whilst in the inter-war period a comparable dispute had developed because of de Gaulle's plans 
10 Jean Freville, Avec Maurice Thorez, 57. 
11 Robert Gildea, The Past in French History, 142. 
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for the establishment of an armee de metier. It is less well-known that the French left's 
preference for a popular military capacity was underlined in resistance historiography. Now 
they cited the character of the resistance as further testimony against military elites and in 
favour of popular armies. 
Statements, such as Freville's which were taken as historical facts, were explicitly 
connected to the present through the employment of didactic claims. For instance, in a popular 
Marxist fashion, he instructed that all History was meaningful in the contemporary period. 12 
As in the example drawn from Pannequin, the biographer spoke to his imagined public. He 
taught his readers that his account continued to illustrate truths about French politics. In fact, 
he went so far as to state that the past literally prefigured the future. For example, the Glieres 
resistance was explicitly described as a model for future social organisation. Freville claimed: 
`Glieres fut plus qu'un fait d'armes: une prefiguration, l'image d'une France fraternelle, qui 
ne separait pas l' independance du pays de la justice sociale'. 13 Again, the historian was 
providing a prompt, or cue, to explain to his potential readership how his words were to be 
interpreted. The combination of these assertions with analytical commentaries such as those 
cited on military strategy, suggested that Avec Maurice Thorez contained vital lessons. 
However, it would be wrong to think that the communists excessively loaded their accounts 
with these types of claim. This was not the case. On the other hand, it would be true to say that 
the occasional meta-historical remark, offered by the writer, directed to the reader, explained 
how the past was to be decoded. The device lent authority to the otherwise descriptive prose. 
12 Jean Freville, Avec Maurice Thorez, 7. Indeed, the text opens with a poetic preface, entitled `Ce que dit 
Maurice Thorez', the first lines of which state `La haine vous aveugle, ö forbans ä l'affüt! Avez-vous oublie si 
vite ce qui fut? L'histoire a ses lecons, le peuple a ses coleres. Il maudit vos desseins, vos complots, vos 
noirceurs'. 
13 Ibid., 48. 
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It meant that passages which were not underlined as being of immediate political value were 
nevertheless presented as part of a wider didactic context. 
The martyrs to the French Communist Party's cause completed the portrayal of the 
resistance as an unselfish, spirited, social struggle. The well-known and evocative phrase, `les 
lendemains qui chantent' was an integral part of this discourse. The death of its author, Gabriel 
Peri, was commemorated in several Cahiers articles and was presented as a symbol of the 
Party's sacrifices. 14 As Marie-Claire Lavabre has noted, even when resistance history was no 
longer a dominant topic in the journal this type of commemoration continued. " The historians 
used his final letter to exemplify the nature of the communist war effort: the dream of creating 
a new post-war society which turned its back on the errors of history. The image of the 
`lendemains qui chantent' illustrated the fact that the war had been a conflict about the future 
of France, not only the resolution of the dilemmas produced by the events of 1940. The 
hagiography which surrounded Peri, and to a lesser extent Pierre Semard and Pierre Sampaix, 
vindicated all the Party's decisions from the inter-war period to the Cold War. The life and 
death of Peri, and the vision he evoked in his final words, were a graphic demonstration that 
to be truly patriotic one had to be a communist and that to be truly communist one was always 
patriotic. Marcel Cachin displays the logic in the following testimony to the sacrifices of Peri 
and Sampaix. Like many other communist writers, he emphasised that the reason they had 
given their lives so freely for the nation was because this was the natural reaction of a 
communist. He wrote: `C'est parce qu'ils etaient communistes qu'ils accepterent de mourir 
14 See for example, Florimond Bonte, "Gabriel Peri: histoire d'un komme, histoire d'un parti", Cahiers, 13 
(1945): 59-73; Gabriel Peri, "La Derriere lettre de Gabriel Peri", Cahiers, 12 (1946): 1108-1109; Gabriel Peri, 
"Gabriel Peri: un grand francais vous parle", Cahiers, 12 (1946): 1169-1189; F. Fontenay, "Peri toujours 
vivant", Cahiers, 12 (1948): 1357-1366; Marcel Cachin, "Le Chemin de Gabriel Pen", Cahiers, 12 (1951): 
1384-1392. 
15 Marie-Claire Lavabre, Histoire, memoire, politique, 479 footnote 101. 
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pour que vive la France Bans la paix, dans l'independance et dans le respect reciproque des 
droits egaux pour tous les peuples'. 16 The martyrs were role models for the Party's members 
to respect and aspire to. These details gilded the legend of the 75,000 f tsilles. '7 The faces of 
Peri and Sampaix, often literally reproduced in photographs next to the historical texts, were 
perpetual examples of the communist ideal. The mythification of Peri's life was far more 
controllable than the unwelcome creation of personality cults around the living (with the 
exception of Thorez). Unlike the healthy ex-resistance figure, Charles Tillon, Peri could no 
longer deviate from the party-line. They favourably compared his exploits and position as a 
secular saint with ex-communists whom they had expelled and denounced as fascists. 
Once more, the construction of Peri as an exemplary life drew on passages of writing 
which explicitly underlined his importance. Writing on the martyr included a level of discourse 
which told the reader how Peri's record remained significant in the present. This was the case 
when Fernand Fontenay published the essay `Peri: Toujours vivant'. In addition to the title of 
the piece, which implied the resistance hero's continued relevance, Fontenay taught: 
`L'exemple de Gabriel Peri est un avertissement aux fauteurs de guerre: le Parti qu'il a 
incarne, jusqu'au sacrifice supreme, est comme hier au service de la France et de la paix'. 18 
The reader was taught that history was a warning and that past sacrifices were worth repeating. 
The circumstances of the occupation would not return. Nevertheless, in the turbulent 
1940s and 1950s, the picture of the resistance hero showed the reader what the PCF expected 
in the present. Events moved on, but the lessons of 1940-1944 had to be upheld. To 
16 Marcel Cachin, "Le Chemin de Gabriel Peri", Cahiers, 12 (1951): 1392. 
17 A culture which was also bolstered by publications such as, Lettres des fusilles, pref. Lucien Scheler (Paris: 
France d'Abord, 1946). 
18 Fernand Fontenay, "Peri toujours vivant", Cahiers, 12 (1948): 1366. 
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paraphrase, the Party had led the people, its actions were socially positive and its leaders 
patriotic and honest. More detailed than journalism, historical writing demonstrated what had 
been achieved, and thus what was desirable in the present. As we will see, PCF historians were 
not alone in employing this discourse. While all three currents claimed to have been the only 
genuine resisters, through a variety of techniques all the historians signalled the continued 
importance of the past. 
The Historic Virtues of Gaullism 
The Gaullist historians argued that from 18 June onwards the silent majority of citizens 
ardently supported de Gaulle's cause. However, this current's mobilisation of resistance history 
was more complex than this manoeuvre reveals. In relation to the RPF, we know the historians 
bolstered the Rassemblement's self-identification as a continuation of the resistance, a unifying 
factor which was central to its otherwise diffuse membership. 19 As Jacques Soustelle 
recollected, the upper ranks of Gaullism were presented as having protected the nation since 
1940. Several years after his separation from de Gaulle, he remembered: 
Deux ans ä peine apres la fin de la guerre, les souvenirs de la France Libre et 
de la Resistance dominaient nos esprits. Tous, et le general de Gaulle le 
premier, nous tendions tout naturellement ä nous representer la naissance du 
Rassemblement comme un second appel du 18 juin, la lutte que nous allions 
entreprendre comme une continuation d'une oeuvre un moment interrompue. 2° 
This was an understandable strategy. Many of the RPF's team, not to mention de Gaulle, had 
19 A point which has been raised in Jean Chariot, Le Gaullisme d'opposition, 51-52 and throughout; Francois- 
Georges Dreyfus, De Gaulle et le Gaullisme, 115. 
20 Jacques Soustelle, Vingt-huit ans de gaullisme (Paris: La Table ronde, 1968), 40-41. 
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played heroic roles in the resistance. Historiography such as the Trente ans collection formally 
recorded the movement's heritage. It complemented the symbolic locations related to the 
resistance used in the series of speeches which preceded the foundation of the group. 21 In 
several sources this was combined with a further allusion to the First World War. The heroism 
of 1914-1918 prefigured both the resistance and the RPF. For instance, Jacques Madaule stated 
that in the face of national renunciation in 1917 a dynamic minority, comparable to the Free 
French, had secured the victory of 1918. Jean Touchard correctly suggested the 
Rassemblement cast itself within a longer tradition of national triumph. 22 Just as the PCF had 
drawn social conclusions from the resistance, the RPF wore a badge of patriotism. 
It is less commonly asserted that after the Rassemblement, de Gaulle's memoirs played 
a new role. Fourteen years after its foundation, the legitimacy of the Free French continued 
to be a distinct model for the nation to reinterpret with pride. Without a formal political 
organisation or parliamentary party, the point was to promote what de Gaulle had achieved, 
and to compare this with the events that had occurred since his subsequent retirements from 
domestic politics. De Gaulle personified himself as the embodiment of the resistance. His 
memoirs established his career as a continuous struggle for the well-being of the nation. Michel 
Winock has correctly written of de Gaulle's aura in 1958: 
Lui-meme ne manqua pas de brandir ä 1'occasion le sceptre invisible que lui ont 
confere 1'Appel du 18 juin 1940 et son action ä la tete de la France Libre. 
Ainsi, au cours de la fameuse `semaine des barricades' d'Alger, ä la fin de 
janvier 1960, il evoque ä la television non seulement le mandat du peuple mais 
encore `la legitimite nationale [qu'il] incarne depuis vingt ans'. Comme si la 
periode allant de janvier 1946, quand il quitte son poste de president du 
21 In the spring of 1947 the RPF was launched through a series of speeches delivered on sites intimately 
associated with resistance and the war, notably at Bruneval and Strasbourg. 
22 Jean Touchard, Le Gaullisme 1940-1969,106-107. 
173 
Conseil, ä mi mai-juin 1958, date oü il revient `aux affaires', n'avait ete qu'une 
parenthese insignifiante. [... ] Ainsi, le passe du General etait un certificat de 
garantie. Sa cause etait celle de la France, et non la cause d'une faction: il en 
avait fait la preuve. 23 
It is necessary to note that de Gaulle's `sceptre invisible' was not exactly an invisible device. 
Rather, the reverse. As witnessed in the selected texts which this thesis addresses, numerous 
cultural products were in circulation throughout the Fourth Republic which staked out de 
Gaulle's place in history and assured his stature as a national figure. It was during the so called 
`paranthese insignifiante' period that Gaullists, coming from a variety of intellectual traditions, 
maintained the legitimacy of the Free French and guaranteed that the nation would not forget 
its legacy. Historians, intellectuals, journalists, and biographers shaped the General's historical 
warrant from 1945 onwards. When de Gaulle was in a political position in which myth-making 
proved to be empirically vital to his success, the ideological history from which a number of 
the myths originated did not suddenly appear out of thin air. Moreover, it is a simplification 
to consider that de Gaulle was the sole author of his myth. Although many loyal Gaullists 
would agree with Alan Pedley that `a man who dominates his contemporaries as de Gaulle did, 
achieves superiority, [... ] by being himself, reality is different. We must appreciate the energy 
of the General's supporters, historians amongst them. 24 
In a broadly comparable style to the PCF writers, the Gaullists claimed that their 
historical accounts of de Gaulle's resistance continued to be meaningful and to hold political 
lessons. However, the didactic tone which was constructed was often more subtle than the 
techniques employed by non-Gaullists. Of course, entire texts, such as the Trente ans 
collection were presented as `lecons' or `enseignements' to the nation but often this reminder 
23 Michel Winock, Nationalisme, antisemitisme etfascisme en France, 417-419. 
14 Alan Pedley, As Mighty as the Sword, 183-184. 
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was employed in a limited fashion, or restricted to an introductory comment. 25 As well as this 
strategy, Gaullists told their readers that the General's career was part of a longer mystical 
destiny. This was the case in both the Trente ans collection and in Cattaui's biography (1956). 
Moreover, it is well known that de Gaulle's memoirs make frequent play on the author's 
intimate relationship with national destiny, or History. 26 The connection between past actions 
and present/future politics was established through the specific focus on the leader. For 
example, concluding his publication, Cattaui wrote: `Mais de Gaulle n'a pas dit son dernier 
mot: plus encore que sa propre destine, 11 porte celle de son pays, de ce vieux peuple de 
France qui ne fut, lors de sa liberation, qu'un seul peuple rassemble'. 27 The fact that the 
General's life was nothing less than a critical moment in the destiny of the nation meant that 
readers were led to believe that the historical record was itself a vital explanation of the past, 
the present and the future. References to fate and de Gaulle's role in French history served as 
a device which anticipated the General's ultimate return to high office. 
Nicolaidis, Bosworth, and others have suggested that much of post-war Gaullist myth- 
making was a simple matter of exaggerating the resistance's contribution to the liberation of 
France. The current's handling of the internal resistance was more varied. It was not only a 
case of showing that the nation had been, `unanimement resistante'. 28 The first dominant theme 
25 Parias, "Avertissement", in Trente ans, vii. 
26 The point has been frequently made, see for example, Alan Pedley, As Mighty as the Sword, 49. 
27 Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle, 112. Comparable claims are made in Cattaui, "De Gaulle: le traditionaliste et le 
novateur", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 413-414; Stanislas Fumet, "De Gaulle: le batisseur", in Parias (ed. ), 
Trente ans, 418; Remy, "L'Homme d'action", in Parias (ed), Trente ans, 419. For instance, Fumet highlighted 
de Gaulle's ability to combine change with historic national traditions, `Mais s'il est revolutionnaire, il entend, 
comme Peguy, ne 1'etre qu'ä condition que cette revolution ne soit pas une rupture insensee des racines, mais 
au contraire qu'elle renoue, et brutalement s'il est necessaire, avec une tradition plus pure et plus profonde. ' 
Again the author's language implied de Gaulle's mystical powers and destiny. 
28 Dimitri Nicolaidis, "La Nation, les crimes et la memoire", in Nicolaidis (ed. ), Oublier nos crimes (Paris: 
Autrement, 1994) : 31. 
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was the recuperation of the internal resistance from any other ideological source, notably the 
Communist Party. All of the historians under review believed that the resistance had flowered 
from the 18 June broadcast. Cattaui reminded his readers that, `il [de Gaulle] a derriere lui les 
masses resistantes de la metropole'. 29 Lyrically, in the introduction to his biography the same 
author claimed: `Cette voix du 18 juin parlait le seul langage compatible avec 1'honneur. Elle 
prenait possession de 1'Histoire'. 30 In a more sophisticated counter-attack against the 
communist interpretation that the resistance had been a product of the proletariat, Madaule 
remarked that its social origins were diverse. He argued that no single class, social group, or 
political party had created the internal resistance. Nevertheless, Madaule was sure that similar 
values to de Gaulle's had guided its spirit and that, furthermore, the Free French logistically 
supported it from London. He underlined the idea that `le contact ne manquera jamais entre 
la France libre de l'etranger et la France interieure qui resiste'. 31 
Paradoxically, despite the historians' attempts to belittle the role of the PCF they also 
portrayed the gradual unification of the internal resistance under de Gaulle's authority as an 
anti-communist contest. This was a recurrent theme in de Gaulle's memoirs and is particularly 
evident throughout much of the second volume, L'Unite. 32 Introducing the 1956 publication, 
de Gaulle stated the tasks he had faced by the middle of the war. He wrote: `Voila ma täche! 
Regrouper la France dans la guerre; lui epargner la subversion, lui remettre au destin qui ne 
depende que d'elle-meme'. 33 He stressed that the communist elements within the internal 
29 Georges Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle, 74. 
30 Ibid., 7. 
31 Jacques Madaule, "La France dechiree et renaissante", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 273. 
32 Correctly the detailed point is noted by Pedley in his work on the theme of `adversity' in the memoirs, see 
As Mighty as the Sword, 106-108. 
33 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 2,3. 
176 
resistance had endangered unity and independence. The history of the unification of the 
resistance contained the detailed portrayal of de Gaulle's successful protection of France from 
a communist-based revolution. It was implied that if the resistance movements had not been 
brought under Gaullist control, then the dominant force of the PCF would have threatened 
post-war life. The following explanation is a typical example of how de Gaulle assessed the 
issue. 
Tant que les forces clandestines ont ä agir spontanement, au hasard des 
occasions et par bandes separees, il ne saurait etre question de leur imposer une 
hierarchie reguliere, ni de leur fixer depuis Alger ou Londres des missions 
precisees dans le temps et sur le terrain. Mais il y aurait de graves 
inconvenients ä les laisser ä elles-memes sans les rattacher ä 1'autorite centrale. 
Car on risquerait alors, soit de les voir glisser ä 1'anarchie des `grandes 
compagnies', soit de les livrer ä 1'emprise preponderante des communistes. 
Ceux-ci, en effet, noyautent et, souvent, commandent les `Francs Tireurs et 
Partisans' qui sont presque un tiers des maquis. Si de Gaulle ne tenait pas tout 
le monde sous son obedience, cette fraction deviendrait une force ä part dont 
disposerait, non le pouvoir, mais 1'entreprise qui vise ä le saisir. En outre, 
d'autres elements, ne sachant ä quoi se rattacher, subiraient l'attrait de cette 
organisation et passeraient sous sa coupe. C'est 1'epoque, d'ailleurs, oil les 
communistes s'efforcent d'accaparer le Conseil national de la resistance, " 
De Gaulle was replying to his communist critics who had been equally uncharitable concerning 
his actions. Arguing that the PCF had been a major threat to the success of the resistance and 
France was his riposte. While we know that Charles de Gaulle was an anti-communist, the 
viewpoint was equally concerned with countering the extreme right-wing's construction of 
history. It debunked critics like Louis Rougier who had accused de Gaulle of having 
collaborated with the PCF. Similarly, it countered the accusation that Gaullism and 
communism had spawned the Fourth Republic. In the atmosphere of the Cold War, de Gaulle 
34Ibid., 254. 
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used his chance to write about the internal resistance so as to put the record straight about his 
relationship with the PCF. 
He expanded on the point in his writing on the Darlan/Giraud question. He contended 
that only he, as an authentic representative of the resistance, could have liberated France. 
Should another military figure, tainted by Vichy, have been used in his place then the people 
would have turned to communism. De Gaulle explained, citing a conversation between himself, 
Churchill and Sir Anthony Eden: 
`Songez, leur dis je, aux consequences que cela risque d'entrainer. Si la France 
devait, un jour, constater que, du fait des Anglo-Saxons, sa liberation c'est 
Darlan, vous pourriez peut-etre gagner la guerre au point de vue militaire, vous 
la perdriez moralement et, en definitive, il n'y aurait qu'un seul vainqueur: 
Stalin'. 35 
De Gaulle was retrospectively proving his anti-communism. By linking US support for 
Darlan with a possible French slide to communism, he was also implying that his style of 
nationalist politics, had been, and continued to be, the only legitimate force to combat the `red 
threat'. Whereas much of the secondary literature's approach to historical memory presents 
Gaullist representations as a consensual portrayal of the occupation, in which the entire nation 
had resisted, in reality the historians characterised de Gaulle as a skilful anti-communist. 
Portraying the General in this way did not heal the divisions of the period. Instead it restated 
them, showing that de Gaulle and his supporters knew how to control the PCF. Perhaps, the 
most adroit aspect was that history implied that non-Gaullist right-wingers, Darlan and Giraud, 
were incapable of this role. In addition to Rousso's discussion of the impact of the Cold War 
on the rehabilitation of the extreme right wing, we can add that the climate of super-power 
35 Ibid., 51. 
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confrontation marked Gaullist historiography to an extent which has not been registered in Le 
Syndrome de Vichy. 36 
Exhibiting de Gaulle's anti-communism was another example of historiographic 
argument by analogy. The political point was that Gaullism's record was relevant in the 
present. De Gaulle's actions were taken to have been authoritative in the past, and under a 
comparable communist challenge they would be commanding for a second time. It was not 
detrimental to de Gaulle's political future to imply his skills as a Cold Warrior, avant la lettre. 
However, Gaullists did not always highlight the connections between past actions and 
contemporary activities in a straightforward didactic manner. Notably, the structure of 
argument which framed the second volume of the war memoirs meant that its conclusion 
implied the anti-communist theme. Long passages of description which presented de Gaulle as 
an anti-communist suggested that should France ever be threatened from this source, the 
General would act in a comparable manner to the 18 June decision. Moreover, the popular 
claim that de Gaulle's destiny was to be a national historical force invested his entire record 
with symbolic meaning. 
The third area which the Gaullist historians examined was the rallying of the French 
colonial territories to the flag of Lorraine. Many historical commentators have ignored the 
topic. 37 Nevertheless, the role of the empire in the final victory was a repeated reference point 
in de Gaulle's own writings and, for instance, those of Jacques Madaule. They outlined two 
seemingly contradictory themes. Proudly, the historians showed that the Free French had 
conducted a far more successful imperial policy than the Vichy regime, whilst on the other 
36 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 42. 
37 The role of the Empire in Gaullist historiography is neglected in the major works of Rousso, Judt, Nora and 
Charlot. It is also overlooked in Guy Perville, "L'Algerie dans la memoire des droites", in Jean-Francois 
Sirinelli (ed. ), Histoire des droites en France, Vol. 2 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 621-656. 
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hand, they recognised that the very imperial territory, which they had protected during the 
war, should not necessarily remain under complete French authority. As in the previous 
examples from the Gaullist current, the lessons of this aspect of resistance history were rather 
more implied than overtly stated. 
The historians reported that Gaullism had successfully protected the colonies. They 
cited episodes from across the war, from the Dakar raid to the anti-American battle over the 
small islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, as examples of de Gaulle's independence and belief 
in the sovereign rights of French overseas territory. In his memoirs, the General described how 
he had fought a global campaign, influencing events in France from around the world. These 
confrontations highlighted his triumphant policy and its implementation. This was a 
straightforward nationalist version of events which reinforced pre-existing notions of the 
benefits of a united nation and empire. The representation implied the subtle reassurance that 
de Gaulle valued the colonial territories and was prepared to defend them. 
The predictable patriotism of the Gaullist's imperial record was only the first element 
in the historians' portrayal of the topic. They also suggested that France's traditional 
domination over her colonies would have to change in the future. Whilst the Gaullists 
explained that colonial territory had been defended against other European or North American 
powers, the claims of self-determination from within the colonies themselves were recognised 
as having been legitimate. De Gaulle did not hide this viewpoint, as he retrospectively 
portrayed it from the vantage point of 1956. For example, he categorically supported the 
overhaul of the French state in the Levant. Writing on its independence movement, he 
concluded: 
Il y avait lä un etat d'esprit assez fort pour qu'il eüt ete absurde de s'y opposer. 
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Sans doute, fallait-il sauvegarder les interets, economiques, diplomatiques, 
culturels, qui etaient le lot de la France au Levant depuis maintes generations. 
Mais cela semblait conciliable avec l' independance des Etats. 38 
This is a good illustration of de Gaulle, the nationalist, who respected the claims of other 
nationalists. Gaullists saw the loyalty of the Empire to the Free French as a reason for new 
post-colonial arrangements to be discussed. They perceived that the imperial territories' 
support for de Gaulle in 1940 and their contribution to the liberation of the metropole had 
warranted the reward of a more flexible relationship between Paris and the periphery. This was 
the logic behind the Brazzaville conference of January 1944, and the subsequent Union 
francaise project, as well as the historical writings which outlined these developments. The 
following summary captures the interpretation. 
Les territoires d'outre-mer sont desormais groupes au sein de cette communaute 
denommee l'Union francaise. 11 ne s'agit certes pas lä d'un simple changement 
de formule, mais plutöt de l'aboutissement d'une evolution politique, 
economique et sociale dont les territoires d'outre-mer furent le theatre depuis 
la fin de la Premiere Guerre mondiale, et que la derniere guerre, et en 
particulier les ralliements ä la France libre accentua. 39 
In a thematic essay devoted to the Union francaise, Lapie's representation shows us the 
uneasy co-existence of the two aspects of the interpretation. His work is a good example of the 
recognition that a new relationship between the Empire and France had been won by the 
latter's wartime role. Conversely, he also advocated that the metropole and periphery 
continued to be symbolically linked, or to share, `des destines inseparables'. This was still 
akin to the integrationist policy encapsulated in the feeling that the territories would somehow 
38 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 2,19. 
39 P. O. Lapie, "L'Union francaise", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 403. 
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gain a new role whilst also remaining pleinement frangaise. 
As would have been common at the time of publication, the accompanying 
iconography, consisting of photographs selected by Jacques Boudet, was deeply marked by the 
colonial mind set of the late 1940s. Alongside the text, a series of images depicted the glories 
of French colonial life. There was a photograph of an African youth in French army garb, 
simply entitled `Jeune soldat de l'Afrique Noire'. Similarly, a smiling young black woman, 
wearing an attractive summer dress, was described as a `Jeune beaute du Cameroun'. The 
montage was completed with a landscape photograph of Western European style architecture 
found in the capital of Algeria, entitled `Alger, la moderne'. The juxtaposition of the 
traditional images of imperial domination with Lapie's partial discursive recognition of the 
need for a new, more democratic, colonial policy is symptomatic of the many paradoxes which 
are apparent in Gaullists' treatments of the subject. Whether intentional or not, two 
contradictory views of how Gaullists' saw the future of the Empire could be drawn from the 
historians' writing on the colonies. 
In short, the aspects of resistance which the Gaullists emphasised provided lessons for 
the political arena of the Fourth Republic. In a generally comparable manner to the 
communists, the historians took the past as a commentary on the present. The rich variety of 
material which could be drawn upon meant that de Gaulle and his fellow-travellers were 
constantly able to characterise themselves as the inheritors of the Free French and a successful 
anti-communist tradition. The repeated claim that de Gaulle's destiny had yet to run its course 
strongly implied that his previous actions could be taken as a model for his predicted future 
role. Although the lessons which were drawn in writing on the Empire formed a major part 
of the Gaullist account, they were always likely to contain contradictory signals. Ultimately, 
France could not maintain colonial possessions without violating the rights of their indigenous 
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people. 
Resistance `Vichyssoise' 
A central theme of the selected extreme right-wing historical writings was also resistance, but 
of a different kind from that which was established in the two alternative currents. Louis 
Rougier and General Pierre Hering perceived that Vichy had developed the most effective 
response to the occupation. Rougier revealed that `il ya une resistance `vichyssoise' tout 
comme il ya une `trahison gaulliste', et non pas seulement une trahison `vichyssoise' et une 
resistance gaulliste'. 40 This inversion of the standard Gaullist interpretation was the core of the 
extreme right-wing's presentation. To paraphrase, the argument was that Petain and several 
of his circle had secretly worked towards the liberation, whilst never fully accepting the logic 
of collaboration. They duped the Germans, and the small number of French who genuinely 
supported nazism, the latter group often being characterised through the figure of Pierre Laval 
and his allegedly dangerous machinations against Petain. 
Professor Louis Rougier was one of the first to advocate the `double game' position. 
He published the first Canadian edition of his Mission secrete ä Londres shortly after Petain's 
trial, in which a comparable thesis was presented. As this suggests, historiography and the 
epuration overlapped. Me Jacques Isorni's defence of Petain was a major reference point, and 
primary source, in the extreme right-wing publications. Succinctly, Chebel d'Appollonia 
summarised Petain's explanation: `J'ai toujours resiste aux Allemands. Donc, je ne pouvais 
etre que favorable ä la Resistance' . 
41 However, the historiographic current was subject to 
40 Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres, 139. 
41 Ariane Chebel d'Appollonia, L'Extreme-Droite en France, de Maurras d Le Pen, 267-268. The purge had a 
comparable influence in extreme right-wing fiction, see, Jeannine Verdes-Leroux, Refus et violences (Pans: 
Gallimard, 1996), 480-481; and much of Nicholas Hewitt, Literature and the Right in Postwar France. 
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significant internal variation. A second version of events did not recognise the need to separate 
a good Vichy (Petain) from a bad one (Laval). Jacques Benoist-Mechin's approach was closer 
to the second interpretation than the first. I will argue that, although strong differences of 
historical analysis emerged, the two sub-currents were complementary. 
As Azema, Bedarida, and Ferro have indicated, Rougier and Hering claimed that the 
more conservative, rather than fascistic members of the Vichy government (Petain, Weygand, 
Baudouin, and Rougier himself) had saved France from the rigours of a brutal occupation and 
prepared the ground for the liberationary army in North Africa. Whereas Gaullists and 
communists thought of the internal resistance as a force of open contestation against nazi 
authority, Rougier implied that the nazis' progress had been most damaged through diplomatic 
guile and negotiation. The classic illustration was when Rougier described a meeting between 
himself and the Marshal, on 20 September 1940. He recorded both Petain's and Weygand's 
hopes for his mission to London, as well as the formation of a new army outside France. He 
wrote, 
Le Marechal fut tres interesse par mon We d'obtenir le desserement du blocus: 
`Le ravitaillement de la population est notre plus grande preoccupation, surtout 
aux approches de l'hiver. Nous vivons sur des stocks. Bientöt ces stocks seront 
epuises. Mais, ii ya une chose plus importante encore ä dire aux Anglais: c'est 
de ne plus s'en prendre ä notre flotte et ä nos bases'. Et il reprit point par point 
l' argumentation de Weygand, presque dans les memes termes. `J'envoie 
Weygand en Afrique du Nord avec tout pouvoir, loin des orages du Conseil des 
ministres oü il ne peut s'entendre avec Laval et hors des regards des Allemands. 
Sa mission sera de sauvegarder 1'Afrique du Nord et de former une armee 
capable de la defendre. Un jour, cette armee nous servira, mais il est encore 
beaucoup trop tot' . 
42 
Petain, Weygand and Rougier were identified as having been part of a conspiracy against 
42 Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres, 64. 
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Laval, the aim of which was the gradual recovery of France from the occupation. Rougier 
reports that in and around the hotels and spas of the chic Allier resort, the `resistance 
vichyssoise' was thought to have been successful until the invasion of the Southern zone, and 
the second Laval cabinet. Hering, who also reproduced the conversation cited above as an 
example of the milieu's activities, expanded on its implications. Combining themes already 
developed in the writings of Rougier, and to an extent those of Louis-Dominique Girard, 
Hering explained that Petain's greatest achievement had been the Montoire negotiations. 43 He 
concluded that the Marshal's strategic authority had outwitted the German delegation. ' He 
judged that at Montoire Petain had saved French North Africa from a German-Spanish threat: 
territory which would later prove to be the key to the Allied victory. Summarising the balance- 
sheet of Petain's period as chef d'etat, Hering stated: `Il a rendu la liberation possible. En 
sauvegardant 1'Afrique du Nord, tremplin de la liberation, jusqu'ä 1'entree en ligne des Alliees. 
4s En reconstituant l'Armee d'Afrique'. 
Benoist-Mechin's treatment is less convoluted. In Soixante fours history proved that 
Petain had been correct to seek an armistice and that Laval had been equally justified in 
sweeping aside the Third Republic and constructing a new authoritarian constitution in its 
place. The principal difference from the Rougier-Hering line was that Laval was not considered 
to have been anti-French and that Benoist-Mechin perceived that his reforms were nothing less 
than was needed at the time. In his concluding portrait of Laval he confronted the issue head 
on: 
43 Louis-Dominique Girard, Montoire, Verdun diplomatique (Paris: Andre Bonne, 1948). 
44 Pierre Hering, La Vie exen plaire de Philippe Petain, 93. 
45 Ibid., 112. 
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On a blame Laval de n'avoir pas fait sienne la formule de Weygand: 
`L'armistice, mais pas une virgule de plus! ' Formule altiere, qui reflete bien le 
temperament du commandant en chef. Mais formule dangereuse aussi, dont 
l'application aurait rapidement provoque l'asphyxie du pays. [... ] Le chömage 
menacant, l'inexistence de moyens de travail, la paralysie des transports, la 
famine approchante, tout cela pose au gouvernement autant de problemes qui 
ne peuvent se resoudre que par la negociation. En vidant les stocks, la France 
peut vivre encore deux mois, trois moil au maximum. Apres cela, nul ne sait 
ce qui arrivera. Alors, - pas une virgule de plus?... 
`Il n'est pas serieux, dira Laval au terme de son expose, je parle comme 
un homme qui a eu souvent la responsabilite du pouvoir, de pretendre que la 
France ne devait pas, qu'elle n'etait pas contrainte de negocier avec 
1'Allemagne, pour assurer aux Francais un niveau de vie minimum, ne fit-ce 
qu'en raison de la situation economique que je viens de decrire'. 46 
This portrayal countered the anti-Laval extreme-right position that his colleagues had 
developed. Nevertheless, one should not overestimate this difference of opinion. The political 
messages which all three of the extreme right-wing historians promoted were closer in kind 
than the Benoist-Mechin statement had indicated. 
Whether supportive of Laval or not, the viewpoints of Rougier, Hering and Benoist- 
Mechin presented Vichy France as a legal government which had been fruitful. Rougier was 
one of the first to recognise that its task had, at least until 1942, been a necessary one. Hering 
was keen to promote Petain's personal triumph. From this foundation of general support for 
the principle of the Vichy regime, whatever its alleged secret resistance role, Benoist-Mechin 
defended the constitutional new order which went with it. After the collapse of the Republic 
a new authoritarianism had sought to revive the nation. Retrospectively, the positive aspects 
of such a state were already identifiable in the debates which had preceded the final vote 
against the Republic. Benoist-Mechin described the symbolic unity which suddenly existed 
between former political enemies. For example, of the support Petain had derived from the 
46 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante fours, Vol. 3,582-584. 
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socialist parliamentarian, M. Spinasse, and the Action Francaise representative, Xavier Vallat, 
he recorded: 
Cet accord entre le depute de gauche et le depute de droite ne manque pas de 
grandeur, et tous les parlementaires presents en saisissent la signification 
profonde. Si les partis enterrent leurs discordes steriles, s'ils font taire leurs 
querelles pour n'ecouter que la voix du pays, quel avenir ne peut-on esperer 
pour la France? Pourquoi a-t-il fallu un tel desastre, pour en arriver lä...? 47 
Benoist-Mechin constructed an image of a new model of political interaction which transcended 
the divisions which had been a product of the Third Republic. He implied that under the dual 
leadership of Petain and Laval a new period of reform had beckoned. That is to say the one 
brief period of extreme right-wing authoritarian governance since the Second Empire was 
viewed with the nostalgia of `what might have been... ' had the regime governed in normal 
peacetime circumstances. 
All of the extreme right-wing writers intimated that France would be better off in the 
present if she were ruled by an analogous constitution to that of the Vichy regime. This aspect 
was as true of Rougier's assessment of Main's double game as it was of Benoist-Mechin's 
more overt approach, in that both writers' accepted the legitimacy of Petain's restorative 
powers. Again, as in the communist and Gaullist currents, the historical writing served as a 
paradigm for the contemporary period. The favourable evaluation of the Vichy regime was also 
a critical assessment of the Fourth Republic. Petain was perceived to have broken away from 
the mistakes of republicanism. The extreme right-wing writers showed the nation to be 
renewed, confident, and for a fleeting moment, France had been proud to be France. 
Expressing the belief that 1940 had ameliorated the conditions which had been suffered under 
ý^ [bid., 159. 
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the Third Republic and the debacle, Benoist-Mechin introduced a quotation from Petain's 25 
June 1940 radio broadcast, with the following judgement: 
Mais qu'il s'agisse de Rabat, d'Alexandrie ou de Saigon, au coeur de tous ces 
problemes, il ya toujours la France, avec ses hommes et ses femmes, ses villes 
et ses champs, ses ports devastes et ses moissons intactes, son passe prestigieux 
et son avenir incertain; c'est ä cette France blessee mais confiante, que le 
Marechal s'addresse ce soir-lä, 48 
The historians characterised Vichy as having been a significant advance on both the republican 
regime which, as we have seen in Chapter IV, they held responsible for the national shame of 
defeat, and the new post-war Republic which was equally tarnished by its role in the epuration. 
When Petain had been installed in office, the historians described the nation as `blessee mais 
confiante'. Benoist-Mechin's description of a rural France which had survived the ravages of 
republicanism contributed to the feeling that, for a short period, a new unity had been created. 
The historiography demonstrated the successes of the extreme right wing's record, and thereby 
implied the importance of authoritarian government in the future. They described Main's 
power in the following abstract terms: 
Qu'est-ce donc que le pouvoir, cette force insaisissable sans laquelle les societes 
humaines ne pourraient pas subsister? Il est facile d'en decrire les 
manifestations des lors qu'il existe. Mais comment nait-il? En quoi consiste son 
essence? 
Mysterieux et irrationnel, le pouvoir jaillit du trefonds des etres. Il 
prend sa source dans 1'elan d'un peuple vers un homme, entre les mains de qui 
ce peuple remet sa destine. Il est fait d'une communion intime entre une nation 
et un individu, et la force dont celui-ci se trouve alors investi West que la 
somme incalculable d'amours accumulees sur sa tete. Cet elan - et lui seul - 
donne le pouvoir veritable. [... ] Ce n'est pas la monarchie, puisqu'il n'est pas 
acquis par heritage. Ce n'est pas la dictature, puisqu'il ne resulte pas de la 
48 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante fours, Vol. 2,506. 
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volonte d'un seul. Peut-etre le terme qui lui convient le mieux est-il celui 
d'autorite. [italics in original]49 
They took Vichy and Petain as an alternative, near perfect, model of society. Once more, a 
didactic mode was used to underline the point that the past held meaningful lessons for the 
present. In addition to implied claims to this effect, like the PCF historians Benoist-Mechin 
used less subtle interjections to signal the contemporary relevance of history. For instance, he 
stated that his entire survey held significant national lessons on the nature of governance. 
Concluding the foreword to the Soixante fours trilogy, this aspect was underlined. The 
historian argued: 
Puisse ce livre, aussi imparfait qu'il soit, nous apporter une conception plus 
exacte des choses; puisse-t-il, en contribuant ä deblayer le passe, nous aider ä 
discerner les chemins de 1'avenir; puisse-t-il surtout - c'est le voeu que l'auteur 
n'a cesse de formuler tout au long de son travail - nous faire toucher du doigt 
les malheurs qui assaillent un peuple lorsque l'Etat devient trop faible pour 
assurer sa defense et nous inspirer ä tous la resolution farouche de ne jamais 
laisser des pages aussi sombres s'inscrire de nouveau dans notre Histoire. so 
Thus before offering passages which merely implied that the past demonstrated the benefits of 
authoritarian government, the historian had openly revealed his intentions. Soixante fours 
worked as both an argument in favour of authoritarian government and as a lesson to help 
avoid a repetition of the Third Republic's failings. Central to both claims was the perspective 
that history was a barometer for the future. 
A second unifying feature of the two extreme right-wing sub-currents was the contempt 
shown for de Gaulle. This was nothing new, and as we have already seen, was a feature of 
49 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixantejours, Vol. 3,610. 
50 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante jours, Vol. 1,12. 
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extreme right-wing writing on the entire period, as well as on the detailed episodes within it. 
When comparing the pro- and anti-Laval strands of interpretation one can see that even within 
the writings of Rougier and Hering, it was de Gaulle, not Laval, who was the primary target 
for polemical attack. Rougier criticised de Gaulle's actions, whilst he limited his comments on 
Laval to the occasional cursory remark. Adopting a tone which was similar to the satirical style 
used by Benoist-Mechin, Rougier addressed the failings of the Gaullist exile community of 
New York. His account of their incessant propaganda equated Gaullism's dominant control of 
public opinion with nazism. He described its hegemonic position as `une veritable Gestapo', 
and coined the phrase `Gleichschaltung' to account for its activities. " Pierre Laval was never 
characterised in these terms. Dispassionately, he was described as the leader of `le parti de la 
guerre contre 1'Angleterre'. Through this rhetoric Rougier highlighted who, more than anyone 
else, he considered to have betrayed France. Indeed the point was made more overtly through 
the use of statements which left the reader in little doubt what Rougier felt that history 
illustrated. For instance, in the concluding chapter to the 1948 edition of Mission secrete 6 
Londres, he declared: 
Teile est l'oeuvre du general de Gaulle. Pour avoir voulu jouer ä 1'apprenti- 
dictateur il a renouvele l'histoire de 1'apprenti-sorcier. Ayant tout en main, il 
a tout compromis, tout perdu. Il a deserte la grandeur de son destin pour la 
petitesse de son ambition. L'escroquerie faite ä la France s'est achevee en 
banqueroute, apres une gestion d'Ubu-Roi. 52 
Rougier used historical writings to highlight what he felt had been the negative consequences 
of de Gaulle's actions. The point is not simply that he was an anti-Gaullist writer, but rather 
51 Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres, 121. 
52 Ibid., 223. 
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that he explicitly claimed that his version of history proved his anti-Gaullism to be true. 
To summarise, the extreme right-wing historians outlined an honourable record that 
they could repeat. This included implying that authoritarianism was more effective than 
republicanism or Gaullism, circa 1939 or 1945. In support of Petain alone, or embracing him 
and Laval, the historians were never ashamed to return to the brief era of national governance 
in search of lessons. Like their counterparts in the communist current, extreme right-wing 
historians intercut passages of description with direct statements which showed how history 
was to be interpreted. 
Concluding Discussion: The Certainties of Ideological Interpretation 
The chapter has shown that all of the ideological historians openly claimed that the past was 
significant in the present. The manner in which this view was articulated varied. Communist 
and extreme right-wing historians made their interpretations of history count through clear 
didactic statements which told readers that history was a model to be either repeated or 
avoided. Gaullists also openly discussed the `lessons' of French history. They focused on de 
Gaulle's place in the destiny of France. Apart from this variation, all three sets of activists 
placed equivalent value in the view that knowledge of contemporary history underpinned 
politics. As will be discussed in the following chapter, a comparable shared struture of 
argument is evident in the historians' writing on the liberation. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the activist historians' didactic assertions and gambits 
illustrate two fundamental features of political engagement: self-confidence and certainty. 
Perhaps above all else, to be an activist historian required faith to instruct with conviction. The 
fact that activist historians publicly claimed the pedagogic or political value of their writing 
shows the period's almost constant faith in the view that the past provided insight, or even 
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foreshadowed future developments. To borrow from Conan and Rousso, this was another 
genuine moment when Vichy represented a `passe qui ne passe pas'. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE LIBERATION 
In this chapter I analyse how the historians exploited the subject of the liberation. I examine 
how and why they ordered writings around a balance of positive and negative assessments. It 
is underlined that in accounting for this episode there was a propensity to use comparable 
structures of argument across the currents. 
`Insurrection Nationale' or `Liberation Trahie'? 
The communist historians identified the capture of Paris through popular unrest and the 
withdrawal of labour as the long awaited insurrection nationale. However, a second 
interpretation marked their writings. This reading was pessimistic about 1944. The historians 
argued that despite the initial successes of the uprising, any hope of true post-war reform had 
been quickly dashed. As Pierre Herve's striking title described, the denouement to the 
occupation was the `liberation trahie'. ' The expulsion of the Party from tripartite government 
and the increase in US-Soviet international tensions confirmed this angle. Nevertheless, the 
importance of the insurrection nationale remained, for how else could the Party historians treat 
the crowning moment of the FTP's military history? After all, in their own terms, they had 
liberated France. 
As in their depiction of the resistance, the communist historians triumphantly accounted 
for the Parisian strike and uprising as the Party's latest heroic success. They showed that this 
was the moment for which Thorez and Duclos had pledged themselves to resist the occupation. 
1 See Pierre Herve, La Liberation trahie (Paris: Grasset, 1946). The phrase derived from the title was employed 
by a number of the representative communist texts in order to capture the idea that the promises of 1944 had 
been deliberately left unfulfilled by bourgeois members of the resistance. For instance it was cited by Jean 
Dautry and Louis Pastor, Histoire de la resistance, 3. 
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The historians underlined the PCF's anti-Vichy activities. They repeated that they represented 
a more authentic expression of the popular will than the Gaullist resistance. Laurent Casanova, 
in his short essay `Le Parti et l'insurrection nationale, ' emphasised that the PCF had called for 
the citizens of Paris to lift the nazi yoke. Categorically he stated, `C'est au Parti Communiste 
enfin que revient l'honneur d'avoir lance dans la nuit du 18 au 19 aoüt, par la voix des elus 
communistes, l'appel ä 1'Insurrection Parisienne'. Z 
Somewhat overlooked in the secondary literature devoted to historiography, the 
communists' reportage also contained a new political edge, the focus of which was the Soviet 
Union's contribution to the defeat of nazism. As well as providing a glimpse of what they 
could achieve when Party and people acted in unison, the selected writers suggested that a 
similar harmony was achievable between France and the Soviet Union. Communists claimed 
that this had already occurred during the liberation of France. Celebrating Stalin's seventieth 
birthday, Thorez underlined the crucial role which he had played throughout the liberation of 
Western Europe. He stated, 
Quand des millions de Francais et de Francaises, quand des millions d'hommes 
et de femmes sur le globe, prononcent avec amour et gratitude le nom de 
Stalin, c'est que d'abord ils se souviennent des cruelles epreuves de la guerre 
et de tout ce qu'ils doivent ä Stalin, au peuple sovietique, ä ses glorieuses 
armees qui ont ecrase les hordes hitleriennes et ramene la paix en Europe et 
clans le monde. 3 
Thorez indirectly linked the liberation with the Chairman of the Soviet Party and the forces of 
2 Laurent Casanova, "Le Parti et 1'Insurrection Nationale", Cahiers, 10 (1945): 26. 
3 Maurice Thorez, "Hommage ä Stalin", Cahiers, 1 (1950): 13. 
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the Soviet Union. Portraying 1944 was an element in the construction of Stalin, and vice versa. 
Writing in the Cahiers, Jean Guillon addressed the theme. The communist historian alluded 
to the critical role which the Soviet Union had played. He claimed: `Aoüt 1944, ce sont les 
actions multiples des FFI appuyees par le peuple de France tout entier, c'est l'insurrection de 
Paris, c'est l'offensive de l'armee sovietique'. 4 The liberation was carefully associated with the 
Party's view of the Soviet Union and its military capacity. By the late 1940s this viewpoint 
functioned as a countermove against the growth of anti-communist propaganda. The image of 
the Red Army was at the centre of the pro- and anti-communist representations. Whereas for 
right-wingers, such as de Gaulle, the Soviet military were `only the distance of the tour de 
France from Strasbourg', for the PCF the history of the liberation allowed this kind of 
proximity to be seen in an entirely different light. They pictured the Red Army as the driving 
force behind the emancipation of Europe in 1944. The communist historians, such as Guillon, 
compared the Soviet forces to the French resistance. They idealised the Soviet war effort. By 
1955, the Party number-two, Jacques Duclos, described European history in the following 
terms: 
11 ya dix ans, le fascisme fut vaincu grace, avant tout, aux efforts titanesque de 
la grande Union sovietique, dont la guerre liberatrice s'etait confondue avec la 
lutte de tour les peuples pour leur independance [... ] Elle montra dans les faits 
la superiorite de l'armee sovietique, armee d'un type nouveau, eduquee Bans 
l'esprit de l'internationalisme, dans l'esprit du respect envers les peuples des 
autres pays et dans 1'esprit du maintien de la paix entre les peuples. 5 
4 Jean Guillon, "Deux anniversaires", Cahiers, 8 (1947): 751. 
Jacques Duclos, "Le Xe anniversaire de la victoire sur le fascisme", Cahiers, 5 (1955): 547. 
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The anti-communist projection of the Red Army was inverted. Duclos embraced the Soviet 
force as a modern, peaceful, military body which had saved France. If one is to read his 
assessment at face value, he constructed it as a `humanitarian brigade' which respected the 
sovereignty of all nations. 
A series of confident images was associated with the events of the 1944 uprising and 
the simultaneous Soviet march westwards. To an extent, these images promised hope for 
France. This was the positive characterisation of the insurrection nationale which, among 
others, Wall, Rousso, Beevor and Cooper have discussed. ' Nevertheless, the PCF's historical 
interpretation did not depict the period in an unquestionably triumphant light. The historians 
were shrewder than has sometimes been presented. The fact that the Party had not won a 
complete victory in 1944 had to be clarified. Writing on the liberation was not just a simple 
question of immortalising heroism. The concluding pages of Fils du peuple list the perceived 
complexities which France faced in 1949. Thorez stated: 
Le peuple avait obtenu des ameliorations sensibles. Il garde le souvenir des 
temps oü nous etions au gouvernement. Il mesure le recul effectue depuis que 
nous n'y sommes plus. Les travailleurs vivent toujours plus mal, tandis que 
s'accroissent les profits capitalistes; des greves nombreuses ont eclate que les 
gouvernants ont reprimees ferocement; les impöts montent. Le franc a perdu la 
moitie de sa valeur; les prix ont triple. 
La reaction releve la tete; les resistants authentiques, calomnies avec une 
impudence croissante, sont traques, arretes, condamnes. Les traitres, les 
anciens collaborateurs sont blanchis, remis en liberte; les dossiers economiques 
des profiteurs de guerre sont classes. ' 
6 Irwin Wall, French Communism in the Era of Stalin (London: Greenwood Press, 1983), 33-35; Henry Rousso, 
"Une memoire en peril", Les Collections du Nouvel Observateur, 16 (1993): 71; implied throughout Anthony 
Beevor and Artemis Cooper, Paris After the Liberation (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994). 
7 Maurice Thorez, Fils du peuple, 220. 
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The passage is typical of the communists' liberation trahie account. Despite the redeeming 
memory of the brief period of PCF government, the Fourth Republic was cast in bleak terms. 
To paraphrase in the light of class analysis, the forces which had caused the Second World War 
had mysteriously escaped punishment and had resumed control of France. Listing the nation's 
economic woes, Thorez implied that the reason why poverty and exploitation had returned was 
because `reaction' had been reinstated. The liberation had failed to conduct social reform, and 
those who had been most responsible for the collapse of France in 1940 had escaped justice. 
He protested that the epuration had been turned against the resistance. 
This analysis of why the liberation had failed was complex. Since the PCF was not in 
power, it had to be explained that despite the honourable successes of the communist 
resistance, capitalism had sabotaged the movement's progression. The historians established 
why the resistance had not lived up to the hopes of its supporters. They justified why their 
politicians had been ousted from office. The preferred conspirators were de Gaulle and the 
military elite. This corresponded with the broader construction of de Gaulle as a reactionary. 
The historians showed that the General had limited a popular uprising against fascism and in 
its place he encouraged a convenient middle-class exchange of power. Writings on a series of 
incidents were drawn together to convey the message. Histoire de la resistance contains several 
good examples which illustrate the theme. In the battle of the Vercors, and the Parisian 
insurrection, the historians identified a Gaullo-bourgeois conspiracy against the people. In the 
context of the Vercors they saw a betrayal of the French forces in favour of the Wehrmacht. 
Dautry and Pastor revealed: 
11 n'entrait ni dans les plans anglo-americains, ni dans les plans des generaux 
francais au service du GPRF que les maquis entreprissent pour leur compte de 
grandes actions au cours de la Liberation. [... ] 
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Le 14 juillet, la Republique est proclamee ä Die par des elements de 
1'enorme maquis du Vercors. La Wehrmacht qui s'attend d'un moment ä 1'autre 
ä un second debarquement sur la cote mediterraneenne, pour conserver sa 
liberte de manoeuvre dans la vallee du Rhone lance 35,000 hommes contre le 
maquis du Vercors qui succombe. Ni le general de Gaulle, ni le BCRA charge 
des parachutages, ne font le necessaire pour que le Vercors tienne jusqu'au 
debarquement, qui n'aura lieu que le 15 aoüt pres de Frejus. Une escadrille 
prete ä partir d'Afrique du Nord se voit meme retirer sa mission. ' 
The implication was that the capitalist powers, de Gaulle and his secret service, the BCRA, had 
allowed the maquis to be massacred at the hands of the Germans. The PCF historians 
suggested that similar conspiracies had ruled the day in Paris. By ensuring that they established 
a truce until de Gaulle could liberate the city the bourgeoisie had arrested the dynamism of the 
masses. Unlike Thiers' memorable attack on the Communards, class interests had triumphed 
through cunning rather than firepower. The historians stated: `Les anticommunistes craignent 
moins le general von Choltitz, commandant allemand Bans Paris que la Liberation de Paris par 
sa population seule, communistes au premier rang'. 9 They suggested that a co-ordinated 
bourgeois exchange of offices had occurred and that the true course of the liberation had been 
lost. 
In 1946, concurrently with the events themselves, Kriegel-Valrimont explained to the 
readers of the Cahiers why history had developed in this manner: 
Au fond, ce qui inquiete le plus les reactionnaires, c'est de voir la classe 
ouvriere tenir une place de plus en plus importante dans la vie nationale; ceux 
qui se gargarisent de formules paternalistes, de `promotions ouvrieres' ne 
supportent pas de voir juger des amiraux par des travailleurs communistes. 
Comme ils regrettent le temps oü ils pouvaient pourchasser Andre Marty pour 
8 Jean Dautry and Louis Pastor, Histoire de la resistance, 36-37. 
9Ibid., 37. 
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son action heroique! lo 
In response to the initial triumphs of the Party and the people, the communist historians 
illustrated the return of class interests. Even after the resistance period, bourgeois society and 
culture were not prepared to witness the sentencing of Admirals at the hands of people's 
justice. 
The PCF historians created two parallel versions of the foundation of the Fourth 
Republic. On the one hand, the story of the insurrection nationale proved what might have 
been the case had communist heroism carried the day. Conversely, a second interpretation, 
centred on the power of the bourgeoisie, claimed that the middle class had re-established a 
society which was not dissimilar to the inter-war period. The bourgeoisie had restored 
unfettered capitalism to Western Europe, a Third World War loomed large, whilst culturally 
speaking the communists recorded that a sea of degradation marked the nation's intellectual 
life. " 
The historians were more astute than has often been recognised in the secondary 
literature. The insurrection nationale-liberation trahie dichotomy is hardly an example of a 
`memoire-bunker, ossifie'. 12 Neither is it a simple reflection of the `cult of Revolution'. 13 The 
dual portrait of hope and hopes dashed, which I have extrapolated, was valuable because it 
formed an open-ended view of the liberation and the contemporary period of the Fourth 
10 Kriegel-Valrimont, "Epuration et justice de classe", Cahiers, 8 (1946): 724. 
11 With regard to the perceived decline in post-war cultural standards, a puritanical line of anti-Americanism was 
to be found in condemnations of the licentious Henry Miller. For example, Laurent Casanova, "Art, litterature 
et politique", Cahiers, 3-4 (1947): 295. 
12 Azema and Bedarida, "L'historisation de la resistance", Esprit: 30. 
13 Gildea, The Past in French History, 53. 
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Republic. Writing on the nearest period of contemporary history, the communists employed 
a practical device to account for events that had yet to run their course. It meant they could 
categorise day-to-day politics either as a continuation of the successful insurrection or as a 
reflection of the disastrous betrayal. Whatever occurred, the historians could claim that their 
account had already predicted the outcome. For example, they would view communist electoral 
triumphs as a return to the halcyon days of the liberation. Conversely, continued governmental 
support for `the bosses against the workers' was anticipated in the liberation trahie strand of 
the presentation. 
The structure of argument delineating two radically different versions of the liberation 
might have been unique to the communist sources. The portrayal reflects the ambiguities of the 
Party's position in the late 1940s. It was the largest political group in the Republic, but after 
1947 had become a pariah for both the RPF and the centre parties of the Troisieme Force. To 
this extent, for a communist, the liberation could not be read in an exclusively laudatory light, 
for to do so would have been to ignore the contemporary political environment. Nevertheless, 
although the PCF historians had good reason to depict the liberation as both a positive and a 
negative episode, as we will see, this was a more universal approach which marked the work 
of historians' writing across all three currents. 
Recovering National Honour or a Return to the Third Republic? 
The Gaullist historians also showed that the liberation had been conducted in the letter but had 
been abandoned in spirit. Theirs was an account of a liberation postponed in which de Gaulle 
delivered the nation to the people but then was mercilessly ousted from high office. In a 
remarkably similar structure of argument to that which I have identified in the communist 
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current, the Gaullists created two further portrayals of 1944. They demonstrated that General 
de Gaulle and those in his command had revived France from the defeat of 1940 and protected 
the nation from the likelihood of a communist coup d'etat. However, echoing the PCF 
historians' view of the liberation trahie, they also suggested that the Fourth Republic was 
balanced on the cusp of future decline (albeit for different reasons to the analogous argument 
found in the communist texts). The constitutional failings which had been associated with the 
late Third Republic, compounded by the rise of the PCF, were considered to have damaged 
the hopes of 1944. 
As outlined by Rousso and Gildea, the Gaullists conceived the liberation as the long 
awaited opportunity to salve the wounds of 1940.14 The Gaullist historians emphasised that the 
`Bataille de France' had recommenced. Thus, they returned to the issues of 1940. Alain 
Brossat correctly analyses the discourse when he writes: 
En ce sens, bien des scenes de la Liberation deroulent ä l'envers le film terrible 
et humiliant de 1'exode de juin 1940: on harcele, on traque, on mortifie chaque 
fois qu'on le peut, et pour des raisons symboliques aussi, les troupes allemandes 
en retraite vers le Rhin, tout comme le faisaient les Stucka ä l'encontre des 
centaines de milliers de civils abandonnes sur les chemins de la debacle. " 
The historians intimated that the sins of defeat had been cleansed by victory. They employed 
the two conflicts over the territory of France to frame the beginning and the end of the World 
War. Comparison between the two campaigns was explicit, drawing attention to the recovery 
which the country had made, via de Gaulle's actions, since the 18 June 1940. De Gaulle and 
Georges Cattaui illustrated the period as a repetition of earlier confrontations. Citing a passage 
14 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 30; Robert Gildea, The Past in French History, 128-129. 
15 Alain Brossat, Liberation, fete folle, 38. 
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from de Gaulle's statement of the 6 June 1944, Cattaui began: 
`La bataille de France, qui est la bataille de la France, a commence. Il n'y a 
plus dans la nation, dans les armees, qu'une seule volonte, qu'une seule 
esperance. Voici se lever le soleil de notre grandeur. ' [... ] Le peuple de France 
se Jeve. Bientöt les regiments du Nord et du Midi operent leur jonction. La 
division Leclerc prend part ä la rupture du front de Normandie. L'armee de 
Lattre monte de la Mediterranee. Comme de Gaulle 1'a predit en 1940, le poids 
des armes francaises pese de plus en plus lourd dans la bataille. 16 
The historiographic source confirms Brossat's view. The allusion to de Gaulle's claim that 
industrial strength was used decisively against the Germans was a direct reference to his earlier 
break from the thinking of the military hierarchy, and thus also a reminder of 1940. 
A second central point of the representation was that the Gaullist liberation was 
constituted as the return of the legitimate forces of order. Although Cattaui stated, `le peuple 
de France se Jeve', the communist implication that the people had liberated themselves through 
popular unrest was not emphasised. This was a restoration of authority, pursued by a self- 
consciously elite group. However, the general manipulation of the topic was not especially 
surprising. It corresponded to the dynamics of the wider Gaullist rise-fall myth of the war, as 
well as the historians' treatment of its resistance activities. 
In addition to the better known aspects of the Gaullist account, historians from this 
current also argued that the period had witnessed a victory against communism. This was 
consistent with much of the anti-communist thrust of the current's writing (see Chapter VI 
above). The historians saved much of their venom for their portrayals of the liberation of Paris. 
De Gaulle's treatment of communist conspiracy is exemplary. At the beginning of the second 
volume of his war memoirs, he explained what was at stake. He summarised: 
16 Georges Cattaui, Charles de Gaulle, 94-95. 
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Mais le parti communiste est lä. Depuis qu'Hitler envahit la Russie, il se pose 
en champion de la guerre. Engage dans la resistance oü il n'epargne pas ses 
pertes, invoquant les malheurs du pays et la misere populaire pour confondre 
en une seule revolte l'insurrection nationale et la revolution sociale, il 
ambitionne de se donner l'aureole du salut public. Pourvu d'une organisation 
que ne retient aucun scrupule et ne gene aucune divergence, excellant ä 
noyauter les autres et ä parler tous les langages, il voudrait apparaitre comme 
1'element capable d'assurer une sorte d'ordre, le jour oil l'anarchie deferlerait 
sur le pays. Au surplus, n'offrirait-il pas ä la France dedaignee 1'aide active de 
la Russie, la plus grande puissance de I'Europe? Ainsi, le parti communiste 
compte-t-il trouver, Bans 1'ecroulement de Vichy, l'occasion d'etablir chez nous 
sa dictature. Oui! Mais ce calcul est vain si 1'Etat est refait ailleurs, si dans 
1'äme des Francais la premiere place est prise par un gouvernement national, 
si son chef, dans la lumiere de la victoire, parait tout ä coup ä Paris. " 
Published in 1956, the year of the Suez crisis and the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian 
revolt, the passage is typical of the current's anti-communism. It reflects a theme that runs 
across the spectrum of the Gaullist texts. For example, Adrien Dansette's earlier work on the 
liberation, as printed in the 1949 Trente ans collection, presented a similar picture. Dansette 
categorically warned that a bolshevisation of France had been perilously close in 1944. He 
commented: `Pour les communistes, le depart des Allemands hitleriens, la chute de 1'Etat 
francais, ne sont que des etapes vers cette transformation integrale qui ferait de la France une 
autre URSS'. 18 This indicated that de Gaulle had defeated not only the occupying forces and 
their French collaborators but equally the secondary internal danger of a communist 
dictatorship. This was a full Red scare which relied on a retrospective anti-communist view. 
Whether or not there had actually been a serious communist threat to France in 1944 is not 
17 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, Vol. 2,2. 
18 Adrien Dansette, "Actes de la liberation", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 323. 
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directly relevant. 19 What is important in understanding the politics behind the discourse is that 
the liberation was cast, not only as a triumph over nazism, but also as a victory over the 
domestic extreme left wing. De Gaulle was shown to be superior on two counts. 
The two angles on the liberation discussed above formed a heroic portrait of de Gaulle's 
contribution to national revival. The liberation highlighted the completion of the mission that 
he had accepted in June 1940. The rhetorical gambit was a delicate one. It appears that all the 
Gaullist historians had sought to use the liberation period to underline the significance of the 
General's actions in 1940, and the equally symbolic power of the errors which others had 
made. The representation suggested that the tragedies of 1940 had been corrected by the 
French military liberation of Paris, an event which was both predicated by, and predicted in, 
de Gaulle's 18 June appeal. To forget 1940 was to diminish the triumph of 1944. The former 
defeat was instrumental in the recollection of the latter victory. Moreover, it would be wrong 
to think that this was the only dimension to the Gaullist account. As I have stressed, writing 
on this episode of the war also had a more pragmatic, contemporary-political function. The 
historians had the opportunity to depict de Gaulle's effectiveness as a leader in the battle 
against communism. This was another powerful rehearsal of de Gaulle, `the anti-communist 
champion'. The implied message was that the General was the best equipped to manage the 
Cold War because he had already conducted an impressive demonstration of how best to handle 
the PCF, saving France from its grasp in the summer of 1944. 
Despite the powerful strand of glorification which marks the work of de Gaulle and 
Cattaui, as in the contemporary communist accounts of 1944 the Gaullists did not construct the 
19 As is now well known, de Gaulle had probably avoided a genuine PCF threat through his November 1944 
negotiations with Stalin. Infamously Stalin had advised, je connais Thorez et qu'ä mon avis, c'est un bon 
Francais... Si j'etais ä votre place, je ne le mettrais en prison.. . du moms s pas tout de suite'. Moreover, the Yalta 
conference designated Soviet interests to the East, with France remaining in the Western sphere of influence. 
For the de Gaulle-Stalin interview see Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, Vol. 2,89-90. 
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early post-war era as an unmitigated success. For example, General de Gaulle resigned the 
presidency in January 1946, and subsequently the voters had ignored his constitutional 
preference. The nation appeared to be divided against itself, and even worse, under threat from 
a new external enemy, the USSR. The Gaullists accounted for these conditions in a second, 
considerably darker, commentary on the liberation era. As in the communist current, the 
liberation could not be seen as an unmitigated victory. For the historians to have done so would 
have appeared naive, and to have ignored many of the political events listed above. Instead it 
was far more credible for them to produce a second reading which reflected what Francois- 
Georges Dreyfus describes as the RPF's general mood of pessimism. 2° The year, 1944, was 
again discussed around a structure of negative arguments. 
In a continuation of the Red scare which had explained the detailed issues of the 
successful liberation of Paris, it was presented that despite the fact that a complete communist 
triumph had been thwarted by de Gaulle, several `political' factors had contributed to the 
continuation of a dangerously high level of communist influence on the post-war political 
system. This was a uniquely Gaullist type of anti-communism which was neither akin to the 
thinking of, say, a Winston Churchill in Britain, or a Joseph McCarthy in the United States. 
It is far closer to what we know about characteristic Gaullist perceptions of the French political 
class, as has, for instance, been illustrated in the studies of Touchard and Rioux. 21 Specifically, 
the anti-communist explanation of the post-war malaise was deeply influenced by that other 
Gaullist bugbear, dislike of the frailties of the parliamentary culture of the Third Republic 
which it feared was being imitated. The rhetorical assault linked the challenge of the PCF with 
20 Francois-Georges Dreyfus, De Gaulle et le Gaullisme, 124. While Jean Touchard highlights the scornful tone 
of many of de Gaulle's pronouncements in this period, Le Gaullisme 1940-1969,104-105. 
'` 1 Jean Touchard, Le Gaullisme 1940-1969,121; Jean-Pierre Rioux, "De Gaulle in Waiting, 1946-1958", in 
Hugh Gough and John Home (eds), De Gaulle and Twentieth Century France, 48. 
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the perceived failings in the constitutional system. In the appropriate chapter from the Trente 
ans collection, Michel Habib explained what had occurred between 1944 and 1948. The 
assessment reads: 
La minorite communisante du MLN rejoint le Front National et constitue avec 
lui le Mouvement Unifee de la Renaissance Francaise (MURF), filiale du parti 
communiste. Ainsi s'opere le regroupement de la Resistance ä la suite des 
partis. 
La vie politique se reveille donc, et dejä le parti communiste, bien que 
participant au ministere, pratique l'opposition latente, en critiquant les actes du 
Gouvernement dans son ensemble ou ceux des ministres non communistes, tout 
en `colonisant' le plus possible les departements qu'il detient. [... ] A l'image 
du parti communiste et pour lutter efficacement contre lui, les socialistes, le 
MRP et ä un degre moindre les moderes qui se regroupent en decembre dans 
le Parti Republicain de la Liberte (PRL) adoptent une structure hierarchisee et 
monolithique qui en fait d'enormes machines, tres disciplines, mais aussi trop 
exclusivement imbues de l'infaillibilite de leur propre doctrine et subordonnant 
trop souvent l'interet national ä leur interet particulier. 
Cette structure des partis a de graves repercussions sur la structure 
gouvernementale elle-meme. 22 
The first complaint lodged against the PCF was that its disciplined organisation had negatively 
influenced the wider political culture of the period. That is to say, Habib accused the 
communists of having participated in the disastrous game of `playing politics'. Habib suggested 
that the PCF had tempted the other political parties to return to structures of self-regulation 
comparable to those that had existed before the war. The Gaullists accused the parties of being 
more concerned with protecting their own self-interest than with defending the interests of 
France, or, as Habib asserted: `subordonnant trop souvent 1' interet national ä leur interet 
particulier'. The negative account of the errors of the post-war era focused, not on the PCF's 
version of Marxist-Leninism, but rather on its characteristics as a domestic political party. 
22 Michel Habib, " 1944-1948", in Parias (ed. ), Trente ans, 287-288,291. 
206 
They fused anti-communism with the politics of anti-politics. Habib continued: 
On ne peut en effet sortir de 1'alternative suivante: ou bien le cabinet forme une 
equipe homogene cimentee par la presence ä sa tete d'une forte personnalite, 
teile que le general de Gaulle, et dans ce cas, les partis ne s'estiment pas lies 
par les actes de leurs representants Bans le ministere et combinent les avantages 
de la participation et ceux de Popposition; ou bien les ministres restent 
etroitement dependants de leur parti et le gouvernement n'est plus que le reflet 
des divisions de ceux-ci et sombre dans l'impuissance. 
Le general de Gaulle ne fat pas longtemps ä s'apercevoir des 
inconvenients de ce systeme. 23 
A stalemate situation in which good government was an impossibility was felt to have 
developed. As might be expected, de Gaulle was himself separated from these events and 
pictured as an outsider who could immediately identify the weaknesses in the new Republic. 
This distanced de Gaulle from the perceived negative results of the liberation, and thus 
positioned him as the one leader who could rectify the Constitution (a point which was made 
in almost all the sample Gaullist writings). 
They grounded the black interpretation of the liberation in the issue of the Constitution 
and the party system. Seven years after Habib's account Cattaui perpetuated the picture in his 
biography of de Gaulle. Although we have seen this source frequently focused on `de Gaulle - 
the man', Cattaui also explained the mistakes of 1944/45 in terms of a communist intrigue. If 
anything, his accusations of conspiracy are more explicit than in Habib's analytical approach. 
Using the biographical form, Cattaui continued to claim that although de Gaulle had won the 
war for France, the political parties who had done so much damage in the 1930s had returned. 
Whilst not directly implicated in this process, by association the largest party (the PCF) was 
perceived to have organised the attack. 
23 Ibid., 291. 
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In its various manifestations, the negative treatment served two very important 
functions: it continued the attack on the PCF that had often been prominent in RPF 
propagandising, and secondly, it discursively linked the other political parties with a system 
of government which was associated with communism and with the ghosts of the Third 
Republic. 24 This refocused the readers' attention on the criticisms of the two Republics. 
However, both the positive version of the liberation and its negative counterpart were 
concerned with addressing the threat of communism. In the former, the account of the 
liberation was used to display de Gaulle's powers as an anti-communist campaigner, whilst in 
the latter they implied that the dangers of communism had continued after 1944-45 and 
therefore required de Gaulle's return to office. 
The Gaullist texts produced a second set of binary representations which forecast that 
the liberation had brought hope but equally a regression to the mistakes of the past. This 
orientation of history was dominant in all of the sources reviewed, especially when read 
alongside the implicit criticisms of the Fourth Republic found in their manipulation of the 
causes of the debacle. As a method of argument the dual account resembles the previous 
communist case, a fact which points to the underlying structural similarities which existed in 
the two currents' writings on the liberation. Whereas many scholars have rightly perceived 
ideological history writing to be very different across currents, the way in which the 
communist and Gaullist historians dealt with this subject reveals a degree of commonality of 
form. Gaullists were as aware as communists that the most effective way to discuss the 
liberation was to provide a subtle account which looked at its benefits and drawbacks. This was 
24 Notably anti-communist themes marked de Gaulle's speeches of 29 June 1947, performed in Lille, and July 
27 1947, made in Rennes. Charles de Gaulle, Discours et messages, Vol. 2 (Paris: Plon, 1970), 81-89 and 97- 
104. Whereas for a generally anti-Gaullist description of de Gaulle's anti-communism see Alexander Werth, 
France 1940-1955 (London: Robert Hale, 1956), 370. 
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a shared disposition because both sets of historians were trying to predict the implications of 
1944 without appearing one-dimensional or simplistic. The strategy which they developed was 
to offer two versions of what the liberation meant for the future, organising their material 
around the positive and negative aspects. Although displaying animosity towards each other, 
the historians were using a comparable framework to organise their interpretations. The PCF 
claimed that the negative events had been due to de Gaulle, whereas the Gaullists ascribed a 
similar role to the communists. 
The Purge: Suffering and Nobility 
The extreme right's re-interpretation of the liberation period began from a completely different 
perspective to either the communist or Gaullist writers. Whilst it is important to note that none 
of the selected extreme right-wing writers admonished the liberation, it is fair to claim that they 
were aggrieved at the manner in which it had been conducted. The key subject was the 
epuration. This in itself marks the extreme right-wing account apart from the other two 
treatments of the era. However, similarities of structures of argument recurred. Like their rival 
historians, Professor Louis Rougier, Jacques Benoist-Mechin and Pierre Hering organised their 
material on '1944-45' around two interconnected sub-interpretations. The texts provided a 
generally pessimistic reading of the purges which had been made against themselves and their 
fellow supporters of the Vichy regime. The historians sought to explain who, or what, had 
caused this unnecessary conclusion to the war. Their writing worked around the attribution of 
blame. In addition to this highly developed message, they constructed a second, more 
impressionistic view which was decidedly affirmative about what they perceived to have been 
the nobility with which key members of the extreme right wing had faced the onslaught. The 
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broad pattern of detailing the liberation between positively and negatively constructed events, 
identified in the communist and Gaullist texts, was echoed. 
Graphic depictions of the purge were common in all of the texts. The historians' 
exaggerated claims of anti-Vichy persecutions far outweighed the occasional reference to any 
anti-resistance/antisemitic atrocities which had been committed under the auspices of Franco- 
German collaboration. As we now know, much of this was based on fabrication and fear, 
rather than empirical evidence. Peter Novick's work on the scale of the purge has seriously 
revised the previously high mortality levels put forward by the extreme right wing and 
supported by the studies of Robert Aron. 25 Furthermore, Novick's work illustrates the wide 
sectorial variations which occurred. For example, publishers were more likely to receive lesser 
punishment than their authors. Equally cushioned were the hyper-conservative institutions of 
the Catholic Church and the Academie francaise. 
Monarchists, dyed-in-the-wool Petainists and neo-fascist members of the community 
could all agree that Gaullo-communists had persecuted their number after the war. 26 In addition 
to the more general exaggerations of scope, the writing on the purge worked around a series 
of accusations that sought to explain why such terrible things had happened to such good 
people. The historians could have framed all of this as another conspiracy theory (sometimes 
they did) but it is important to realise that they applied less esoteric explanations. Instead of 
intrigues, the alleged purge atrocities were simply classified as having been the natural side 
effect of the triumphs of Gaullism and communism. 
25 In Peter Novik's The Resistance versus Vichy (London: Chatto and Windus, 1968) it is accepted that 9673 
executions were committed during the purge. Previously Robert Aron had indicated the high estimate of 30,000- 
40,000 summary killings. A figure used in his Histoire de l'epuration, 3 Vols (Paris: Artheme Fayard, 1967, 
1969,1974). 
26 Their case has been paraphrased by Chebel d'Appollonia, L'Extreme-Droite en France: de Maurras ä Le Pen, 
276; Jean-Pierre Rioux, "Des clandestins aux activistes (1945-1965)", in Michel Winock (ed. ), Histoire de 
l'extreme droite en France (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1993), 215-241. 
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Considering extreme right-wing literary and journalistic sources, Nicholas Hewitt has 
shown how references to the Red Terror of 1793-94 framed the political group's interpretation 
of the purge. 27 This is also true of the historical sources which I have reviewed and in which 
the historians implied that another republican-motivated massacre had occurred. Hering, in 
detailing the perceived errors of Petain's trial, wrote that the events of the courtroom had been 
nothing less than `la replique fidele du Tribunal revolutionnaire de 1793'. 28 Similarly, Louis 
Rougier commented that Petain's fate had been uniquely French, unfortunately inspired by the 
nation's revolutionary past. With an additional observation on the English way of handling 
sensitive circumstances, he summarised: 
En Angleterre, on eüt confine le marechal Petain dans une belle propriete de 
1'Ile de Wight et on eüt donne consign ä la presse de se taire. Le monde 
s'etonnait de cette fureur jacobine qui consistait ä formuler la sentence avant 
meme que s'ouvrissent les debats. 29 
Yet suggesting that the extreme right-wing historians only manipulated 1944 through 
the vector of past animosities would be inaccurate. Representing the purge was not only a 
question of `Bridging the Revolution' . 
30 The historians tended to delegitimise the epuration on 
the basis of a series of more contemporary forces than those of the Convention. In the final 
chapter of Mission secrete ä Londres, Louis Rougier established a negative model of what kind 
of France was being built on the bones of the epures. His conclusion was a polemical warning 
27 Nicholas Hewitt, " 1944/1793: la droite intellectuelle et le mythe de la Terreur Rouge", French Cultural 
Studies, 5 (1994): 286-287. 
28 Pierre Hering, La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain, 127-128. 
29 Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres, 189. 
30 The phrase, `Bridging the Revolution' is from Robert Gildea's The Past in French History, 298, in which he 
uses it to frame his discussion of extreme right wing historiography. 
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that the key errors of the purge had not only been the false punishment of collaborators who 
had resisted but equally the unjust promotion of ignoble faux-resistants. He remonstrated: 
Ayant detruit la constitution, bouleverse l'administration, il [de Gaulle] lui faut 
payer les frais d'etablissement du nouveau regime. Les frais sont eleves, car, 
ayant fait appel ä 1'interet pour arriver, les dents des associes sont devenues 
longues. Tous les maquisards, de la premiere ou de la treizieme heure, les 
veritables et les simulateurs, les combattants et les terroristes, ceux du plateau 
de Glieres comme ceux du marche noir, revendiquent places et sinecures. Pour 
s'en faire une clientele, il triple, quadruple, quintuple le nombre des 
fonctionnaires, [... ] Il installe la bureaucratie la plus nombreuse, la plus 
incompetente, la plus venale que la France ait connu au cours de son histoire, 31 
The consequence of the Gaullist misunderstanding of the history of the war, and the purges that 
followed from it, was the creation of a top-heavy state that was incapable of competing with 
the rest of the capitalist world. Over-glorification of the resistance was not only presented as 
morally and historically wrong, but also economically disastrous. In addition to criticising the 
purge for its actual miscarriages of justice, Rougier slowly pieced together a dystopic vision 
of a future France in which de Gaulle had banished all that had been noble and efficient. 
Indeed, contra Harvey G. Simmons' recent analysis, nothing in the work of any of the 
historians suggests that de Gaulle acted as the `magnetic point toward which the entire French 
right wing turned after 1945' . 
32 Instead, hatred of the arrogant de Gaulle was the common bond 
which united the extreme right wing. 
Continuing his analysis of the bureaucratisation which he felt had accompanied the 
purge, Rougier detailed the indirect, but massive, economic consequences of 1944. He argued: 
31 Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres, 213. 
32 Harvey G. Simmons, The French National Front (Oxford: Westview Press: 1996), 20. 
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Pour payer ses creatures, il faut faire fonctionner `la pompe ä phynances'. Au 
temps de 1'occupation, la Banque de France virait quotidiennement au compte 
des autorites occupantes la somme de 400 puis 300 millions de francs. Au temps 
de de Gaulle, la planche ä billets imprime pour un milliard de francs par jour. 
Du 7 mars 1940 au 28 decembre 1944, le stock d'or de la Banque de France est 
demeure inchange ä 1778 tonnes: 40% du stock d'or en poids avait disparu. Les 
nationalisations precipitent la chute des valeurs en Bourse. La devaluation de 
la devise nationale est imputee comme un enrichissement sur lequel s'abat 
l'impöt de perequation. La poursuite des benefices de guerre se transforme en 
une veritable inquisition fiscale qui paralyse les chefs d'industrie. 33 
Rougier displays the range of issues and themes which extreme right-wingers raised through 
writing on the purge. The two examples from Mission secrete a Londres illustrate the notion 
that deep political and economic changes had accompanied the false treason trials. The extreme 
right wing was not only aggrieved at a miscarriage of justice, but also used the purge to 
demonstrate the society which they considered the Gaullo-communist liberation was founding. " 
Rougier's argument was based on a neo-liberal condemnation of state intervention in the 
market, in which the PCF was a target. 35 However, the accompanying portrayal of de Gaulle 
showed him to have been equally to blame. The Fourth Republic, far from being represented 
as separate and different from de Gaulle, was shown to be his creation. This, of course, was 
a major difference in tone from the Gaullist critique which, nevertheless, also used anti- 
communist rhetoric in order to pursue a reformation of the Fourth Republic's constitutional 
order. 
Jacques Benoist-Mechin was no less pessimistic about what 1944-45 had demonstrated. 
33 Louis Rougier, Mission secrete ä Londres, 214. 
34 The theme was repeated in the polemical attack on the Fourth Republic published by Jean Maze, Le Systeme 
(Paris: Editions Segor, 1951) a brief summary of which is given in Nicholas Hewitt, Literature and the Right 
in Post-War France, 59. Equally typical is Pierre Dominique, "Ugolin, le Pere Systeme, la seule cloche des 
Deux-Eglises: Le general a tout pour plaire", Rivarol, 21 June 1956: 16. 
35 This corresponds with Rougier's inter-war ultra liberalism, see Richard Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable, 
9-12,55. 
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In the final pages of Soixante fours he compared the legal basis of the Vichy state with the 
alleged illegality of the subsequent purges which were made against it. Just as Rougier had 
used the catastrophe of the epuration to illustrate the malicious forces of Gaullism and 
communism, Benoist-Mechin implied that democracy was much less interested in the rule of 
law in 1940 and again in 1944 than ever the authoritarian Vichy government had been. He 
wrote: 
Ainsi donc, en democratie, on peut lancer un pays dans la guerre sans un vote 
du Parlement, 1'y maintenir avec une voix de majorite, le saigner ä mort, en 
paraphant de son propre chef des accords qui ne sont soumis ä la ratification de 
personne; mais lorsqu'une majorite massive adopte une loi rigoureusement 
conforme ä la volonte populaire, et qui a pour seul objet le salut de la nation, 
celle-ci n'a aucune valeur parce qu'une infime minorite en a decide autrement? 36 
For Jacques Benoist-Mechin the purge could be used as another example of the false rhetoric 
of democracy, claiming that only in a so-called democratic society could a popular and 
legitimate government (the Etat frangais) be quickly denigrated by the wishes of `une infame 
minorite'. Again the history of the purge, here only alluded to, was employed to discredit what 
was considered to have been its cause, `democracy' 
In sum, representing the epuration established another derisive construction of France 
under the Fourth Republic. In this case, the very forces which had triumphed in 1944 were 
blamed for the purge and the subsequent crisis of the state. Without doubt the hatred with 
which the purge-liberation was viewed by the extreme right outweighed the communists' fears 
of a liberation trahie or the Gaullists' concerns about the constitutional system. Nevertheless, 
it highlights the fact that, in varying degrees and with different slants, all three currents of 
historians felt that the liberation had not created the France for which they hoped. There was 
36 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, Soixante fours, Vol. 3,619-620. 
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a propensity to understand the recent past as having produced a malign political order. 
Nonetheless, in the case of the extreme right it is less well documented that its 
historians were apt to provide another more confident version of events. The strategy was 
significant because it signalled that they had not been completely crushed. By praising the way 
in which key figures from the Vichy regime conducted themselves during the trials, the activist 
historians asserted that their political beliefs continued to be valid and had not been 
extinguished. The implication was that the seeds of future triumph were visible, even at the 
point at which many must have thought all was lost. 
As in the communist and Gaullist writings, the extreme-right historians did not 
conclude their portrayal in a cloud of overwhelming pessimism. Balanced with the explanations 
reviewed above, Hering and Benoist-Mechin derived comfort from the noble sacrifices which 
their ideological representatives had suffered. Whilst writing on the purge discredited opposing 
political actors (Gaullists and communists) and their core beliefs (for instance state economic 
intervention, or liberal democracy), the historians also manipulated the fate of Petain and Laval 
to emphasise their personal qualities of strength and dignity, which were then implicitly 
associated with either the political beliefs which they had held or the regime which they had 
established. For example, in the following passage Jacques Benoist-Mechin reviewed Laval's 
final confrontation with death. Comparing Laval's psychology in 1940 with his behaviour in 
1944, he wrote: 
Durant les j ournees qui vont du 2 au 10 juillet [1940], Laval ne deploie pas 
seulement un immense talent, mais une activite inoule. Alors que son fatalisme 
le predispose ä la nonchalence, il se depense en interventions, en demarches, 
en discours, et fait preuve d'une energie dont on ne l'avait pas cru capable. Elle 
dissout peu ä peu les petits cotes de sa nature, pour ne plus laisser apparaitre, 
ä travers ses regards et ses paroles, qu'un coeur dechire par les souffrances du 
pays. 
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Lors de son proces, il se debattra comme un sanglier blesse qui refuse 
de mourir. En juillet 1940, sa lutte est differente, mais eile n'est pas moires 
belle, car tous ses efforts sont diriges vers un seul but: empecher la France de 
perir. Et l'on saisit soudain la passion la plus profonde qui l'anime au delä de 
la richesse, au delä meme du pouvoir, c'est un amour brillant et forcene de la 
vie... 37 
The hagiography constructs Laval's trial and execution as a final challenge in the life of a great 
man. Laval's own efforts to protect himself in 1944 were carefully juxtaposed with those he 
had made for France in 1940. Benoist-Mechin's allusion to the purge, with its deliberately 
violent but heroic overtones - `il se debattra comme un sanglier Blesse' - suggested a dignity 
and beauty which he also showed to be a fitting conclusion to Laval's life. His unjust and 
violent death romantically underlined the qualities that he had possessed in 1940.38 Apart from 
the metaphysical deductions which might be drawn from the combination of a noble life and 
savage death it is important to note that this opinion relegitimated Laval's entire career. The 
emphasis on the tragic, almost Jacobean, nature of his demise was oriented to imply that his 
war had been equally meritorious. 
More widely acknowledged by commentators has been the equivalent tone in the case 
of writing on Petain. In his death, and the suffering which preceded it, Pierre Hering 
contended that Petain's concerns had only ever been for France, strongly echoing his famous 
phrase, je fais ä la France le don de ma personne'. Repeatedly, the extreme right wing 
stressed that Petain had accepted his punishment so that the people of France could be united. 
Hering writes, `Le Marechal, avons-nous dit, a tout sacrifie, jusqu'ä sa propre gloire, pour le 
37 Ibid., 591. 
38 A similar discourse was used in the case of Robert Brasillach. For example, see Maurice Gait, "Il ya six ans, 
Brasillach", Rivarol, 8 February 1951: 8. 
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salut de la France et du monde' . 
39 He concluded with a play on the theme: `Le Marechal n'a 
Tien d'un arriviste. 11 n'a jamais cherche ä se pousser. La gloire lui est venue toute seule et il 
n'a pas hesite ä la sacrifier pour le salut de son pays' . 
40 The writing functioned in support of 
Petain's legitimacy in 1940 and 1944. Like Joan of Arc before him, the extreme right 
characterised the Marshal as having been wrongly punished and as having sacrificed himself 
for a better cause. By implication this `better cause' was the Vichy regime. The portrayal of 
Petain's cruel demise only added to the myth of his life. In turn this implied that the epuration 
had witnessed a resurgence in national values, embodied in the leader's sacrifices. Although 
the period had no doubt been hard, the historians knew that all had not been lost. As for 
Petain, one can repeat Richard Griffiths' remark, `He became the embodiment of all that was 
best in the French nation, an almost religious figure whose final sufferings and imprisonment 
only served to enhance his sanctity'. 41 
Concluding Discussion 
The historiography inspired by the liberation testifies to the similar structure of argument 
across the three currents. That all of the selected historians divided the period into two broad 
patterns of writing which either glamorised the period, or decried it, is significant. It reveals 
the common form which all of the activist historians used to debate the meaning of the most 
recent episode from the history of the war. 
The strategy to detail the liberation in two different ways appears to have been the 
result of a common aim. Each of the historians preferred to await the full impact of the 
39 Pierre Hering, La Vie exemplaire du Marechal Petain, 127. 
40Ibid., 137. 
41 Richard Griffiths, Marshal Petain, 339. 
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liberation before ascribing it an exclusively favourable or critical interpretation. Identifying 
aspects of its history which were either beneficial or harmful to France allowed all of the 
chroniclers to imply that the object of their ideological preference had been responsible for the 
positive angle. Conversely, enemies were accused of having tarnished the hopes which 
naturally followed the end of the occupation. 
Writing on a period of history, the implications of which had yet to run their full 
course, meant that the historians had to be cautious. Offering a definitive account of the 
meaning of the liberation in the late 1940s or even the early 1950s would have appeared 
cavalier. A simplistic condemnation or tribute would have looked suspicious and only 
undermined the credibility which all of the historians required. Offering a positive and a 
negative interpretation allowed them to seem balanced, even when they were clearly pursuing 
an ideological line. Indeed, the dual pattern of argument allowed the historians to read 
subsequent events in two ways, either as following the implications of, for example, the 
national insurrection or the liberation trahie. 
The shared structures of argument also add to our knowledge of the more general 
political positions of the three ideological currents. That not a single historian viewed the 
liberation as an entirely positive national experience indicates the political difficulties in which 
the three ideological groups found themselves. Had any of the ideological groups been 
dominant, one assumes that their historians would have viewed the liberation in an exclusively 
rosy light. However, the complexities of the immediate post-war period meant that all three 
groups did not develop this position. Despite the fact that Gaullists and communists had done 
so much to bring about an end to the occupation, events had not worked out in their favour. 
For the PCF the early Cold War had proved trying. For the Gaullists, even after their initial 
electoral success (1947), the prospect of working within a parliamentary system which they 
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despised was problematic. In a sense because neither the French Communist Party nor the RPF 
controlled the Fourth Republic, its birth was likely to be cast in the dual manner which I have 
analysed. Unlike the more or less straightforwardly approving accounts of their respective 
resistance movements, PCF and Gaullist historians had to handle the liberation with care. One 
of the great ironies of the politics of the period and the historiographical works which it 
produced, was that the liberation, the apotheosis of the resistance, was not open to simple 
exaltation by a single group. Perhaps, this frustrating position contributed to the ferocious 
debates which were conducted over the meaning of Vichy, or in the language of Rousso, was 
a significant cause of the early stages of the syndrome. 
The most surprising feature of any of the currents is that the extreme right-wing 
identified limited aspects of the purge in an heroic manner. Often unmer: ±ioned in the several 
accounts of the faction in this period, this was an important part of its writing. Had the purge 
only been accounted for as a terrible trap in which the French had been captured, its activist 
historians would have been unable to offer their followers hope for change in the future. Even 
in one of their darkest hours, the extreme right were sufficiently lucid to remember that 
glimpses of strength maintain solidarity. The descriptions of the heroic suffering of martyrs 
served the purpose. To borrow a phrase from Susan Suleiman, the purge was viewed as the 
`delayed triumph of future good' . 
42 The implication was that knowledge of the enemy's actions, 
balanced with respect for the dignity which had been maintained by friends, meant that the 
extreme right would flourish in the future, a step which the publication of historical writings 
advanced. 
a` Susan Suleiman, Authoritarian Fictions (Princeton: Princeton University Press New Edition, 1993), 111. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DEGREES OF NEUTRALITY 
The aim of this chapter is to use the knowledge of the three currents to analyse more neutral 
historical texts. I examine four works on the occupation: Robert Aron's and Georgette Elgey's 
Histoire de Vichy, Andre Siegfried's De la IIF ä la IV Republique, Henri Michel's Histoire 
de la resistance, and Michel's and Boris Mirkine-Guetzevich's Les Idees politiques et sociales 
de la resistance. The affinities between the historians' writing and the extreme right-wing's, 
the Gaullist's and the PCF's interpretations are examined. A discussion of the problems of 
writing an ideology free account of the occupation concludes the chapter. 
Reviewing Ideological Alignments 
It has sometimes been argued that key histories of the war were either crypto-Petainist or 
crypto-Gaullist in their tone. Lucette Valensi and Marc Ferro have uncovered extreme right- 
wing sympathies in Aron's and Elgey's Histoire de Vichy. ' In recent years Aron's reputation 
has been seriously tarnished. 2 As I have shown, extreme right-wing journalists slowly 
recuperated Histoire de Vichy, a process which, to an extent, the Giraudist accepted. 3 As has 
been well documented elsewhere, his subsequent Histoire de 1'epuration is an exaggerated 
I Lucette Valensi, "Presence du passe, lenteur de 1'histoire", Annales ESC, 48.3 (1993): 493; Marc Ferro, 
Petain, 707-711. 
2 See for example, Zeev Sternhell on Aron, Neither Right Nor Left: Fascist Ideology in France (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1986), 284-285; whilst for Aron's wartime and post-war politics see his 
autobiographical work, Fragments d'une vie (Paris: Plon, 1981); Pierre Assouline, Une eminence grise: Jean 
Jardin 1904-1976,141-149. 
3 See Chapter II above. 
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account. ' Similarly Andre Siegfried, a doyen of French political science, has received 
comparable reproach. Despite being unable to link the historian to an extreme right-wing 
group, Jean-Pierre Azema contended that his interpretation of contemporary history contained 
Petainist ideological marking. ' Likewise, it has been gently implied that aspects of Michel's 
or the CHDGM's work lent support to a Gaullian view of the war. ' However, our knowledge 
of the three ideological currents brings a more nuanced view of the first wave of writing. The 
standard ideological alignments suggested by Valensi and others require greater clarification 
than has been previously offered. 
Robert Aron's, Georgette Elgey's and Andre Siegfried's Vichy 
At just over 720 pages, Histoire de Vichy was a comprehensive survey. Although written `en 
equipe' with Georgette Elgey, its cover bore only Aron's name. Principally, the historians 
narrated the political and cultural life of the regime, focusing on its internal ideological 
divisions, and external relations with Germany. They employed and evaluated many secondary 
sources which others had already produced (as we know, pro-Vichy enthusiasts had written the 
majority of these books). Aron and Elgey also discussed the differences of view contained in 
the growing literature, they looked to judicial evidence, and eyewitness testimonies from non- 
French sources, for example, the accounts of foreign diplomats, the Swiss Walter Stücki and 
the American Kenneth Pendar. ' Moreover, Aron's journalistic experience makes the account 
4 Robert Aron, Histoire de 1'epuration. 
'Jean-Pierre Azema, "Vichy et la memoire savante", in Azema and Bedarida (eds), Le Regime de Vichy et les 
Francais, 26-27; while for a summary of Siegfried's academic career see Theodore Zeldin, A History of French 
Passions, Vol. 1,367-370. 
6Jean-Piepe Azema and Francois Bedarida, "L'Historisation de la resistance", Esprit: 30,31; Henry Rousso, 
Le Syndrome de Vichy, 285. 
7 Walter Stücki, La Fin du regime de Vichy (Zurich: Dresde, 1947); Kenneth Pendar, Le Dilemme France-Etats- 
Unis (Montreal: Beauchemin, 1945). 
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a fluent recit. His style is engaging, notably when developing several petits histoires of the 
regime. The detailed portraits which the historians produced of the more colourful figures who 
were drawn to collaboration are fascinating. They enhance the authenticity of the work. 
Valensi's judgement that Histoire de Vichy was a soft extreme right-wing interpretation 
rests on the fact that it offered a `double-game' theory which was akin to those produced by 
the extreme right. However, the work is not straightforward. Instead, the historians produced 
a representation which, on the one hand, was close to the interpretations of Rougier and others, 
while on the other hand, was significantly different from them. Indeed, Aron and Elgey 
suggest that Petain had tried to use the Vichy regime as a front for anti-German resistance. As 
Ferro has correctly analysed, they described several of Petain's circle as having engaged in 
resistance. ' Similarly, Ferro was correct to underline the authors' sympathetic discussion of 
the armistice, implying that Petain had not sought full collaboration. 9 Moreover, Aron and 
Elgey carefully depicted the Marshal: characterising his position in the following terms, `Il a 
choisi de ne pas choisir: ni collaboration militaire avec le Reich, ni resistance ouverte'. 10 This 
phrase suggests attentisme. It distances Petain from full military collaboration, whilst not 
separating him from the armistice and the German occupation. Nonetheless, the use of the term 
`resistance ouverte' implies a level of support for a secret anti-nazi strategy. This portrayal 
approaches one of the typical extreme right-wing defences of the regime. Specifically, it 
resembles Rougier's and Hering's opinion that Vichy had been central to the ultimate victory. 
The depiction confirms Rousso's subtle view that Aron's work was viewed with sympathy 
8 Marc Ferro, Petain, 708. 
9 Ibid., 708-709. 
10 Robert Aron and Georgette Elgey, Histoire de Vichy, 367. 
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from the right. " 
In addition, the historians argue that Petain's leadership was as honourable as de 
Gaulle's, and vice versa. Drawing on the belief that the two men had worked in harmony, the 
historians wrote: `Tous deux etaient egalement necessaires ä la France. Selon le mot que l'on 
pretera successivement ä Petain et ä de Gaulle: `Le Marechal etait le bouclier, le General 
1' epee' . 
12 As we know this is neither a classic extreme right-wing nor a classic Gaullist 
contention. Generally, historians writing within these currents either selected de Gaulle or 
Petain as the saviour of France. Gaullists were uncharitable towards the Marshal, whilst 
extreme right-wingers mocked the General. Thus, Aron's and Elgey's claim is closer to the 
position of Petaino-Gaullism adopted by Remy in 1950 when he argued that the nation had 
required both their sacrifices. For Aron, who believed in reconciliation between the French 
and the speedy amnesty of purge prisoners, this line bridged the antagonisms perpetuated in 
the mainstream Gaullist and extreme right-wing literature. In so doing it reveals his 
compassion for Petain. 
Nonetheless, not all of the interpretation presented in Histoire de Vichy contributed to 
a neo-Petainist rehabilitation of the regime. A significant aspect of the interpretation did not 
conform to the extreme right-wing or the Petaino-Gaullist patterns of writing. Although, they 
imply a double game, Aron and Elgey indicated that this had been an unsuccessful policy. 
Consistently, they establish the difficulties and weakness of Petain's position. For example, 
they portrayed his actions as having led to national abjection. For example, describing his visit 
to Metz in 1942 they wrote: 
11 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 291. 
12 Aron and Elgey, Histoire de Vichy, 94. 
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Recevant le maire de Metz, qui lui expose que les Alsaciens-Lorrains ont 
l'impression d'etre abandonnes par le gouvernment, Petain ne retient pas ses 
larmes... Reaction certes tres emouvante, mais qui n'apporte guere de remedes 
aux maux dont souffre la France. 13 
This judgement is not comparable with the work of Rougier, Hering or Benoist-Mechin. The 
view which it encapsulates denies the central purpose of the regime and Petain's belief in his 
own mission. Moreover, whereas the extreme right-wing historians suggested that Vichy had 
maintained its authority throughout the occupation, Aron and Elgey argued that the resistance 
movements had gradually won national support. Employing the Maurrassian terminology of 
the `pays reel' versus the `pays legal', the historians emphasised that as the war progressed 
Vichy had lost the trust of the populace. To paraphrase, whilst the regime maintained its 
constitutional status the historians underlined that it had lost its original legitimacy. " 
On several other symbolic issues, the historians did not support the extreme right- 
wing's standard account. Notably their depiction of the debacle and Petain's seizure of power 
cannot be approximated with any of the ideological stances with which we are familiar. Instead 
of welcoming Petain's rise to power the two historians questioned whether he was a 
responsible leader. Reporting on the events of summer 1940 they stated: 
Mais est-il vraiment l'homme exceptionnel que tout le pays attend? A-t-il les 
qualites superteures que necessiterait 1'evenement? Ou bien n'est-il pas surtout, 
comme il apparaIt en plusiers points de son portrait, l'homme des qualites 
moyennes poussees ä leur plus haut degre? Ne serait-ce pas a ce titre qu'il lui 
echut successivement de combler, puis de decevoir, l'attente anxieuse des 
Francais, en proie ä des circonstances qui eussent exige du genie? " 
13 Ibid., 522. 
14 Ibid., 594. 
15 Ibid., 37. 
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Clearly, this was not the response of a committed extreme right-wing historian. In fact it is 
nearer to a Gaullist's assessment of Petain's abilities. Evidence from Aron's and Elgey's 
writing on the 17 June repeats this type of analysis. In perhaps the most obvious opportunity 
to glorify Petain, the historians were cautious. Although they cited the speech in full, their 
commentary is not congratulatory. None of the enthusiasm displayed in the extreme right-wing 
current of interpretation is evident. Simply, Aron and Elgey explained that the speech had the 
negative effect of implying to the troops that the armistice had already been signed, thus 
sacrificing lives to the continued enemy onslaught. After citing the broadcast, they reminded 
the reader that: `Cet appel, entendu directement par les combattants ou retransmis par les 
Allemands, desarme nos dernieres troupes. Les Allemands vont le repandre dans tout les 
secteurs oil les Francais luttent encore' . 
16 In representing this central moment of Petain's 
career, the historians construct the event as having caused unnecessary military confusion. This 
is not an extreme right-wing mode of interpretation. Unlike Ferro, Valensi and others I cannot 
equate Aron's work with an unambiguously soft-Petainist depiction. 
On the other hand, neither can their interpretation be associated with the communists' 
nor the Gaullists' historiographic view. Unlike these currents, the historians did not suggest 
that Petain had taken office by conspiracy or betrayal. On the contrary, they emphasised that: 
`Jamais Petain ne complote'. 17 Instead, it was noted that a spectrum of political opinion had 
genuinely hoped Petain would assume a new position of authority. This assessment moves 
Aron's and Elgey's writing nearer to the work of Rougier and Hering. It also explains why 
extreme right-wingers admired Aron, though his writing was not consistently comparable to 
16 Ibid., 61. 
17 Ibid., 32. 
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their thinking. 
To review, Histoire de Vichy offered a negative double-game interpretation. Although 
the historians accepted that members of the Vichy government had turned to secret resistance 
they also frequently disapproved of the regime's actions. This included questioning Petain's 
abilities as chef d'etat and showing the steady decline to civil war. The representation is 
distinct from the classic extreme right-wing portrayal. In the work of Rougier, Hering, 
Benoist-Mechin and many of their colleagues, Main's actions were always favourably cast. 
As I have illustrated Hering considered that the Marshal had contributed to the liberation. 
Rougier claimed that Vichy had been triumphant. On the whole, Aron and Elgey avoided these 
arguments. They were critical of a number of Petain's decisions. Their interpretation brought 
a degree of solace to Petainists but it did not reproduce the panoply of extreme right-wing war 
myths. Aron's and Elgey's work is a complex account which cannot be easily associated with 
a clear ideological school of interpretation. 
A nuanced view of Andre Siegfried's work can also be presented. Published by the 
Bernard Grasset house in 1956, De la Ii! ä la IVY Republique included four chapters devoted 
to the occupation. The inventor of electoral geography discussed the fall of the Third Republic, 
the political composition of the Vichy regime, and analysed `L'oeuvre et la signification du 
regime'. Recently, Siegfried's thesis has been linked with the `defenseurs de Vichy' current. 
Azema has argued: 
il [Siegfried]a une formule qui deviendra classique: `I1 ya donc un Vichy de 
Petain et un Vichy de Laval'. Sans doute le jugement porte sur Laval est-il 
relativement nuance (`un aventurier de grande classe') alors qu'il denonce dans 
le Vichy de Petain la remontee pernicieuse de tendances autoritaires de la 
societe francaise. Mais, ä la these qu'il existe bien deux Vichy, totalement 
differents, se superposera aisement l'idee que le premier est le bon, et le second 
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le mauvais. 18 
This is a simplification of Siegfried's analysis. Certainly he had used the phrase which Azema 
cites, but it seems unlikely that it was intended in the way he suggests. In the chapter entitled 
`Le Vichy de Petain, le Vichy de Laval', Siegfried categorised the extensive variety of 
ideological groups which rallied to the regime. This was not a case of analysing Vichy in terms 
of only two of its key actors. The title denotes one of several internal divisions which the 
political scientist discussed. Siegfried noted that whilst Petain was an authoritarian in the style 
of Franco, the Marshal had also attracted support from, `Maurrassiens', `les technocrates', 
`L'Eglise' and `certains protestants'. 19 The classification of Laval as an `aventurier' and 
supporter of `fascisme de gauche' were further typologies in the range which Siegfried 
examined. Siegfried's analytical claim that Vichy was a multi-ideological regime does not 
imply that there was either a morally acceptable, or morally unacceptable, section within it. 
Simply, his argument indicates that support for Petain was politically diverse. 
In fact, like Aron's and Elgey's work, Siegfried offered what I have identified as a 
negative double-game account. As in Histoire de Vichy, the political scientist accepted that 
Petain had attempted to provide clandestine resistance. However, the characterisation was not 
enthusiastic. Sceptically, Siegfried questioned those who thought that the double-game had 
been a triumph. He wrote: 
Dans sa conception de l'armee, des groupements militaires ou paramilitaires sur 
lesquels il s'appuie, le gouvernment apparait bien comme le Janus ä deux faces 
d'une politique de double jeu. Le marechal n'est pas `collaborateur'. Avec les 
militaires restes ä ses cotes, il entreprend de refaire clandestinement une armee 
18 Jean-Pierre Azema, "Vichy et la memoire savante", in Azema and Bedarida (eds), Le Regime de Vichy et 
les Francais, 26. 
19 Andre Siegfried, De la III! ä la IV Republique, 85-87. 
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[... ] Que ferait-on de cette armee? Les tenants du double jeu ne le disent pas. 
L'histoire nous enseigne que, parmi les militaires, le plus grand nombre 
passeront ä la Resistance ou se rangeront du cote des Allies. 20 
Siegfried felt that the double game had been marginal and, to an extent, dishonourable. For 
instance, elsewhere in the text he described it as the `mesquin double jeu'. 21 On this point the 
work was significantly different from the extreme right-wing current's portrayal. Historians 
like Rougier saw the regime's strategies and gambits as having been relatively successful. 
Although the political scientist accepted that a double-game had been played, he was not 
convinced of its merits. For this reason it is a misconception to begin to align his 
representation with the extreme right-wing current of writing. 
Henri Michel's Resistance 
Histoire de la resistance and Les Idees politiques et sociales de la resistance were influential 
scholarly publications. In the following pages I will question whether Michel's writings in 
these works were open to ideological marking. 
On a range of historical episodes, it is true that Henri Michel employs a Gaullist 
interpretation of history. This is the case in his writing on the 18 June 1940 broadcast. On this 
episode the historian's description is very similar to those developed by mainstream Gaullists. 
In his single-authored `Que sais-je' history of the resistance, he spoke of the appeal in the 
following terms: 
Un appel ä tous ceux qui voulaient continuer la lutte etait ainsi lance du seul 
pays encore Bans la guerre ä ce moment: il etait notamment sous la fonnule: la 
flamme de la Resistance francaise ne doit pas s'eteindre et ne s'eteindra pas'. 
20 Ibid., 98. 
21 Ibid., 93. 
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De cet instant, la Resistance naissait. 22 
At this critical juncture, Michel supported the Gaullist myth. His discourse overlapped with 
the classic view developed by Madaule, Cattaui, and de Gaulle that the resistance was 
inexorably born on the 18 June. The case was repeated in the subsequent co-edited history. For 
instance, in his introductory essay to the work, Michel argued that `peu ä peu, la radio dice 
`anglaise' jouant un role preponderant dans ce rassemblement, tous les Resistants se 
considerent comme les soldats du General de Gaulle'. 23 The equation which implied that all 
resisters had been under de Gaulle's authority authenticated one of Gaullism's core messages. 
Equally, it denied the veracity of the communists' or the extreme right wing's interpretations. 
Furthermore, the historian's sympathy did not only mean the approval of a selection 
of Gaullist views but also the de-legitimation of the PCF's claim to represent the national 
resistance. Characterising the French Communist Party's efforts in Les Idees politiques et 
sociales de la resistance, he instructed that their historiography was difficult to distinguish 
from propaganda. He explained that the communists' actions between 1940 and 1941 had 
included a tentative acceptance of the German invasion and the Vichy regime. In a typical 
denunciation of the PCF's Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact policy, Michel revealed that `l'autorisation 
sera demandee ä Hitler, apres l'armistice, de faire reparaitre l'Humanite'. 24 Although he 
acknowledged the Party's significant resistance after 1941, he adopted an anti-communist 
interpretation. Michel estimated that the PCF's command had worked only for itself, and by 
implication not for the national community. For example, he wrote: `Bref, le Parti Communiste 
22 Henri Michel, Histoire de la resistance, 7. 
23 Michel and Mirkine-Guetzevich, Les Idees politiques et sociales de la resistance, 23. 
24 Ibid., 27. 
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joue toujours son propre jeu'. 25 These assessments of the PCF are akin to those produced by 
mainstream Gaullist writers, including de Gaulle. That Michel not only supported the Gaullist 
view of itself but also rephrased the current's assessment of the PCF is indicative of his 
ideological alignment. 
Nonetheless, Michel did not consistently advocate a crude Gaullist interpretation. For 
instance, he was less charitable towards the General's team in London. Unlike the picture 
established by orthodox Gaullist historians, he described the Free French group as an internally 
divided organisation. He questioned the group's cohesion: `Ils sont trop divises, trop eloignes 
les uns des autres pour constituer un tout veritable, trop peu nombreux aussi pour que les 
oppositions d'idees ou de personnes ne s'exasperent pas au contact quotidien et ne se durcissent 
pas la formation de clans rivaux'. 26 This is not an equivalent view to the Gaullist interpretation 
in which they employed the Free French as a model for the RPF (see Chapter VI). These 
criticisms may suggest that Michel supported de Gaulle but wished to distance himself from 
his immediate political circle. 
Secondly, Michel also underlined the diversity of ideological opinions which motivated 
resistance. He discussed resistance activity of all types and highlighted the strengths and 
weaknesses of each group. His aim to examine all possible political shades is reflected in his 
selection of primary documents published in Les Idees politiques et sociales de la resistance. 
It included examples from communist resistance writings, as well as non-Gaullist right-wing 
texts. Similarly the introductory essay to the collection reviews `La France libre'; `Les 
Mouvement de Resistance' ; `Le Giraudisme' ; `Les Communistes' ; `Les Socialistes' and `Des 
Partis Politiques'. Notwithstanding what we know of Michel's judgement of the PCF, this 
25 Ibid., 28. 
26 Ibid., 17. 
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openness to the variety of resistance groups is very different from the discourse of the three 
dominant ideological currents. All of the activist historians claimed that their preferred political 
faction had been the major force in the resistance. They discussed the patriotic significance of 
their own movement whilst normally highlighting the threatening nature of the others. Michel 
does not always do this. In addition, he was also aware of the possibility of non-ideological 
motivations in resistance and the deep complexities of the period. For example, in a typical 
passage, he writes: 
Mais 1'adhesion a un Mouvement ne signifie pas 1'acceptation, nullement 
exigee, des idees defendues dans le journal. En temps ordinaire, l'abonne d'un 
quotidien y retrouve des theses qui lui sont cheres; l'affilie ä un Mouvement de 
Resistance, dans lequel il est entre le plus souvent par le hasard des rencontres 
et des amities, inclut dans ses täches de militant la diffusion du journal du 
Mouvement, mais peut tres bien refuser son accord ä teile ou teile We qui y est 
exprimee. 27 
This analysis is unusual. Despite Michel's confluence with Gaullism, it marks his work apart 
from it. The majority of ideological historians did not recognise the historic subtleties which 
Michel was acknowledging in his work. The historian captures a similar tone in the penultimate 
chapter of Histoire de la resistance which discussed `Le Martyre de la Resistance'. 28 Here, he 
reflects on the universal sacrifices of those who resisted. Describing the personal cost of 
resistance and the dangers of both the French police and the Gestapo, on this subject, the 
historian avoided using his account to privilege one type of political motivation over another. 
He ignored the claims of the PCF and the Rassemblement on the war dead. In their place, 
Michel portrayed an apolitical version of civic heroism. 
27 Ibid., 6. 
28 Henri Michel, Histoire de la resistance, 119-123. 
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In sum, Michel's publications combined a keen approval for de Gaulle's actions with 
a less partisan respect for all forms of resistance. The passage cited below illustrates both 
Michel's attempted neutrality and the influence of Gaullism on his work. In the final paragraph 
of Histoire de la resistance he writes: 
Cependant, en annulant la defaite provisoire, en redonnant ä la France sa place 
parmi les grandes nations, en ecrivant quelques-unes des plus belles pages de 
son histoire militaire, en provoquant un renouveau des plus belles vertus 
civiques et patriotiques, la Resistance a bien merite de la Patrie. 29 
This conclusion did not categorise resistance as belonging to a single ideological formation. 
Instead Michel honoured `la Resistance'. This was different from the communist historians' 
exclusive praise for the people's resistance or the mainstream Gaullist historians' propensity 
to conclude with discussions of General de Gaulle's contributions. To this extent Michel's 
writing did not correspond to either of these currents. Nevertheless, a tendency to support 
Gaullism is also evident. One can see that the actions which he associated with the honour of 
having fought in the secret war resemble the classic Gaullist explanations of why resistance had 
been necessary. As in the Gaullist current of historiography, Michel accounts for the debacle 
as a `defaite provisoire'. Similarly, he shows that resistance restored the classic Gaullian values 
of national prestige and rank. Reproducing the Gaullist language, he classified the resistance 
period as having been a process of national recovery and patriotic pride. It had resulted in a 
`renouveau des plus belles vertus civiques et patriotiques'. The influence of Gaullism on 
Michel's work cannot be ignored. 
In the light of the three ideological currents, a refined evaluation of the work of Aron 
and Elgey, Siegfried, and Michel has emerged. Aspects of their histories developed extreme 
29 Ibid., 127. 
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right-wing and Gaullist representations. However, this was not a simple propagation of either 
extreme right-wing or Gaullist views but rather a matter of subtle overlap. As exemplified in 
the final quotation from Michel, ideological shadings were nuanced and often balanced with 
less, or differently, coloured perspectives. This is the case in Aron's and Elgey's description 
of Petain's 17 June speech and Michel's comments on the Free French group. In addition to 
using well-known politically marked arguments the historians frequently wrote about the war 
in ways which transcended the ideological codes with which they have been sometimes 
associated in the secondary literature. 
Writing Non-Ideologically-Coloured Accounts of the Occupation. 
Empirical evidence suggests that producing an ideology-free depiction of the occupation was 
highly problematic because of the network of political divisions which encased the key issues 
of the war experience. On almost any given topic a three-way ideological debate raged. This 
meant that historical assessments could be quickly labelled and associated with one of the 
dominant currents of interpretation. The cumulative effect of these types of interpretative 
polarisations was to make the historian walk an ideological tightrope. His or her examination 
of any topic was likely to either alienate or attract one of the three common ideological slants. 
A matrix of political convictions had captured the subject. 
We can expand on Henry Rousso's comparison between the symbolic power of the 
Dreyfus Affair and Vichy. 30 Whereas, broadly speaking the Dreyfus case produced Dreyfusard 
and Anti-Dreyfusard interpretations, the occupation period resulted in more complex divisions. 
The war and occupation was not a single legal case in which innocence or guilt had to be 
proved. Instead, over the period which the historians' charted, layer upon layer of ideological 
30 Henry Rousso, Le Syndrome de Vichy, 335. 
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divisions and complex similarities were formed. De Gaulle's flight to London, the nature of 
resistance and Vichy were all eruneshed in the conflicting representations of the ideological 
currents. Further controversies within the currents themselves complicated the more 
straightforward tri-polar cleavages. The historical meaning of a figure such as Pierre Laval 
provoked internecine fractures between extreme right-wing historians. The scale of the 
interpretative web which I have illustrated made disconnection from all of the established 
ideological views extremely difficult. 
The power of the ideological historian's grip on the occupation was self-perpetuating. 
When historians published new accounts, society judged them on their proximity to the well 
known fracture points. Classically, this was the case with Aron's and Elgey's Histoire de 
Vichy. It attracted support from the extreme right because it conformed to aspects of the 
group's view of the period and openly contested Gaullist and communist representations. It did 
not matter that the work was also at variance with significant aspects of extreme right-wing 
dogma. New evidence, primary or secondary, was likely to be seen to legitimate or debunk one 
of the three ideological currents. Potentially, this meant that almost any portrayal of Vichy 
could be called into the service of an ideological argument. The polarities of debate had the 
power to filter writings on the occupation into ideological positions which were not always 
appropriate. 
Despite this phenomenon, as I have illustrated in this chapter, it was possible to 
produce historical writing which at least partially voiced an ideology-free interpretation. There 
were signs that historians represented Vichy and resistance in ways that did not always comply 
with clearcut ideological assumptions. In comparison with works produced within the three 
dominant currents, Aron's, Michel's, and Siegfried's books were less coloured. One can 
distinguish their texts from the ideological histories because of the variations of analysis, 
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flexibility of opinions, and inconsistencies of interpretation that they displayed. Whereas all 
of the ideological historians produced texts which maintained a complete ideological picture 
throughout their work, the examples which I have drawn out show that contradictory political 
signals coexisted in the pages of the more scholarly texts. The political inconsistencies in 
Aron's, Siegfried's and Michel's writing would be almost inconceivable in the work of Thorez, 
de Gaulle or Benoist-Mechin. The variability of perspective demonstrated in the detailed 
examples analysed in this chapter suggests a move towards objectivity. 
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CONCLUSION 
The use of the past by activists to portray and influence the politics of the present was a normal 
activity. The work of Maurice Thorez, Charles de Gaulle and Jacques Benoist-Mechin 
demonstrates that a vibrant and healthy political culture had been fully restored to France by 
the late 1940s. 
Through charting the patterns of production, I have shown that inter-ideological 
confrontation was a consistent factor. Reaction to the extreme right wing's publications 
stimulated political passions, with the example of the Taittinger affair illustrating the milieu 
of litigation, polemic and, more rarely, physical violence. De Gaulle's war memoirs inspired 
similar responses from the left and right. This event launched a series of counter-projects, 
which included the intellectually skilled recuperation of Aron's and Elgey's Histoire de Vichy 
to the Petainist agenda. These episodes support the view that the early post-war period 
witnessed a civil war between the ideologies, with their representatives dominating writing in 
the field. Ideological production was deeply marked by waves of claim and refutation. 
Although all three currents published accounts, I have emphasised that the extreme 
right-wing historians produced books which were more influential than has been previously 
acknowledged. Historians such as Benoist-Mechin and Rougier found mainstream publishers 
who supported them, a fact which is further evidence of their current's growing cultural 
confidence. 
The thesis has shed new light on the figure of the activist historian and his writing. 
Comparative textual analysis of representative publications indicates the complex process of 
re-creating history. Writers offered accounts of the past which were both politically assertive 
and defensive. They sought to show their preferred ideological tradition in its best possible 
236 
light, while concealing those aspects of the national record which were likely to prove 
sensitive. Nonetheless, it has been a significant oversight in the secondary literature to equate 
this strategy with crude propagandising. A feature of each of the ideological currents was the 
range and detail of subject matter to be interpreted. The extensive analysis of structural 
features of the historiography has underlined the sophistication of the ideological producers. 
As we have seen, when it was advantageous to do so, particularly in writing on the 
debacle, historians of different ideological opinions shared perspectives. The writers were 
conscious of each other's viewpoints; with communists and extreme right-wingers reacting to 
the Gaullists' treatments of the 18 June broadcast. Moreover, the common desire to present the 
past as a model for future engagement linked each of the ideological currents. While it was 
always unlikely for a consensus to develop around the meaning of an event as symbolically 
important as the liberation, this thesis has shown that comparable rhetorical presentations of 
the episode formed across the currents. In short, the different groups of activist historians were 
sharp minded, even sometimes witty, manufacturers of persuasion. As such they employed 
similar rhetorical devices to prove their case. 
Several avenues of further research in the study of ideological engagement and 
historiography present themselves. The detailed analysis of the three ideological currents 
contained here opens the way for comparison with the political colouring found in other media, 
for example, in the early filmic portrayals of Vichy France. Given the nuanced understanding 
of each ideological current's interpretation which has been offered, further analysis may or 
may not suggest the political proximities of fictional pieces which resonate with the legacies 
of Vichy, such as Malle's Ascenseur pour 1'echafaud, or the first documentaries of the period 
like Resnais's Nuit et brouillard. Similarly, new research could examine the continued history 
of ideological interpretation of the war into the Fifth Republic. In the light of the detailed 
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picture of the activist historians' work in the period before the Algerian crisis, questioning 
whether decolonisation significantly altered the equivalent treatments produced during the 
1960s may prove valuable. 
Analysis of centre left publications in contrast with the PCF's or Gaullists' 
interpretations represents another possible direction for supplementary research. However, 
given that recent historiographic debate has centred on Aron and to a lesser extent Michel, a 
number of conclusions about their work can be drawn. The writers of a more neutral type 
should not be confused with outright political activists. While their interpretations are close to 
the ideological representations, they do not replicate them. It is a misconception to cast 
Histoire de Vichy as an example of a purely slanted text. This is a question of gradation of 
ideological shading. When the work of Aron and Michel reflected common politically coloured 
opinions, this was a sign of influence but not of unmitigated commitment. 
Following the interpretation provided by Henry Rousso, the study has shown that 
throughout the Fourth Republic historical interpretation was often based on factors related to 
inter-ideological conflict. However, one cannot confirm Rousso's view that de Gaulle's 
Memoires de guerre and Aron's and Elgey's Histoire de Vichy quietened the controversies of 
the immediate post-liberation era, or in any sense heralded a repression of debate. As has been 
shown, the events which surrounded the release of both volumes of de Gaulle's memoirs 
suggest a climate of heightened ideological activity and discussion of the meaning of both 
Vichy and the resistance. In addition, despite the many functional and structural commonalities 
which have been identified across ideological boundaries, one cannot agree with those scholars 
who have used Rousso's work to argue that a single national glorification of the resistance 
united French political culture at this time. Instead, the ideological historians continued their 
debates, using all manner of rhetorical device to pursue their different causes. 
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While some in the governmental offices of the Fourth Republic may have wished to 
modernise, the politically committed historians devoted their careers to arguing that the 
occupation remained significant. They told their readers that the past contained lessons for the 
present. This common investment in the belief that historical understanding provided answers 
to contemporary questions meant that the subject of the occupation retained significance and 
excitement, at least until a new national drama was played out in 1958. 
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APPENDIX I: THE APPEL DE MAURICE THOREZ ET JACQUES DUCLOS, 
AUGUST 1940, AS CITED IN NOGUERES, HISTOIRE DE LA RESISTANCE 
JUIN1940-JUIN1941,461-467. 
PEUPLE DE FRANCE! 
Notre Pays connait maintenant les terribles consequences de la politique criminelle 
suivie par des gouvernants indignes, responsables de la guerre, de la defaite, de 1'occupation. 
Des milliers et des milliers de jeunes gens et de peres de families sont tombes, des 
milliers et des milliers d'evacues chasses de leurs foyers ont connu le plus lamentable des 
exodes sur les routes de France, de nombreuses villes, de nombreux villages ont ete detruits, 
des malades et des blesses souffrent Bans les höpitaux, des centaines de milliers de prisonniers 
se morfondent loin de leur famille, des veuves, des vieux parents, des orphelins pleurent leurs 
disparus . La France meurtrie, douloureuse, trahie par ses dirigeants, subit la rangon de la defaite. 
Voila oü nous ont conduits les politiciens ä la DALADIER, ä la REYNAUD, ä la MANDEL, 
qui, soutenus par un Parlement de VALETS et de corrompus, ont pousse la France ä la guerre 
pour servir les interets des ploutocrates, pour supprimer les libertes publiques, pour faire 
regner la terreur, ecraser le peuple et porter les armes contre 1' U. R. S. S., pays du socialisme 
(envoi de materiel de guerre aux gardes-blancs finlandais et constitution de l'armee Weygand 
en Syrie). 
Les faits sont lä qui montrent ä quel point cette politique a fait faillite, ä quel point eile 
a ete nefaste. L'heure est venue de situer les responsabilites de tous ceux qui ont conduit la 
France ä la catastrophe. 
La clique des dirigeants banqueroutiers de la politque de guerre a beneficie de l'appui 
de tous les partis, unis dans une meme besogne de trahison et Bans une meme haine de la classe 
ouvriere et du communisme. Le Parti Radical avec ses Daladiers, ses Bonnet, ses Chautemps 
et ses Chichery; le Parti Socialiste avec ses Blums, ses Serol, ses Ziromsky, ses Paul Faure; 
les partis de droite avec Flandin, Marin, Fernand Laurent, Laval, Chiappe; 1'U. S. R., avec 
Frossard, De Monzie, Deat, Marquet; le P. S. F. , avec la Rocque et Ybarnegaray; la bande ä Doriot et les chefs usurpateurs de la C. G. T., les Jouhaux, Belin, Dumoulin, etc., sont tous 
responsables des malheurs de la France. 
La malediction de tout un peuple trahi monte vengeresse, vers ces hommes qui ont 
voulu la guerre et prepare la defaite. 
A cause de ces hommes, la moitie du territoire frangais subit 1'occupation de l'armee 
allemande, aux frais de la France, comme 1'indique le traite d'armistice. 
A cause de ces hommes, le Peuple de France connait 1'humiliation de cette occupation 
et ne se sent pas chez lui. Il voit, en meme temps, que he Gouvernement de traitres et de 
vendus qui siege ä Vichy en attendant de venir ä Versailles, pour imiter he sinistre Thiers, mise 
sur des concours exterieurs pour se maintenir au pouvoir contre la volonte de la Nation. 
Mais rien ne pourra empecher que les comptes soient regles et les masses laborieuses 
en demandant que la France soit aux Frangais expriment ä la fois la volonte d'independance 
de tout un peuple et sa ferme resolution de se debarrasser ä tout jamais de ceux qui font 
conduit ä la catastrophe. 
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SEULS, LES COMMUNISTES ONT LUTTE CONTRE LA GUERRE! 
Seul, debout dans la tempete, fidele ä sa politique de paix, noire Grand Parti 
Communiste s'est dresse contre la guerre, comme il s'etait dresse seul contre l'occupation de 
la Ruhr par Poincare, parce qu'il a toujours ete contre Poppression d'un peuple par un autre 
peuple. 
Nous, Communistes, nous avons defendu le Pacte germano-sovietique parce qu'il etait 
un facteur de paix, et des le premier mois de la guerre, alors que la repression s'etait abattue 
sur nous, face ä tour les profiteurs, affairistes et politiciens pour qui la guerre etait une 
fructueuse entreprise nous avons reclame la paix par 1'envoi d'une lettre des Deputes 
Communistes au President de la Chambre. 
C'est pour cela que ces deputes ont ete emprisonnes et condamnes, c'est pour cela que 
des milliers de communistes ont ete jetes Bans les cachots et les camps de concentration 
cependant que, sous la menace de la prison et du peloton d'execution, nos militants ont 
continue vaillamment la lutte pour la Paix. 
Desormais, chaque Francais est ä meme de constater que si les propositions 
communistes, toutes de clairvoyance et de sagesse, avaient ete suivies, la guerre avec ses 
desastres aurait ete epargnee ä notre pays. Mais les gouvernants francais qui Wont pas voulu 
la paix, ne se sont pas prepares ä la guerre et ont sciemment organise la trahison. 
Avant la grande offensive allemande de Mai dernier, politiciens et generaux francais 
ont fait la guerre ä l'interieur contre les ouvriers, et en meme temps ils ont desorganise la 
production, sabote la fabrication des chars et des avions, puise dans les stocks de l'armee 
francaise pour ravitailler les reactionnaires finlandais. Its n'ont rien prevu, rien organise, ils 
ont renoue la tradition d'incurie criminelle des generaux du Second Empire. Tous ces hommes, 
civils et militaires, ont trahi la France et sont indignes de la moindre parcelle de confiance. 
Seul, un Parti a vu clair, seul un Parti a eu raison, seul, un Parti n'a ete ni dupe, ni 
complice, seul un Parti a eu le courage de lutter; ce Parti, c'est le Parti Communiste Francais, 
Parti du Peuple, au service du Peuple. 
LA FRANCE VEUT VIVRE LIBRE ET INDEPENDANTE 
La France encore toute sanglante veut vivre libre et independante. 
Le peuple de France veut regler lui-meme, conformement ä ses traditions et ä son 
genie, les questions sociales et politiques surgies de la tradition des classes possedantes. La 
France ne veut pas eire mice au pas par les aventuriers de Vichy. 
Jamais un grand peuple comme le nötre ne sera un peuple d'esclaves et si, malgre la 
terreur, ce peuple a su, sous les formes les plus diverses, montrer sa reprobation de voir la 
France enchainee au char de l'imperialisme britannique, il saura signifier aussi ä la bande 
actuellement au pouvoir, sa volonte d'etre libre. 
Les politiciens, civils et militaires, ä la solde du capitalisme ont conduit le Peuple de 
France ä la guerre sous pretexte de defendre la liberte et, aujourd'hui, ils imposent leur 
dictature, parce qu'ils ne veulent pas rendre de comptes, parce qu'ils veulent que les 
ploutocrates puissent s'enrichir de la defaite comme ils se sont enrichis de la guerre. 
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Cela ne doit pas etre; cela ne sera pas! La France ne deviendra pas une sorte de pays 
colonise; la France au passe si glorieux ne s'agenouillera pas devant une equipe de valets prete 
ä toutes les besognes. 
La France doit se relever, eile se relevera; il le faut, dann l'interet meme de la fraternite 
des peuples, que, de toutes nos forces, nous voulons. 
La France doit se relever en tant que grand Pays avec son industrie et son agriculture. 
Aucun travailleur francais ne pourrait admettre que soient aneanties ou laissees ä 1'abandon les 
richesses industrielles de la France qui doivent revenir ä la collectivite nationale. 
La France doit se relever, mais eile ne se relevera que par le travail et Bans la liberte. 
Les usines doivent rouvrir et travailler pour les besoins quotidiens des hommes; les paysans 
doivent etre ramenes ä leur terre d'oü la guerre les a chasses en grand nombre. Ce n'est pas 
en enrölant des jeunes gens, ainsi que semblent vouloir le faire les traitres de Vichy, pour les 
amener ä la campagne, comme des serfs, que seront resolus les problemes economiques poses 
devant notre pays. 
La France doit se relever pour etre une terre de travail et de liberte, mais non une terre 
de servitude et de misere. 
QUI DONC PE UT RELEVER LA FRANCE? 
Qui pent relever la France? C'est la question qui se pose. 
Ce ne sont ni le generaux battus, ni les affairistes, ni les politiciens tares qui peuvent 
relever la France; ils ne sont bons qu'ä la trahir et ä la vendre. Ce n'est pas dans les milieux 
corrompus du capitalisme que peuvent se trouver les elements de la renaissance nationale. 
C'est dans le peuple que resident les grands espoirs de liberation nationale et sociale. 
Et c'est seulement autour de la classe ouvriere ardente et genereuse, pleine de confiance 
et de courage, parce que 1'avenir lui appartient; c'est seulement autour de la classe ouvriere 
guidee par le Parti Communiste, Parti de proprete, d'honneur et d'heroisme, que peut se 
constituer le Front de la Liberte, de 1'Independance et de la Renaissance de la France. 
Nous appelons ä s'unir pour sauver notre pays, pour l'arracher des mains de ceux qui 
I'ont conduit au desastre, les Paysans, les Petites Gens qui ont ete si abominablement trompes 
par le Parti Radical, les Travailleurs socialistes que le Parti de Blum et de Paul Faure ainsi que 
les chefs traitres de la C. G. T., ont places ä la remorque des potentats du capital, les 
travailleurs chretiens ä qui les princes de 1'Eglise ont preche la confiance en des gouvernants 
indignes, tous les Frangais honnetes qui veulent que la France se releve et se libere des chains 
du capitalisme qui a prepare le desastre pour detruire les conquetes sociales de 1936. 
L'Unite de la Nation peut se faire. Elle doit se faire et eile peut se faire tout de suite, 
pour alleger le fardeau de misere qui pese sur notre pays. 
Que tous les hommes et les femmes de bonne volonte, que les vieux et les jeunes 
s'unissent ä la ville, au village, partout, en des comites populaires de solidarite et d'entraide, 
pour organiser 1'assistance aux refugies, aux malheureux, aux demobilises, aux chömeurs, aux 
malades, aux blesses; pour organiser le ravitaillement qui, dans de nombreuses communes 
isolees n'est pas assure; pour creer d'un bout a l'autre du Pays, un esprit de solidarite 
fraternelle fonde sur le principe `Un pour tous, tous pour un'. 
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LA FRANCE AU TRAVAIL 
Mais s'il faut panser les plaies, il faut aussi reconstruire; reconstruire pour le bien de 
la collectivite et non pour fournir l'occasion de nouveaux profits aux maitres et proteges de ces 
Messieurs du gouvernement de Vichy. 
Il faut remettre la France au travail, mais en attendant, il faut assurer le pain quotidien 
aux sans-travail. Et pour remettre le pays au travail ii faut mobiliser les ressources de la 
Nation, en confisquant tous les benefices de guerre et en effectuant un prelevement massif sur 
les grosses fortunes. 
Il faut remettre la France au travail, mais pour cela les voleurs capitalistes doivent eire 
mis hors d'etat de nuire, les mines, les banques, les chemins de fer, les chutes d'eau et autres 
grosses entreprises doivent etre restitues ä la Nation. 
Il faut remettre la France au travail, mais pour cela il faut assurer aux petits et moyens 
paysans des livraisons d'engrais ä bas prix, livraisons que rendrait possible le retour ä la 
collectivite nationale des industries chimiques et il faut aussi remettre ä ceux qui les travaillent 
les grosses proprietes foncieres appartenant aux banquiers, seigneurs et autres exploiteurs du 
Peuple. 
Il faut remettre la France au travail, mais pour cela il faut que les pouvoirs puiblics au 
lieu de se desinteresser du sort des paysans fassent droit ä leurs revendictions: 
a) paiement des recoltes detruites ou perdues du fait de la guerre; b) livraison de 
semences selectionnees; c) paiement de dommages pour la reconstruction des maisons detruites 
et le renouvellement des instruments aratoires deteriores ou aneantis, ce qui donnera du travail 
ä de nombreux ouvriers; d) livraison d'animaux aux paysans sinistres pour la reconstitution du 
cheptel; e) versement d'une indemnite aux petits paysans sinistres pour qu'ils puissent vivre 
en attendant la prochaine recolte. 
II faut remettre la France au travail, sans subordonner la reprise de l'activite 
economique du pays au profit des capitalistes, et en s'attaquant, au contraire, aux privileges 
des classes possedantes. 
LES DROITS DU PEUPLE 
Le peuple a le droit d'exiger que son travail profite ä la collectivite et non ä quelques 
parasites capitalistes, et il a le droit de demander des comptes ä ceux qui ont fait le malheur 
du pays, fauteurs et profiteurs de guerre, ministres d'hier et d'aujourd'hui, generaux traitres 
et incapables. 
Le Peuple a le droit d'exiger la mise en accusation des responsables de la guerre et des 
desastres de la France. 
Le Peuple a le droit d'exiger la liberation des defenseurs de la Paix et le retablissement 
dans leurs droits et fonctions des elus qui ont combattu la guerre. 
Le Peuple a le droit d'exiger l'abrogation des mesures de dissolution prises contre les 
groupements politiques, syndicaux, cooperatifs, culturels et autres en raison de leur hostilite 
A la guerre. 
Le Peuple a le droit d'exiger le retablissement des libertes syndicales et le 
retablissement dans leurs fonctions des delegues elus et des conseillers prudhommes dechus 
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par le gouvernement des fauteurs de guerre. 
Le Peuple a le droit d'exiger la parution en toute liberte des journaux en qui il avait 
confiance, qui lui disaient la verite et qui ont ete interdits ä cause de cela. 
Le Peuple a le doit d'exiger que soient reconnus les droits sacres des mutiles, des 
veuves, des orphelins, des vieux parents dont le fils a ete tue. Les victimes de la guerre ne 
laisseront pas Petain declarer que 1'Etat ne fera rien pour elles en meme temps que les 
profiteurs de guerre gardent les milliards voles au Pays. 
Mais ces droits, le Peuple devra les imposer par son union et par son action. 
UNE PAIX VERITABLE 
Le Peuple frangais qui paie si cher les crimes des fauteurs de guerre, veut de toutes ses 
forces la Paix dans l'independance complete et reelle de la France. Il n'y a de paix veritable 
que dann l'independance des peuples, et les Communistes qui revendiquent pour la France le 
droit ä son independance proclament aussi le droit ä l'independance des peuples coloniaux 
asservis par les imperialistes. 
Au surplus, le Peuple de France peut constater que c'est guides par la haine du peuple 
que les gouvernants frangais nous ont conduits ä la guerre et se preparaient ä attaquer le Pays 
du Socialisme comme le prouvent les telegrammes echanges entre Gamelin et Weygand sur le 
bombardement de Bakou et de Batoum. 
L' U. R. S. S., de Lenine et de Stalin, pays du Socialisme et espoir des travailleurs du 
monde est le rempart de la Paix comme eile vient de le montrer une fois de plus en reglant 
pacifiquement avec la Roumanie la question de la Bessarabie et de la Bukovine du Nord. En 
defendant le pacte Germano-Sovietique, en aoüt 1939, nous avons oppose ä la politique des 
fauteurs de guerre la politique stalinienne de Paix et aujourd'hui nous avons conscience de 
servir la cause de la paix et de l'independance de notre pays, en demandant la conclusion d'une 
pacte d'amitie franco-sovietique. 
UN GOUVERNEMENT DU PEUPLE 
Pour relever la France, pour remettre la France au travail, pour assurer son 
independance dans la Paix, pour assurer la sauvegarde des droits du Peuple, pour liberer notre 
pays des chains de 1'exploitation capitaliste et de Poppression il faut chasser le Gouvernement 
de traitres et de valets dont le chef Petain a dit cyniquement aux blesses, aux refugies, ä ceux 
qui ont tout perdu: `1'Etat ne pourra rien pour vous. ' 
Le gangster de la politique Laval, le radical staviskrate Chautemps, les Socialistes 
Riviere et Fevrier, le P. S. F., Ybarnegaray et autres politiciens vendus ä la Frossard et ä la 
Marquet ont impose la Constitution de Vichy pour faire peser sur le Peuple de France la 
dictature des forbans. 
Avec la Constitution de ces Messieurs, plus de liberte d'opinion, de presse, 
d'association, plus de libertes syndicales, plus de pensions pour les anciens combattants, plus 
d'assurances sociales, plus d'elections pour designer les membres de la Chambre qui seront 
nommes par les Ministres, et puis enfin, un seul parti autorise, le Parti de Laval, La Rocque. 
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Doriot, Chautemps, Frossard, Riviere, Fevrier et Cie. 
La complicite du Parti Radical et du Parti Socialiste a permis ä Petain de se faire 
nommer dictateur, mais derriere lui c'est Laval, son remplacant eventuel, qui detient le 
pouvoir. A peine les Ministres radicaux et socialistes avaient-ils assure 1'etranglement des 
libertes publiques qu'ils disparaissaient de la scene pour laisser la place aux reactionnaires 
Lemery et Pietri et ä M. Mireaux, directeur du Temps, `la bourgeoisie faite journal', comme 
disait autrefois Jules Guesde. 
Ce Gouvernement de honte oü se retrouvent aux cotes de militaires battus, les Bazaine 
de 1940, et aux cotes d'affairistes notoires, des politiciens tares, deshonore la France. 
Voila travailleurs et democrates francais les resultats de la politique de Daladier, Blum, 
et consorts qui, en frappant le Parti Communiste francais, ont prepare la destruction des 
libertes republicaines Bans notre pays et viennent d'aider Laval, Marquet et Weygand ä devenir 
les maitres de la France. 
Mais le Peuple de France ne se laissera pas faire. A la ville, Bans les campagnes, dans 
les usines, Bans les casernes doit se former le front des hommes libres contre la dictature des 
forbans. 
A la porte le gouvernement de Vichy! A la porte le gouvernement des ploutocrates et 
des profiteurs de guerre! 
C'est un tout autre gouvernement qu'il faut ä la France. 
Un gouvernement que l'unite de la Nation rendra possible demain; un gouvernement 
qui sera le Gouvernement de la renaissance nationale compose d'hommes honnetes et 
courageux, de travailleurs manuels et intellectuels n'ayant trempe en rien Bans les crimes et 
combinaisons malpropres de la guerre; un gouvernement du Peuple, tirant sa force du Peuple, 
du Peuple seul, et agissant exclusivement dans 1'interet du Peuple. 
Voila ce que pense le Parti Communiste, voila ce qu'il to dit, Peuple de France, en ces 
heures douloureuses en t'appelant ä t'unir Bans tes Comites populaires de solidarite et 
d'entraide, Bans les syndicats, Bans les usines, les villes, les villages, sans oublier jamais que, 
tous unis, nous releverons la France, nous assurerons sa liberte, sa prosperite et son 
independance. 
Sous le signe de la lutte contre le regime capitaliste, generateur de misere et de guerre, 
d'exploitation et de corruption, qui a dejä disparu sur un sixieme du Globe, en U. R. S. S., sous 
le signe de la fraternite des Peuples, nous serons les artisans de la renaissance de la France. 
A bas le capitalisme generateur de misere et de guerre! 
Vive 1'Union Sovietique de Lenine et Stalin, espoir des travailleurs du Monde. 
Vive 1'unite de la Nation Francaise. 
Vive la France libre et independante. 
Vive le Parti Communiste Francais, espoir du Peuple de France. 
Vive le Gouvernement du Peuple, au service du Peuple! 
AU NOM DU COMITE CENTRAL DU PARTI COMMUNISTE FRANCAIS: 
MA URICE THOREZ JA CQ UES D UCLOS 
Secretaire General Secretaire 
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APPENDIX II: CHARLES DE GAULLE'S 18 JUNE BROADCAST AS CITED IN THE 
MEMOIRES DE GUERRE, VOL. 1,267-268. 
Appel du general de Gaulle aux Franfais- Le 18 juin 1940 
Les chefs qui, depuis de nombreuses annees, sont ä la tete des armees frangaises ont forme un 
gouvernement. 
Ce gouvernement, alleguant la defaite de nos armees, s'est mis en rapport avec 
1'ennemi pour cesser le combat. 
Certes, nous avons ete, nous sommes, submerges par la force mecanique, terrestre et 
aerienne, de 1'ennemi. 
Infiniment plus que leur nombre, ce sont les chars, les avions, la tactique des 
Allemands qui nous font reculer. Ce sont les chars, les avions, la tactique des Allemands qui 
ont surpris nos chefs au point de les amener lä oil ils en sont aujourd'hui. 
Mais le dernier mot est-il dit? L'esperance doit-elle disparaitre? La defaite est-elle 
definitive? Non! 
Croyez-moi, moi qui vous parle en connaissance de cause et vous dis que rien n'est 
perdu pour la France. Les memes moyens qui nous ont vaincus peuvent faire venir un jour la 
victoire. 
Car la France n'est pas seule! Elle n'est pas seule! Elle n'est pas seule! Elle a un vaste 
Empire derriere eile. Elle peut faire bloc avec 1'Empire britannique qui tient la mer et continue 
la lutte. Elle peut, comme 1'Angleterre, utiliser sans limites l'immense industrie des Etats- 
Unis. 
Cette guerre n'est pas limitee au territoire malheureux de notre pays. Cette guerre n'est 
pas tranchee par la bataille de France. Cette guerre est une guerre mondiale. Toutes les fautes, 
tous les retards, toutes les souffrances, n'empechent pas qu'il y a, dans l'univers, tous les 
moyens pour ecraser un jour nos ennemis. Foudroyes aujourd'hui par la force mecanique, nous 
pourrons vaincre dans 1'avenir par une force mecanique superieure. Le destin du monde est 
lä. 
Moi, general de Gaulle, actuellement ä Londres, j'invite les officiers et les soldats 
frangais qui se trouvent en territoire britannique ou qui viendraient ä s'y trouver, avec leurs 
armes ou sans leurs armes, j'invite les ingenieurs et les ouvriers specialistes des industries 
d'armement qui se trouvent en territoire britannique ou qui viendraient ä s'y trouver, ä se 
mettre en rapport avec moi. 
Quoi qu'il arrive, la flamme de la resistance frangaise ne doit pas s'eteindre et ne 
s'eteindra pas. 
Demain, comme aujourd'hui, je parlerai ä la radio de Londres. 
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